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ABSTRACT 
Values, rewards, uncertainty and risk play a central role in economic and psychological 
theories of decision-making. Over the past decade, numerous experiments have used 
neuroimaging techniques to uncover the neural realization of such decision variables while 
individuals engage in a range of tasks. These have led to a consensus that economic choice 
involves interplay between multiple systems that enjoy both cooperative and competitive 
relations. In this thesis, I utilize functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
computational formalizations of choice to explore how these different brain systems interact 
to support adaptive decision-making.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, I present data from a task in which the inclusion of a dynamic 
environment required subjects to sometimes approach an option they would normally avoid, 
or avoid an option they would normally approach. This allowed me to uncover brain systems 
that track time-varying components of the environment, or immediate reward information, 
as well as the mechanisms by which these components are integrated. I found that adaptive 
control in this context involves downstream integration, via functional coupling, of distinct 
decision components that are computed in separate, often widespread, networks. Yet, 
choice variables represented in the striatum may in some cases be resistant to modulation, 
contributing to maladaptive behaviour.  
In Chapter 6, I investigate whether task training alters the way in which these different value 
systems manifest in choice; or more broadly, whether value computations in the brain adapt 
as humans become more proficient at internalizing models of the world. To address this, I 
trained subjects on a value-guided decision-making task for 3 consecutive days. The data are 
suggestive of a shift in the implementation of value-guided planning with training, from a 
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more cumbersome, resource-dependant mechanism, to a more efficient and robust process 
that remains resistant to attentional load.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introducing neuroeconomics 
Humans and other animals are continuously required to make choices between alternative 
options or courses of action. Neuroeconomics is the study of underlying neurobiological 
processes that support such decision-making. Importantly, this field draws on economics, 
psychology, neuroscience and computational modelling, all of which are required for a full 
understanding of human behaviour. Neuroeconomics is typically studied in the context of 
behavioural tasks where subjects are provided knowledge of (or must learn about) a set of 
reinforcers and task contingencies that allow them to maximize rewards earned and 
minimize punishments or losses.  
To date, there is a broad consensus, supported by an array of both human and animal 
experiments, that choice involves assigning a ‘value’ to potential alternatives that compete 
such that the option with the highest expected value can be chosen (Basten, Biele, Heekeren, 
& Fiebach, 2010; Hunt et al., 2012; Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009; D. Lee, Seo, 
& Jung, 2012; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2007; Rangel & Hare, 
2010; Roesch, Calu, & Schoenbaum, 2007; Schultz, 2000; Strait, Blanchard, & Hayden, 2014; 
Wunderlich, Rangel, & O'Doherty, 2009). This process can be subdivided into five arbitrary 
stages, each equally pertinent for optimal decision-making and each evoking distinct 
computations (see Figure 1.1, p. 11). Although the precise organisation of these stages is still 
debated, they provide a useful breakdown of the decision-making process into separate 
components that can be investigated in turn. In the following section I introduce these stages 
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and include a brief synopsis of our understanding of the underlying neurobiology. I then 
summarize how the work presented in this thesis contributes to that knowledge.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Computations involved in decision-making; adapted from (Rangel, Camerer, & 
Montague, 2008). In order to initiate a decision, an agent must first identify and represent 
their internal state, the external state of the world, and the possible set of actions available. 
Next, a value must be assigned to each of these actions, which are compared so that the 
action with the highest expected utility can be selected. Once the chosen action is executed, 
the agent can then assess the desirability of the outcome. Any discrepancy between the 
expected and received outcome is used to inform future choice through learning. 
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1.2 The stages of value-guided decision-making 
1.2.1 Stage 1: Representation  
An agent wishing to make decisions within a dynamic environment must identify (and 
represent) a number of key variables that form an integral part of the decision-making 
process. First, the current set of internal states or motivations must be recognized. For 
example, an animal may assign a higher ‘value’ to water (and indeed experience it as 
intrinsically more rewarding) when in a thirsty state as opposed to a hungry state. Similarly, 
animals are more likely to exert effort for a food reward, such as pressing a lever, when 
hungry compared to when sated. Previously it has been suggested that internal states drive 
changes in behaviour through negative feedback mechanisms that aim to regulate 
homeostasis, or rather, to minimize the difference between the current state and a 
hypothetical physiological setpoint (Toates, 1986).  
While many behavioural characteristics are explained well by this framework, it has received 
wide criticism. Specifically, behaviours typically associated with discrete motivational states 
often occur in the absence of a negative feedback signal. For example, consumption of food 
or drink often precedes or anticipates physiological depletion (Toates, 1986). Further, food 
that is administered intravenously (and thus lacking any associated sensory properties) does 
not reinforce behaviours otherwise induced by motivated states. In this regard, rats do not 
learn to enact a response that results in intragastric feeding, but quickly learn to enact the 
same response when it results in the normal oral consumption of milk (N. E. Miller & Kessen, 
1952). Consequently, alternate models have been proposed which describe a more unified 
role for classical reinforcement learning and homeostatic regulation, whereby rewards are 
re-defined as action outcomes that reduce subsequent homeostatic drive (Keramati & 
Gutkin, 2011).  
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Relatively little is known about the neurobiology of how changes in internal state influence 
decision-making. The hypothalamus has long been implicated in homeostasis and in 
particular the regulation of energy intake (Dietrich & Horvath, 2013). For example, neurons 
in the arcuate nucleus and ventromedial hypothalamus regulate their activity in response to 
changes in the levels of metabolic fuels including glucose and fatty acids (Lam, Schwartz, & 
Rossetti, 2005; Minokoshi et al., 2004). But it is not yet clear whether the hypothalamus has 
a direct role in regulating decision-making. Interestingly, peripheral hormones that play an 
important role in the regulation of energy intake and appetite have been shown to act within 
key decision-making regions in addition to regulating hypothalamic function. For example, 
leptin administration alters activity levels within the human striatum (Farooqi et al., 2007), 
and it is thought that ghrelin signalling interacts with the striatal dopamine response in 
rodents (Narayanan, Guarnieri, & DiLeone, 2010). Yet the mechanism via which this might 
influence the valuation or subsequent action selection stages remains vague.  
It has recently been suggested that tonic dopamine, a neuromodulator that plays a crucial 
role in action, reward, and arousal, encodes the average reward rate of the environment, 
and is thus closely linked to motivation (Y.  Niv, Daw, & Dayan, 2005). This idea has its origin 
in a proposal that outcomes tend to have higher utilities in more deprived states, generating 
a higher average expected reward rate, and that this reward rate plays an important role in 
determining optimal response times. In brief, normative models predict that when an agent 
interacts with an environment where the average reward rate is higher, all actions should be 
performed at a faster rate, regardless of their outcomes, to preclude opportunity costs for 
future rewards induced by slow responses. The proposal that dopamine is involved in 
tracking this reward rate is corroborated by evidence that administration of L-DOPA, the 
precursor to dopamine, exacerbates the relationship between average reward and the 
vigour with which actions are emitted in humans (Beierholm et al., 2013). Yet, several open 
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questions remain, particularly regarding how internal states interact with different value 
systems to guide motivated decisions.  
In addition to the agent’s own internal state, other variables that need to be accounted for 
include the external state of the world, and the range of different possible options or actions 
that should be included in a putative value comparison process. For example, a different 
course of action may be chosen when in a volatile compared to stable environment, or in a 
high threat compared to low threat condition. Evidence from recent studies implicate 
prefrontal cortex (in addition to the parietal cortex) as important (Behrens, Woolrich, 
Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Glascher, Daw, Dayan, & O'Doherty, 2010; Ide, Shenoy, Yu, & 
Li, 2013; Kolling, Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 2012; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, 
& Behrens, 2011), and this will be discussed in the following sections. Finally, there is a dearth 
of knowledge regarding how the brain decides which actions to assign values to at this stage 
of the decision-making process.  
1.2.2 Stage 2: Valuation 
Given a representation of both internal and external states, and a set of candidate options 
or actions, the brain then needs to assign a value to each option so that the option likely to 
maximize the total expectation of reward and minimize the expectation of punishment can 
be selected. Much of the literature in both animals and humans has focused on the valuation 
stage. Correlates of the subjective value of goods have been found in a multitude of brain 
regions including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Plassmann et 
al., 2007; Sokol-Hessner, Hutcherson, Hare, & Rangel, 2012), anterior cingulate cortex (X. Cai 
& Padoa-Schioppa, 2012; Kennerley et al., 2009), parietal cortex (Hunt et al., 2012; Platt & 
Glimcher, 1999), amygdala (Jenison, Rangel, Oya, Kawasaki, & Howard, 2011), posterior 
cingulate cortex (Jocham et al., 2014; Kable & Glimcher, 2007), and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Kennerley, Behrens, & Wallis, 2011; 
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Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Plassmann et al., 2007; Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, & 
McDannald, 2011), with the two most reproducible regions in humans being the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and striatum (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013). In 
the non-human primate field, vmPFC, medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) and lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC) are considered anatomically and functionally distinct (Bouret & 
Richmond, 2010; Monosov & Hikosaka, 2012; Noonan et al., 2010; Rich & Wallis, 2014), 
although far more studies have recorded from OFC than vmPFC. By contrast, in human 
studies the vmPFC and mOFC are often conflated creating confusion over the appropriate 
nomenclature. This may partly be due to the poor spatial resolution of fMRI which makes it 
difficult to define a clear-cut anatomical boundary between these regions. Therefore, from 
this point on, when using the term “vmPFC” in humans I will consider this to include regions 
from both vmPFC and mOFC, but not LOFC.          
Some accounts posit that valuations in human vmPFC signal the difference in value between 
chosen and unchosen options (Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009; De 
Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Serences, 2008), and that vmPFC thus acts as a 
final value comparator (Hunt et al., 2012; Strait et al., 2014; Wunderlich, Dayan, & Dolan, 
2012). By contrast, others argue that the comparison process is resolved elsewhere in the 
brain (Basten et al., 2010; Morris, Dezfouli, Griffiths, & Balleine, 2014; Wunderlich et al., 
2009), and that the outcome is transferred to vmPFC, which encodes the final chosen value 
(Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Hampton, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2006b; 
Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Wunderlich et al., 2009). A recent experiment has also shown 
evidence that vmPFC may in fact encode the relative value difference between attended and 
unattended choice options (Lim, O'Doherty, & Rangel, 2011). Further, a multitude of work in 
both animals and humans now points towards the existence of at least three dissociable 
value systems: habitual, goal-directed and Pavlovian (Dayan, 2008). The neural and 
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computational basis of the valuation stage will be reviewed and discussed in detail in Chapter 
2.  
1.2.3 Stage 3: Action selection 
Once the brain has assigned a value to the options under consideration, an action must be 
initiated so that the agent can select the option deemed to generate the largest expected 
utility. Until recently, little was known about how the brain achieves this. Theoretical models 
have emerged from studies of perceptual decision-making that model binary choices in the 
perceptual domain as a race-to-barrier diffusion process (Heekeren, Marrett, & Ungerleider, 
2008). Although a variety of proposed model exist, the general principle is built upon the 
notion that evidence for each alternative option accumulates over time until one option 
surpasses a predetermined decision threshold, at which point that option is chosen. Further, 
it is thought that individual populations of neurons encoding each option inhibit each other 
such that activity only survives in the eventual winning pool.  
Indeed it has been shown these models accurately predict single neuron activity within the 
parietal cortex in non-human primates during perceptual decision-making (Shadlen & 
Newsome, 2001), though it has remained unclear whether the same mechanisms apply to 
value-guided decision-making. A recent study tested this precise hypothesis by investigating 
the temporal dynamics of valuation signals in local field potentials from 
magnetoencephalography data (Hunt et al., 2012). Interestingly, the authors found that the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC) matched the 
model predictions accurately, suggesting these regions engage in value comparison, whereas 
other regions associated with value matched poorly, suggesting they perform alternate 
computations that do not contribute to selection of an action. Follow-up work has shown 
that the PPC is more likely to support value comparisons during decisions under time 
pressure, whereas vmPFC takes on the role of a comparator when decisions are made 
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without time pressure, suggesting that parallel cortical mechanisms may resolve the same 
choices in differing circumstances (Jocham et al., 2014). Lastly, it is worth noting that recent 
neurophysiological recordings in animals have corroborated the notion from human 
neuroimaging experiments that vmPFC compares the value of choice options to enact 
decisions (Strait et al., 2014).  
1.2.4 Stage 4: Outcome  
Real-life decisions typically result in an immediate reward or punishment and a complex set 
of delayed consequences. Often, the outcome conveys meaningful information regarding 
how “good” the choice that led to it was, which is then used to inform future decision-
making. In human fMRI studies, activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (and other 
regions such as the amygdala (LaBar et al., 2001)) has been shown to correlate with 
subjective ratings of pleasure at the time of reward delivery for primary rewards 
(Kringelbach, O'Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 2003). Further, it has been shown that these 
signals subside when the subject is first fed to satiation and thus experiences the outcome 
as less desirable in the context of food rewards, or images of food (Fuhrer, Zysset, & 
Stumvoll, 2008; Kringelbach et al., 2003). Other regions implicated in outcome evaluation 
include the anterior cingulate cortex, which has been shown to activate in response to 
decision errors both in single neuron recordings and fMRI studies (Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Ito, Stuphorn, Brown, & Schall, 2003). Further, in non-human 
primates, neurons in anterior cingulate cortex respond to outcomes in a manner that 
depends on previous reward history, suggesting a role in the evaluation of choice outcomes 
(Seo & Lee, 2007). However, whether the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate cortex make entirely distinct contributions to outcome evaluation, or whether 
other regions are additionally involved, remains unclear. In addition, since the majority of 
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value-guided decision-making paradigms adopt outcomes that consist of immediate rewards 
or punishments, little is known about how the brain evaluates long-term consequences.  
1.2.5 Stage 5: Learning  
In order to improve future decision-making on the basis of outcome evaluation, the brain 
must update one or more of the representations discussed at stage 1, such that “better” 
actions can be chosen in the future. This is perhaps best understood and illustrated in the 
context of the habits system, or model-free reinforcement learning (MF-RL). The theoretical 
and computational premise underpinning this type of learning is that the brain estimates the 
difference between the expected value of an outcome and the actual value of the received 
outcome, a quantity termed a prediction error. This prediction error is used to update the 
value of the action that led to the observed outcome in a manner proportional to the 
magnitude of the prediction error (governed by a learning rate). In this context, the agent 
can learn an approximation of the true value of the action after several rounds of choices 
and outcomes, and thus optimize behaviour in the face of rewards and punishments 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).  
In general, reinforcement learning models, defined in terms of a Markov decision process, 
are characterized by: 
 a set of environment states, s ϵ S 
 a set of actions that transfer the agent between states, a ϵ A  
 a matrix that characterizes transitions between states, T  
 rewards, r, following state-action transitions in the environment 
 a policy, π, that assigns an action to each state (e.g. in accordance with a principle of 
reward maximization) 
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The goal of the agent is to learn a value function that predicts the sum of future rewards 
(from all forthcoming states) expected from a particular action at a particular state in the 
environment. Note that the value of arriving at a particular state has two components, the 
immediate reward or payoff associated with that state, and the value associated with the 
state change itself.  
Thus, by exploiting the recursive relationship between successive (and deterministic) states, 
one can define the value of state s1 as: 
𝑉(𝑠1) = 𝑟1 +  𝛾𝑉(𝑠2)  
where 0 < γ < 1 captures the discounting of future rewards, r1 is the immediate reward 
associated with state 1, and s2 is the sum of all future rewards associated with reaching that 
state.  
However, if state transitions are instead probabilistic, such that action a in s1 can lead to s2 
or s3, then the value of s1 depends on the values of both s2 and s3, weighted by the probability 
of reaching either state. In this context, the value of s1 can be rewritten as: 
𝑉(𝑠1) = 𝑟1 + 𝑝(𝑠2)𝛾𝑉(𝑠2) + 𝑝(𝑠3)𝛾𝑉(𝑠3)  
where p(s2) and p(s3) are transition probabilities from states 1 to 2 or 3.  
In fact, under the Markov assumption that the previous trajectory to a given state has no 
bearing on future state transition probabilities or future rewards, the value of any state 
(under a policy π) can be defined by the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957): 
𝑉𝜋 (𝑠) = ∑ 𝜋(𝑎|𝑠) ∑ 𝑝(𝑠′|𝑠, 𝑎)[𝑅(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑠′) +  𝛾𝑉(𝑠′)]
𝑠′𝑎
 
This equation can be solved by iteratively updating one state after the other until 
convergence. This requires knowledge of both T (transition functions) and R (the set of 
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rewards in the environment) so that the average reward over all actions can be computed. 
Reinforcement learning methods, most notably temporal difference (TD) learning (R. S. B. 
Sutton, A. G., 1998), attempt to approximate the Bellman equation without the need for 
explicit models of the world. To achieve this, we must revisit the notion that successive states 
retain a recursive relationship, where the value of a given state is equal to the immediate 
reward and the value of the following state. One can calculate the difference between these 
quantities and formulate the following update equation: 
𝛿 = 𝑉(𝑠𝑛) − (𝑟(𝑠𝑛) + 𝑉(𝑠𝑛+1)) 
δ, the prediction error, is used to update the value of the preceding state: 
𝑉(𝑠𝑛) = 𝑉(𝑠𝑛) +  𝛼𝛿 
where 0 ≤ ɑ ≤1 is a learning rate 
Thus, rather than storing all past rewards and performing an average every time it is 
required, temporal difference learning updates the predicted expectation of reward online 
and then simply stores, or “caches”, this representation.  
Remarkably, extremely reliable neural correlates of this prediction error signal have been 
found in both animals and humans. The first observations came from midbrain dopamine 
recordings by Schultz and colleagues in non-human primates (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 
1997). In this experiment, the researchers showed that single neurons increased their firing 
rate in response to unexpected rewards, but that after several consecutive outcomes the 
same neurons fired in response to the cue that predicted the same reward. Further, if the 
reward was subsequently omitted, the same neurons transiently decreased their firing rate 
in a manner predicted by a negative prediction error, or the unexpected omittance of a 
rewarding outcome. Since then, several fMRI experiments in humans have identified 
prediction error signals in the ventral striatum (Glascher et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2008; J. P. 
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O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003), which receives input from the 
dopaminergic cell bodies within the ventral tegmental area of the midbrain, supporting a 
role for dopamine in habitual or model-free reinforcement learning.  
So far I have discussed learning associated with a habitual controller, which does not require 
knowledge of transition or reward functions, but instead relies on trial-and-error. Somewhat 
more complex is learning associated with goal-directed or model-based choice. In this 
scheme, an agent makes choices by searching through a decision tree whereby the 
consequences of all possible sequences of actions and outcomes are simulated so that the 
best action at any given state can be chosen (Dayan, 2008). Thus, unlike habits which are 
retrospective, model-based action is prospective. A number of recent experiments have 
begun to unravel the neural underpinnings of model-based reinforcement learning. For 
example, neural correlates of state prediction errors that report discrepancies between an 
agent’s current model of the world and the observed state transitions resulting from an 
action have been reported in the intraparietal sulcus and lateral prefrontal cortex (Glascher 
et al., 2010). Further, a recent report has questioned the classical view that the ventral 
striatum exclusively supports model-free reinforcement learning by demonstrating that the 
BOLD signal in this region integrates both model-free and model-based prediction errors 
signals (Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011).  
There remain a number of open questions. For example, it is unknown whether the habit 
system can learn through observation without directly experiencing outcomes, or whether 
it can adopt more sophisticated computations with task training. Moreover it is unclear 
whether the habit system can learn adequately when the delay between action and outcome 
is temporally extended. Finally, the precise mechanism that supports a model-based system 
in learning action-outcome and outcome-value representations (that are needed to infer 
action values) is yet to be elucidated.  
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1.3 Summary of the work presented in this thesis  
Having described the key stages required for value-guided decision-making I now give a brief 
summary of the experiments reported in this thesis and how they address some of the open 
questions in the literature.  
In daily life humans make adaptive decisions by taking into account the current state of the 
external world and the future consequences of actions with regards to future states. 
Together these processes encompass portions of both stage 1 (representing the state of the 
external world) and stage 2 (evaluating the immediate and delayed consequences of each 
possible action). Importantly, a change in the current state of the world typically 
accompanies a change in the value of the options under consideration, which may drive 
subsequent switches in choice. In my first experiment, I characterized the computational and 
neural underpinnings supporting these aspects of decision-making. I used a novel sequential 
decision-making task where actions could bestow immediate rewards but also had delayed 
consequences. Subjects had to take into account both components when making choices 
and were often required to switch their responses based on the changing delayed 
consequences. This allowed me to investigate how the brain tracked changes in the 
environment to calculate the future costs of acting, and how these computations were 
integrated with representations of stimulus value. I used computational modelling in 
combination with a parametric fMRI design.  
In my second experiment I used a variant of the same sequential decision-making task to 
explore how subjects arbitrate between different components of value when they endorse 
opposing actions. In this version of the task, acting for a large immediate reward could have 
detrimental future consequences by diminishing the availability of reward later in a trial. 
Thus, in order to maximize monetary gain across a trial, subjects had to sometimes reject 
large immediate rewards, creating an incentive for self-control. Thus, I again focused on 
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stage 2 of the decision-making sequence, but with an emphasis on whether and how distinct 
value systems contribute to the valuation process. Importantly, the task was carefully 
designed to decorrelate the immediate reward associated with a stimulus from its overall 
value. Using computational modelling and fMRI, this allowed me to explore the neural 
correlates of each value component and their manifestation in behaviour. Importantly, I was 
able to address an ongoing debate in the literature where on the one hand choice is thought 
to be governed by a single common value system or alternatively by multiple value systems 
(Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & 
Cohen, 2004).  
In my third experiment, I again investigated how multiple value systems contribute to 
decision-making, but with an emphasis on the outcome evaluation and learning stages of the 
decision-making process (see stages 4 and 5). A prominent and contemporary account of 
learning proposes that one system, the model-based (MB) system, supports goals, whereas 
a second system, the model-free (MF) system, supports habits (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). It is 
thought that these systems act in parallel but it has also been shown that MB reasoning is 
impaired when prefrontal cortex function is disrupted or when working memory demands 
increase (Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013; Smittenaar, FitzGerald, Romei, Wright, 
& Dolan, 2013). It is well-established that task training, particularly in the domain of working 
memory, can increase successive task performance (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Shah, 
2011). By contrast, it remains unexplored whether frequent task performance alters the 
degree to which model-free or model-based control is dominant in choice in a similar 
manner. Here, I used a previously established multi-stage decision paradigm where model-
based and model-free strategies make qualitatively different predictions about how 
outcomes are used to inform future actions. I trained subjects to perform this task for 3 days 
so as to assess the impact of choice habituation on model-based or model-free decision-
making. I hypothesized that following training subjects would adopt a model-based strategy 
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even under high working memory load, suggestive of a change in the mechanism by which 
model-based calculations are implemented with increasing task exposure. 
While a wealth of value-guided decision-making paradigms have characterized neural 
representations of stimulus value, few have used sequential paradigms. The work presented 
here therefore offers valuable insight into our understanding of how the brain signals long-
term components of value and how this contributes to adaptive decision-making. I discuss 
my findings in the broader context of decision neuroscience and the implications for both 
healthy and maladaptive decision processes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Multiple value systems  
Here I return to the valuation stage of the decision-making process and provide a more 
detailed overview of the literature. As previously mentioned, there is now ample evidence 
pointing towards the existence of multiple valuation systems for decision-making, and these 
are outlined as follows. 
2.1.1 Goal-directed control  
In his seminal paper (Tolman, 1948), Tolman argued that animals negotiating a maze to 
harvest rewards develop a cognitive map of the environment (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978), that 
enables (through mental search) a pre-emptive evaluation of the best course of action. 
Contemporary accounts refer to this type of behaviour as goal-directed (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Rangel & Hare, 2010). Formally, the goal-directed 
system assigns values to actions by computing action-outcome contingencies, and evaluating 
the rewards associated with each respective option. Goal-directed behaviour is thus 
computationally synonymous with model-based choice (Daw et al., 2011; Dayan, 2008). 
Because the goal-directed system requires forward planning, it is computationally 
demanding. That is, in a sequential environment, goal-directed actions need not only 
consider the immediate consequences of an action but the total expected reward that is 
likely to result from all ensuing states and actions. However, it is this very property that 
makes the goal-directed system highly flexible. The nature of prospective planning affords 
an intrinsic revaluation of actions following a change in environmental contingencies without 
the need for experiencing new outcomes.  
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Consider, for example, the scenario in Figure 2.1A (p.27), of an animal navigating around the 
branches of a maze with the aim of locating rewards. In this example, the set of possible 
outcomes following a sequence of two consecutive actions includes a block of cheese, an 
apple, a drink of water, or no reward (X). Assuming the animal is placed at the entrance of 
the maze, the aim is to perform the sequence of actions that will maximize the total 
expectation of reward overall. The challenge here (even in this relatively simple example), is 
that maximizing total reward requires planning through both actions in the sequence, rather 
than just one action-outcome. Presuming the animal knows the layout of the maze and the 
locations of the respective rewards they can simply plan through each route and choose the 
pair of actions that will yield the largest reward under a given motivational state. Suppose 
the animal is routinely placed in the maze in a hungry state. The optimal action sequence in 
this case would be L-L which results in a block of cheese, their preferred food outcome (+4 
utils of reward). In contrast, suppose the animal is first fed to satiety and then placed in the 
maze. Here the optimal action course would be R-R resulting in water (+4 utils of reward). 
This is the essence of goal-directed control. The set of outcomes and the corresponding 
actions that yield them are explicitly represented, allowing online calculation of the best 
action under the present motivational state. 
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Figure 2.1 An illustration of goal-directed versus habitual valuation in a maze-like paradigm; 
adapted from (Y. Niv, Joel, & Dayan, 2006). The goal of the animal is to acquire the outcome 
that is most valuable given the current motivation state (in this example hungry or thirsty), 
by navigating from an initial to a terminal state via an intermediate state. (A) Assuming the 
animal is familiar with the layout of the maze, it knows, under a goal-directed system, that 
choosing L-L will lead to the block of cheese, the most desirable outcome if hungry (+4 utils 
of value), but that it should choose R-R if thirsty, leading to water (+4 utils of value). In 
essence, the animal can use knowledge of action-outcome contingencies in the maze to plan 
through each route and assign a value to each action pair. (B) Supposing the animal receives 
daily training in the maze and experiences all actions and outcomes on multiple occasions, 
the animal can then calculate an expected value for each action in each state, and cache this 
value for future use. Thus, if the animal receives training in the hungry state, then choosing 
L at the maze entrance acquires a value of +4 (based on the expectation of cheese at the 
terminal state), whereas choosing R acquires a value of +3 (based on the expectation of an 
apple at the terminal state). Thus the decision to go L at the maze entrance becomes 
habitual. While computationally efficient, this can be maladaptive under a change in 
motivation state.  
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2.1.2 Habitual control 
The second value system, the habitual system, is thought to be synonymous with model-free 
decision-making (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). The 
habit system learns to assign values to stimulus-response (S-R) associations, without 
explicitly representing outcomes. Thus, actions that lead to rewards or the avoidance of 
punishments are repeated, whereas those that lead to the converse are extinguished. S-R 
accounts of learning date back to experiments conducted by Thorndike (Thorndike, 1911), 
who concluded that animals can learn instrumental contingencies that are “blind to changes 
in the environment”. Unlike the goal-directed system, the habit system learns the value of 
actions slowly through trial-and-error. Further, while the habit system may assign the same 
value to an action as the goal-directed system in a stable environment, actions may be 
incorrectly valued following a change in environmental contingency, until the correct value 
has again been learnt.  
Let us revisit the maze-task in Figure 2.1B (p. 27). Supposing both the environment (the 
locations of the rewards) and the motivational state (hungry rather than thirsty) of the 
animal are constant over a prolonged period of time, the animal can learn that the action 
sequence L-L yields the preferred result. Thus, the animal can store or ‘cache’ a value for 
going L at the maze entrance, which represents the total expectation of reward at the end 
of the sequence. This is because the animal knows from experience that going L from the left 
room results in the cheese reward, and so by extension, going L at the maze entrance has an 
eventual expected value of +4 utils of reward. By contrast, the best possible outcome from 
choosing R at the maze entrance is the apple, resulting in +3 utils of reward. Thus, the 
decision to choose L at the maze entrance becomes habitual. The animal no longer has to 
plan through each route, and ceases to represent each individual action-outcome.  
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In a stable environment, the habit system is computationally efficient and highly 
advantageous. However, suppose that on one occasion, the animal is fed to satiety before 
entering the maze, devaluing the block of cheese from +4 to +1 utils of reward. The preferred 
outcome is now water (+4 utils of reward), which requires choosing R-R. Yet under habitual 
control, the animal will draw on cached values which incorrectly motivate choosing L-L. Thus, 
the habit system relies on re-learning the set of Q-values (the value of each action in each 
state) following a change in motivational state, and is less intrinsically flexible.  
2.1.3 Pavlovian control 
The third value system is the Pavlovian system. This system assigns values to a discrete set 
of actions that are evolutionarily advantageous, such as approaching stimuli that are 
predictive of water or food, and avoiding stimuli that are predictive of threat (Dickinson, 
1980; Huys et al., 2011). However, in some cases these innate or ‘hard-wired’ responses can 
be maladaptive (Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014). For example, in a famous 
experiment by Hershberger, a food tray was made to recede at twice the speed with which 
the animal approached, but would move towards the animal at twice the speed if the animal 
were instead to recede (Hershberger, 1986). The animals were unable to learn to overcome 
the prepotent drive to approach the tray for food, presumably demonstrating the influence 
of a Pavlovian bias. While it is thought that the Pavlovian system largely controls responses 
to a narrow set of predetermined stimuli, evidence indicates that through sufficient training, 
animals can learn to deploy Pavlovian responses to relatively novel stimuli. It is currently 
unknown whether there is a simple common Pavlovian system, or multiple systems that 
interact during choice. 
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2.1.4 Other value systems 
It is worth noting that a number of researchers have reported evidence in favour of multiple 
value systems operating in parallel in a context where it is not clear which of the three 
established value systems (if any) they map on to. For example, McClure and colleagues 
demonstrated that a different ‘value’ network is active when people choose small and 
immediate rewards compared to large but delayed rewards in a temporal discounting task 
(McClure et al., 2004). One might predict that a preference for immediate rewards would be 
subserved by brain regions previously shown to support habitual behaviour (Yin & Knowlton, 
2006) whereas a preference for delayed rewards would be subserved by brain regions 
previous shown to support goal-directed behaviour (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Morris et 
al., 2014; Rangel & Hare, 2010), yet the pattern of neural activations reported in the study 
did not necessarily support this account. Further, other researchers have noted that there is 
extensive overlap between the neural correlates of model-free and model-based valuation 
and that these systems may be more integrated than previously hypothesized (Doll, Simon, 
& Daw, 2012). For example, in rodents it has been shown that dorsolateral striatum is 
required for habitual control (Yin & Knowlton, 2006), whereas dorsomedial striatum is 
required for goal-directed control (Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005; Yin, Ostlund, Knowlton, 
& Balleine, 2005). Although these neighbouring regions are structurally similar, the 
expression of divergent functional computations is not surprising given their distinct 
anatomical connections (see Striatum, p 39).  
2.1.5 Arbitrating between the different systems  
A natural question that follows the preceding discussion is why are multiple value systems 
needed, and how does one arbitrate between the different systems when they promote 
divergent actions? I have already discussed that the model-based system is most useful in 
changing environments where one can update actions without the need for experiencing 
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outcomes. However, the difficulty of a tree search increases exponentially with increasing 
depth, making several model-based computations near-intractable. By contrast, the model-
free system is highly efficient in stable environments where only a limited set of values are 
cached, but can induce erroneous decisions in non-stable environments. Similarly, the 
Pavlovian system hard-codes a number of evolutionarily advantageous responses, but is 
limited to a narrow set of actions and can be maladaptive in complex environments. Given 
that each system possesses a unique set of advantages and disadvantages, it seems intuitive 
that being able to utilize all three would produce complimentary results.  
However, this still does not address how these systems interact during decision-making. One 
influential theory by Daw and colleagues proposed that the model-based and model-free 
systems trade-off according to two forms of uncertainty - knowledge and computational 
noise - which are tracked by each system (Daw et al., 2005). Then, the relative contribution 
of each system during choice should be directly proportional to their respective levels of 
uncertainty, with the system demonstrating the least uncertainty presiding. Very recently, 
this hypothesis was formally tested by Lee and colleagues using a clever behavioural 
paradigm in which on different trials the structure of the task favoured control by the model-
based or model-free system respectively (S. W. Lee, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2014). The 
authors demonstrated that the inferior lateral prefrontal cortex and frontopolar cortex 
encode the reliability (or uncertainty) of each system in addition to the relative comparison 
between the two quantities. Further, they reported changes in functional connectivity 
between these areas and regions within the striatum that support model-free control. Thus, 
model-free processing could be subject to top-down control by the prefrontal cortex when 
the output of a model-based system is deemed sufficiently reliable.  
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2.1.6 Summary 
In summary, there are thought to be at least three separate value systems for guiding choice 
distinguished as goal-directed (model-based), habitual (model-free) and Pavlovian. Broadly, 
goal-directed choice is thought to be subserved by the prefrontal cortex (and subregions of 
the striatum) while habitual choice is subserved by other regions within the striatum. The 
neural basis of Pavlovian valuation remains less well-understood. In section 2.3 I will review 
the neural evidence and validity of this conjectural distinction.  
2.2 Anatomy of the prefrontal cortex and striatum  
Today, there is a rich body of work in both humans and animals that implicates distinct 
regions of the prefrontal cortex and striatum in different facets of value-guided decision-
making, including goal-directed and habitual control (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Balleine & 
O'Doherty, 2010; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Valentin, Dickinson, & 
O'Doherty, 2007; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). In the following section, I will provide a brief (and 
admittedly highly simplified) anatomical description of these regions, including their 
respective delineations and projections. 
Crudely, the prefrontal cortex (PFC) can be anatomically divided into dorsolateral, 
ventrolateral, dorsomedial, ventromedial, frontopolar and orbitofrontal components, each 
with distinct anatomical projections and functions (Badre, 2008; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 
2003; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Petrides, 2005; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1999; Tanji & Hoshi, 
2008; Walker, 1940; Wise, 2008). Most knowledge about the anatomical connections of 
prefrontal cortex comes from experimental work in monkeys, whereas the functional 
computations subserved by these regions comes from both single unit recordings in monkeys 
and human neuroimaging studies. For this reason it is essential to have architectonic maps 
that are based on the application of similar criteria in the delineation of areas in both the 
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human and monkey cerebral cortex. One example of a contemporary numerical scheme used 
to delineate regions of PFC that is comparable between species is shown in Figure 2.2, where 
panel A shows the human brain and panel B the macaque monkey brain (Petrides & Pandya, 
1999). This work by Petrides and Pandya builds on historical cytoarchitectonic maps in the 
human and monkey brains by Brodmann (Brodmann, 1909) and then Economo and Koskinas 
(Economo & Koskinas, 1925), and later on by Walker (Walker, 1940).          
 
 
Figure 2.2 Cytoarchitectonic maps of the lateral and medial surfaces of the frontal lobe; 
taken from (Petrides & Pandya, 1999). (A) Human brain, and (B) Macaque monkey brain. 
Note that the present numerical scheme provides a basis for a closer integration of findings 
from functional neuroimaging studies in human subjects with experimental work in the 
monkey. 
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2.2.1 Lateral prefrontal cortex 
In lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), areas 9, 46 and 9/46 in Figure 2.2 constitute the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) while areas 44 and 45 constitute the ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). The basic architecture and anatomical connectivity of these 
regions is thought to be similar in the human and macaque brains (Petrides & Pandya, 1999, 
2002) (for a detailed cross-species review see  (Wise, 2008)).  
DLPFC and VLPFC are often viewed as part of two distinct, large-scale networks within the 
PFC respectively. DLPFC is part of a mediodorsal network originating from the periallocortex 
in the medial PFC, whereas VLPFC is part of an orbitoventral network originating from the 
periallocortex in the orbital PFC (Tanji & Hoshi, 2008). The orbitoventral network is 
characterized by multiple sensory inputs, including visual, auditory, somatosensory, 
gustatory, and olfactory (E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001). This pattern of connections suggests 
that this network plays a major role in receiving multiple sensory signals to retrieve and 
integrate necessary information. In contrast, the mediodorsal network receives inputs from 
multimodal areas in the temporal cortex or auditory areas in the superior temporal gyrus, 
and from the parvocellular lateral part of the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus  (Tanji & Hoshi, 
2008). This suggests that the dorsal network receives signals that are already processed and 
are multimodal in nature. Thus the dorsal and ventral parts of the LPFC seem to process 
information based on distinct inputs. Additionally, there are extensive interconnections 
between the two networks (Barbas & Pandya, 1989; Petrides & Pandya, 2002).  
The DLPFC has preferential connections to motor structures including the supplementary 
motor area (SMA), pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), the rostral cingulate, the 
premotor cortex, the cerebellum and superior colliculus, which may be important for its 
control over action (Bates & Goldman-Rakic, 1993; Lu, Preston, & Strick, 1994; E. K. Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). The VLPFC by comparison is linked with the ventral premotor cortex (Petrides 
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& Pandya, 2002). Wide areas of LPFC project to the dorsal striatum of the basal ganglia. These 
connections are topographically organised such that DLPFC projects mainly to dorsal and 
central caudate nucleus whereas VLPFC projects mainly to ventral and central caudate 
nucleus (Haber, Kunishio, Mizobuchi, & Lynd-Balta, 1995; Parent & Hazrati, 1995). These 
connections, as well as other major inputs and outputs of LPFC are summarized in Figure 2.3 
(taken from (Tanji & Hoshi, 2008)).    
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Figure 2.3 Schematic of the major input-output organization and cytoarchitecture of the 
lateral prefrontal cortex; taken from  (Tanji & Hoshi, 2008). The top panel refers to the 
mediodorsal network (red), of which the DLPFC forms an integral part, whereas the bottom 
panel refers to the orbitoventral network (blue), of which the VLPFC forms an integral part. 
The middle panel (green) refers to inputs and outputs that are common to both networks, 
where areas chiefly projecting to the orbital or medial prefrontal cortex, but less to the LPFC, 
are italicized. The left column refers to input structures, the right column to output 
structures, and the middle column to cytoarchitectonic boundaries. Rs = rostral sulcus; cs = 
cingulate sulcus; cc = corpus callosum; as = arcuate sulcus; ps = principal sulcus; mos = medial 
orbital sulcus; los = lateral orbital sulcus. PF, PFG, PG, PGm, and Opt are subareas in the 
parietal cortex (see (Pandya & Seltzer, 1982)). SII = secondary somatosensory area; LIP = 
lateral intraparietal area; CMAr = rostral cingulated motor area; pre-SMA = pre-
supplementary motor area. 
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2.2.2 Medial prefrontal cortex 
The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) can be split into dorsal and orbital (ventral) 
components. The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) spans areas 24, 32 and 33, and for 
simplicity will be considered as synonymous with the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in this 
thesis. Neurons in ACC receive afferent projections from the anterior medial, medial dorsal 
and parafascicular thalamic nuclei (Gabriel, Burhans, Talk, & Scalf, 2002). Other major inputs 
come from visual cortex, hippocampus, subiculum, entorhinal cortex and amygdala (Gabriel 
et al., 2002; Vogt, Rosene, & Pandya, 1979). There is also significant reciprocal connectivity 
between anterior and posterior cingulate cortices (Vogt et al., 1979). Anterior cingulate 
neurons largely project to most of the aforementioned thalamic areas, the subiculum, 
entorhinal cortex, pons, the basal ganglia (including the caudate nucleus and nucleus 
accumbens), and in primates, to multiple areas of the motor and pre-motor cortex (Gabriel 
et al., 2002). It is also worth noting that Goldman-Rakic and colleagues have demonstrated 
direct reciprocal projections of cingulate cortical neurons (in primates) to the lateral 
prefrontal and parietal cortex (Goldman-Rakic, 1988).  
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been proposed to span areas 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 
(Walker, 1940), though more recent studies have subdivided these regions further 
(Carmichael & Price, 1994). In humans the term ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is 
typically used to refer to a region that spans the medial OFC (mOFC) and other areas on the 
medial wall, though not the central and lateral regions of OFC (Kringelbach, 2005). OFC 
receives sensory inputs from gustatory, olfactory, somatosensory, auditory and visual 
regions, and is perhaps the most polymodal region of the cerebral cortex (Kringelbach, 2005). 
It has direct reciprocal connections with the amygdala, cingulate cortex, insula, 
hypothalamus, hippocampus, striatum, periaqueductal grey and DLPFC (Cavada, Company, 
Tejedor, Cruz-Rizzolo, & Reinoso-Suarez, 2000; Kringelbach, 2005).  
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It has been proposed that OFC forms part of a larger functional network known as the orbital 
and medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC), which includes parts of ACC and has unique 
anatomical connections with the rest of the brain (Carmichael & Price, 1994, 1996). Based 
on local cortico-cortical connections, two connectional systems or networks were recognized 
within OMPFC, which are referred to as the 'orbital' and 'medial prefrontal networks' 
respectively. The areas within each network are preferentially interconnected with other 
areas within the same network, and also have common connections with other parts of the 
cerebral cortex (Carmichael & Price, 1994, 1996; Ongur & Price, 2000). The orbital network 
is characterized by connections with several areas of sensory cortex, whereas the medial 
prefrontal network is characterized by its outputs to visceral control areas in the 
hypothalamus and periaqueductal grey (Price & Drevets, 2010). It also has connections with 
specific regions or cortex that include the rostral part of superior temporal gyrus, the anterior 
and posterior cingulate cortex, the entorhinal cortex and parahippocampal cortex (Price & 
Drevets, 2010; Saleem, Kondo, & Price, 2008).    
2.2.3 Frontopolar cortex 
The frontopolar cortex (FPC), commonly associated with Brodmann area 10 (though its 
precise cytoarchitectonic boundaries are debated (Ramnani & Owen, 2004)), is the anterior 
most region of PFC and one of the least well understood regions of the human brain (Christoff 
& Gabrieli, 2000). However, there is a broad consensus that FPC is important for high-level 
cognition, including the learning and representation of abstract actions and task rules, and 
influences processing in more posterior prefrontal regions (Badre & D'Esposito, 2009; 
Boschin, Piekema, & Buckley, 2015; Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999). FPC 
is unique in that it seems to lack connections with ‘downstream’ regions in the way that 
other cortical regions are connected. Instead, it shares reciprocal connections with 
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supramodal cortex in the PFC, anterior temporal cortex and cingulate cortex (Ramnani & 
Owen, 2004).    
2.2.4 Striatum 
The striatum is a subcortical structure that acts as a major input station to the basal ganglia. 
Anatomically it can be divided into the dorsomedial striatum (caudate nucleus in humans), 
dorsolateral striatum (putamen in humans), and ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens and 
olfactory tubercle, though the term ventral striatum is often synonymous with the former) 
(Balleine, Delgado, & Hikosaka, 2007; Haber & Knutson, 2010; Parent & Hazrati, 1995). The 
striatum interacts with the cortex via recurrent networks referred to as corticostriatal loops, 
classically divided into four loops: motivational, executive, visual and motor (Seger, 2008). 
Almost all of the cortex sends projections to the basal ganglia (including the striatum and 
subthalamic nucleus), which themselves project to output structures of the basal ganglia 
such as the globus pallidus, internal segment and substantia nigra pars reticulata. These 
regions project to the thalamus and then back to the cortex forming “loops” (see Figure 2.4) 
(Tekin & Cummings, 2002).  
Different cortical areas have predominant connections to different striatal regions and these 
are summarised in Figure 2.5, taken from (Seger, 2008). These connectivity profiles are 
thought to underlie differences in the role of the caudate, putamen and ventral striatum in 
decision-making (Balleine et al., 2007; Haber, 2011; J. O'Doherty et al., 2004; Yin, Knowlton, 
& Balleine, 2004), and these will be explored in detail in the following section (2.3). 
Importantly, the so-called “reward circuit”, first identified by the observation that rats would 
work for electrical stimulation in specific brain sites (Olds & Milner, 1954), forms an integral 
part of the cortico-basal ganglia system. The key structures in this network are the anterior 
cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, ventral striatum, ventral pallidum and the midbrain 
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dopamine neurons. Their anatomical projections (focusing on inputs to, and outputs from 
the ventral striatum) are shown in detail in Figure 2.6, taken from (Haber & Knutson, 2010).          
 
 
Figure 2.4 Corticostriatal circuits involved in decision-making; taken from (Balleine et al., 
2007). Recurrent loops from sensorimotor (SM) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPC) to 
dorsolateral (DL) and dorsomedial (DM) striatum mediate the acquisition of habitual and 
goal-directed control respectively. These connections feed back to the cortex via the 
substantia nigra pars reticulata/internal capsule of the globus pallidus (SNr/GPi) and 
mediodorsal/posterior (MD/PO) nuclei of the thamalus. A further corticostriatal loop 
involving the ventral striatum (VS) (and tonic dopamine release) influences the performance 
of the DL and DM loops through encoding reward acquisition and reward prediction. 
VTA/SNc = ventral tegmental area / substantia nigra pars compacta.  
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Figure 2.5 Illustration of the four major corticostriatal loops; taken from (Seger, 2008). 
Cortical input from different regions is kept separate as it projects to basal ganglia output 
structures, then back to cortex. This figure summarises the projection paths of different 
regions of frontal cortex to different parts of the striatum. These anatomical distinctions may 
underlie the varying functions of these cortico-striatal loops in value-guided decision-
making.  GPi = Globus pallidus, internal portion. SNr = Substantia nigra pars reticulata.  
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Figure 2.6 Schematic illustrating key structures and pathways of the reward circuit; taken 
from (Haber & Knutson, 2010). The red arrow refers to input from the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC); the dark orange arrow refers to input from the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC); the light orange arrow refers to input from the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC); the yellow arrow refers to input form the dorsal prefrontal cortex (dPFC); the brown 
arrows signal other main connections of the reward circuit. Amy = amygdala; dACC = dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex; dPFC = dorsal prefrontal cortex; Hipp = hippocampus; LHb = lateral 
habenula; hypo = hypothalamus; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; PPT = pedunculopontine nucleus; 
S = shell, SNc = substantia nigra, pars compacta; STN = subthalamic nucleus; Thal = thalamus; 
VP = ventral pallidum; VTA = ventral tegmental area; vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
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2.3 The neural mechanisms of value-guided choice  
The investigation of the neural substrates of goal-directed and habitual control in humans 
would not have been feasible had it not been for a generation of behavioural experiments in 
animals that helped to characterize and validate these two systems.  
2.3.1 Background 
Early experiments probed goal-directed and habitual control using instrumental conditioning 
paradigms (Colwill & Rescorla, 1986). Typically, rodents learn to enact a response, such as 
pressing a lever, in order to receive a rewarding outcome, such as a food pellet. After a period 
of training, the rewarding outcome would be devalued, e.g. a food outcome could be fed to 
satiety, or paired with a noxious substance. Next, the instrumental contingency is tested in 
extinction, i.e. the animal is now free to press the lever but without delivery of the associated 
outcome, or any continued reinforcement.  
Importantly, goal-directed and habitual systems predict a different course of action following 
outcome devaluation. If the animal’s choice is guided by a stimulus-response (S-O) 
association, then the animal should continue to enact the conditioned response even if the 
outcome is undesired. In other words, the disposition to press the lever should be under 
habitual control. By contrast, if the animal has learnt an action-outcome (A-O) association, 
less instrumental responding should occur as the animal has an explicit representation of an 
outcome that is no longer motivationally salient. Thus, behaviour in the latter case is said to 
be goal-directed. It is now more than 30 years since Adams and Dickinson first showed that 
rats trained to press a lever for sucrose reduced their responding in an extinction test 
following devaluation of the sucrose, confirming that animals are indeed capable of forming 
A-O associations (C. D. Adams & Dickinson, 1981). Interestingly however, S-O (habitual) 
control prevails in a context where the instrumental contingency is over-trained prior to 
44 
 
testing in extinction (Dickinson, Nicholas, & Adams, 1983), suggesting that behaviour is 
initially goal-directed (R-O driven), but transitions to habitual (S-R driven) with increasing 
exposure.  
These experiments were not only important as a proof-of-concept for dual systems in 
decision-making, but also formed the conceptual basis for a number of lesion and 
pharmacological manipulations that aimed to uncover their neural bases. These have 
revealed strong evidence in rodents that dorsomedial striatum is required for goal-directed 
behaviour (Yin, Ostlund, et al., 2005), whereas dorsolateral striatum supports habitual 
behaviour (Yin et al., 2004). These two regions correspond to the caudate nucleus and 
putamen in primates, respectively. Interestingly, lesions of the PFC, in particular the insular 
and prelimbic regions of PFC, induce similar deficits in the ability to appropriately adapt to 
changes in outcome contingency as those seen with lesions to dorsomedial striatum (Balleine 
& Dickinson, 1998), implying these regions may form part of a common functional network. 
In this section I will provide a detailed overview of what is currently known about the neural 
basis of value-guided decision-making, taking each anatomical region in turn.    
2.3.2 Lateral prefrontal cortex  
As previously mentioned, the LPFC can be anatomically delineated into the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, Brodmann areas 9, 46 and 9/46) and ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (VLPFC, Brodmann areas 44 and 45) (see Figure 2.2, p. 33). Although much of this 
section will focus on DLPFC, these regions have distinct functional roles in decision-making 
and these will be discussed in turn.  
Some of the earliest evidence relating neurobiology to human behaviour came from clinical 
observations of the effects of brain injury (Fellows, 2013), and It is well-documented that 
damage to the LPFC in humans is associated with a cascade of cognitive deficits, including an 
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impaired ability to recognize changes in the external environment, deficits in inhibitory 
control, and a reduced capacity for bridging together temporally segregated events (Manes 
et al., 2002; Owen, 1997). Further, lesion experiments in both humans and monkeys have 
revealed both a rostral-caudal axis in the organisation of cognitive control in LPFC, and a 
dorsal-ventral axis in the mid-lateral region of PFC (Petrides, 2005). These distinctions, first 
discovered in the late 1980s (Petrides, 1987) and early 1990s (Petrides, 1994) respectively, 
have since been supported by an array of functional MRI experiments in humans (Badre, 
2008; Koechlin et al., 2003; Petrides, Alivisatos, & Frey, 2002).  
Briefly, it is thought that the most caudal region of LPFC is involved in fine motor control and 
sensorimotor mappings, whereas more rostral region of LPFC are involved in higher-order 
control processes that regulate selection among multiple competing responses and stimuli 
based on conditional operations (Petrides, 2005). In this manner, posterior-anterior LPFC 
mediates progressively abstract, higher-order, and most likely hierarchical, control (Badre & 
D'Esposito, 2009). While the mid-dorsolateral PFC is thought to primary be involved in the 
monitoring of information in working memory (Petrides, 2000), the mid-ventrolateral PFC is 
thought to be involved in the active retrieval and manipulation of information held in 
posterior cortical association regions (Petrides, 1996, 2005). 
From a neuroimaging perspective, fMRI experiments suggest LPFC plays a central role in 
control processes that have a modulatory influence on decision-making and support goal-
directed behaviour (Badre & Wagner, 2004; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Johnson, 2001; Petrides, 
1996; Shallice & Burgess, 1996). These experiments have included tasks that require future 
planning and the calculation of long-term values (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Basten et al., 
2010; Glascher et al., 2010; van den Heuvel et al., 2003; Wallis & Miller, 2003; Wunderlich, 
Dayan, et al., 2012). Outside of the value domain, the DLPFC is recruited in tasks requiring 
executive or cognitive control (Badre, 2008; Badre & Wagner, 2004; M. M. Botvinick, Braver, 
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Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Knight, Grabowecky, & Scabini, 1995; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 
1999), and has been associated with the management of working memory (Barbey, Koenigs, 
& Grafman, 2012; Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003), attentional control (Knight et al., 1995), 
reasoning and planning (van den Heuvel et al., 2003), and action initiation (Frith, Friston, 
Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991). While VLPFC is also implicated in executive control, it is thought 
to have a much more focused role pertaining to the inhibition of unwanted or prepotent 
actions (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Braver et al., 2001). This is particularly notable in 
Go-NoGo or stop-signal tasks, in which subjects typically have to enact a speeded response 
on Go trials, but to inhibit responding when a NoGo trial is displayed (e.g. via a visual cue) or 
a stop signal is presented (e.g. via an auditory tone) (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984).   
Despite a growing consensus in neuroimaging that LPFC supports executive or goal-directed 
decision-making, it is important to note that lesion studies are not always consistent with 
this. For example, damage to LPFC in humans does not reliably disrupt working memory 
performance in delayed match-to-sample tasks (D'Esposito & Postle, 1999). Further, while 
some studies report that patients with LPFC damage show impaired decision-making in the 
Iowa Gambling task (Fellows & Farah, 2005; Manes et al., 2002) (a task requiring goal-
directed inferences (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994)), other studies report 
unimpaired performance (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Anderson, 1998). This has led to a 
degree of controversy regarding the precise role of LPFC in decision-making.  
However, it is important to remember that neuroimaging and lesion studies provide 
complimentary evidence. While neuroimaging relates measures of regional brain activation 
to behaviour, lesion studies examine whether a particular brain region is essential for a given 
process or component of behaviour. Thus, it is possible that in some cases, fMRI activations 
in LPFC represent processes that are merely correlated with those supporting goal-directed 
behaviour (Fellows, 2013). This potential criticism has at least partly been addressed by a 
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recent experiment that has provided a comprehensive mapping of multiple tasks (that 
measure both cognitive control and decision-making) in a large sample of well-characterized 
patients with focal brain lesions (including LPFC). Here, Gläscher and colleagues report that 
LPFC plays an essential role when competing responses need to be inhibited, and is recruited 
for functions such as error detection and conflict monitoring that are important for adaptive, 
goal-directed behaviour (Glascher et al., 2012).      
In a famous planning task, first designed by Shallice and known as the Tower of London task 
(Shallice, 1982), a player is presented with two configurations (a start state and a goal state) 
of three coloured balls arranged in three pins, and the objective for the player is to transform 
the balls from the start state into the goal state in the least number of moves possible (Figure 
2.2A, p. 33). While several variants of the task exist, in all cases, the player has to plan 
through the correct sequence of moves before initiating any action. It is well-established that 
the DLPFC (as well as the premotor cortex, supplementary motor area, striatum and parietal 
cortices) is recruited during the planning phase, with the BOLD response correlating with task 
difficulty (e.g. an increase in the minimum number of moves) (van den Heuvel et al., 2003) 
(Figure 2.2B, p. 33). Related to this, tasks that require switches in response or the resolution 
of conflicting responses, such as in the Stroop (Stroop, 1935) or Eriksen flanker (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) tasks, also reliably activate the DLPFC; although these tasks also famously 
recruit the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; see 2.2.3) (M. Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, 
& Cohen, 1999; Kerns et al., 2004).  
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Figure 2.7 A schematic of the Tower of London (ToL) task and the associated neural networks 
recruited during planning; adapted from (Newman, Carpenter, Varma, & Just, 2003; Saper, 
Iversen, & Frackowiack, 2000; Shallice, 1982). (A) In Shallice’s original task a player must plan 
an action sequence, comprising a pre-allocated number of moves, in order to transverse 
from an initial position to a goal position. (B) Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and superior 
parietal cortex are recruited bilaterally during planning, with the strength of activation 
increasing with task difficulty.  
A further role frequently attributed to the LPFC is the representation of abstract task rules 
(Stokes et al., 2013), such as where subjects are required to respond to colour versus 
orientation (W. Cai & Leung, 2009). For example, a number of recent studies using 
multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA; see (Haxby, 2012)) and decoding methods, have shown 
representations of task rules or contexts in distributed frontoparietal networks, including 
both the DLPFC and VLPFC (Reverberi, Gorgen, & Haynes, 2012; Waskom, Kumaran, Gordon, 
Rissman, & Wagner, 2014; Zhang, Kriegeskorte, Carlin, & Rowe, 2013). It is thought that 
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these representations provide a contextual bias on low-level perception, decision-making 
and action, allowing stimulus-response processing to align with internal goals (Waskom et 
al., 2014). Further, subjects with prefrontal cortex damage are unable to flexibly adapt to 
changes in such associative rules (Moore, Schettler, Killiany, Rosene, & Moss, 2009).  
While these data suggest that LPFC is engaged during goal-directed choice, many of these 
paradigms do not allow for attribution of specific computations to the underlying BOLD 
response, generating uncertainty regarding the precise contribution of LPFC. Recent 
experiments have attempted to address this using computational modelling and parametric 
fMRI designs to map specific neural computations relevant for goal-directed choice. For 
example, it has been shown that the DLPFC (in additional to the parietal cortex) tracks state 
prediction errors that encode discrepancies between observed state transitions and an 
agent’s current model of the world, a computation particularly relevant for model-based 
decision-making (Glascher et al., 2010). In the value domain, several recent experiments 
suggest that DLPFC supports choice by encoding goal values (Plassmann, O'Doherty, & 
Rangel, 2010), or by modulating representations of value in other valuation regions, such as 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and striatum (Diekhof & Gruber, 2010; Hare et 
al., 2009). Of special note, representations of subjective goal values have been demonstrated 
using fMRI in both the vmPFC and DLPFC in an economic auction paradigm where subjects 
bid for the opportunity to eat or avoid foods they liked or disliked respectively, and similar 
goal values have been identified in the non-human primate DLPFC (Wallis & Miller, 2003).  
Both the DLPFC and posterior parietal cortex are engaged during intertemporal choice 
suggesting these regions form part of a value network that is able to calculate long-term 
values, and this may be related to the exercise of self-control (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). 
Interestingly, a recent study has shown that the degree of effective connectivity between 
DLPFC and vmPFC (a region associated with the computation of stimulus values; see 
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Ventromedial prefrontal / orbitofrontal cortex, p. 52) was predictive of an individual subject’s 
propensity to discount future rewards in a similar paradigm (Hare, Hakimi, & Rangel, 2014). 
Other evidence that DLPFC supports self-control comes from a recent study where dieters 
made choices between food items rated according to healthiness and taste (Hare et al., 
2009). The researchers demonstrated that vmPFC tracked goal values independent of the 
degree of self-control, but while it incorporated a representation of both health and taste in 
self-controllers, only taste was tracked in non-controllers. Importantly, self-control was 
associated with increased activity in DLPFC and an enhanced functional connectivity 
between DLPFC and vmPFC, the latter suggestive of top-down modulation of a 
representation of value in vmPFC by DLPFC (Hare et al., 2009).  
Despite these advances, there are several open questions regarding the role of LPFC in goal-
directed choice. While a majority of decision-making paradigms involve one-shot decisions, 
real life requires making sequences of choices, each conferring an immediate reward or 
punishment and a complex set of delayed consequences. We know little about what role 
LPFC plays in estimating these long-term consequences or how this contributes towards 
adaptive decision-making. Further, it is not clear whether there is a single common value 
system (Hare et al., 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007) that guides choice, or whether separate 
systems calculate immediate and long-term components respectively (McClure et al., 2004) 
when choice is sequential. Several lines of evidence point towards multiple value systems, 
although there are differing accounts of the computations subserved by each system 
(Balleine, 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; McClure et al., 2004).  
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2.3.3 Anterior cingulate cortex  
It is worth focusing briefly on the anterior cingulate (ACC) region of dPFC and its relation to 
adaptive decision-making. It has long been known from neurophysiology studies that 
damage to the ACC results in impaired decision-making, particularly in the ability to adapt to 
fluctuations in context (Kennerley & Walton, 2011; Kennerley, Walton, Behrens, Buckley, & 
Rushworth, 2006). For example, ablation of dACC in humans results in an increase in the 
number of errors when subjects are required to flexibly respond according to a changing set 
of reward contingencies (Williams, Bush, Rauch, Cosgrove, & Eskandar, 2004). ACC is also of 
particular interest because of the myriad of roles it has been associated with, including the 
detection of decision errors (Braver et al., 2001), monitoring decision conflict (Kerns et al., 
2004), overriding prepotent responses (Liston, Matalon, Hare, Davidson, & Casey, 2006), and 
evaluating choice outcomes (Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004; Walton, 
Croxson, Behrens, Kennerley, & Rushworth, 2007). More recently it has been linked to 
foraging in the context of evaluating alternative choice options (Behrens et al., 2007), and 
the coding of state prediction errors or surprising events (Ide et al., 2013).  
Interestingly, several tasks that recruit the ACC require implicit representations of 
downstream consequence, and as such it seems plausible that ACC could have a common 
role in evaluating future outcomes during sequential choice. However, to my knowledge no 
paradigm has been able to formally address this. Moreover, while it is thought that ACC 
tracks decision variables that feed into the decision process, and is thus “pre-decisional” 
(Kerns et al., 2004; Wunderlich et al., 2009), there are also proposals that ACC signals 
outcome variables that can be used to inform future choice, and is thus “post-decisional” 
(Blanchard & Hayden, 2014; X. Cai & Padoa-Schioppa, 2012). Recent data from non-human 
primates suggests a dominant role for the latter, though conflicting evidence has left the 
issue controversial.  
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For example, in a recent experiment, Blanchard and Hayden showed that dACC signalled the 
value of foregone choice options, a post-decisional variable, when monkeys were performing 
a simple foraging task (Blanchard & Hayden, 2014). Further, lesion experiments suggest that 
ACC is essential for using extended action-outcome histories to learn the value of actions and 
optimize future choices (Kennerley et al., 2006). By recording neuronal activity from the PFC 
in behaving monkeys, Kennerley and colleagues showed that a portion of ACC neurons 
encoded the probability of reward during decision-making (a likely pre-decisional 
computation) in addition to the discrepancy between expected and experienced reward 
during outcome receipt – a post-decisional prediction error signal (see Chapter 1, p. 18-20) 
(Kennerley et al., 2006; R. S. Sutton, 1988). Recent experiments using fMRI in humans have 
provided corroborative evidence that ACC indeed encodes a prediction error signal for 
driving future decisions (Ide et al., 2013). However, other studies have noted that the BOLD 
response in ACC matches the output of a putative value comparator, and may thus be 
involved in the decision process itself (Wunderlich et al., 2009). Lastly, the computational 
role played by ACC with regards to evaluating future consequences, and how this is 
distinguished from more lateral regions of PFC, remains vague.  
2.3.4 Ventromedial prefrontal / orbitofrontal cortex 
I have previously discussed that in order to execute decisions that will yield favourable 
outcomes, the brain needs to assign a value to potential options in the environment. While 
correlates of goal value have been previously found in LPFC (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Litt, 
Plassmann, Shiv, & Rangel, 2011; Plassmann et al., 2007; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012), this 
region is more frequently associated with other types of representations, such as the state 
of the environment (Behrens et al., 2007; Yoshida & Ishii, 2006), the set of current task rules 
(Moore et al., 2009; Stokes et al., 2013), or the agent’s hierarchical goals (Hare et al., 2009).  
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In contrast, one of the most coherent findings in the field of value-guided decision-making is 
that the more ventral portion of PFC, in particular the vmPFC, is especially tuned towards the 
representation of value in humans (Boorman et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 
2007; Plassmann et al., 2007; Strait et al., 2014). This finding is illustrated in a recent meta-
analysis of BOLD response from an array of value-guided fMRI experiments (Bartra et al., 
2013), in which the vmPFC (in addition to the striatum) was a region most consistently 
implicated in value coding. As previously mentioned, vmPFC and medial orbitofrontal cortex 
(mOFC) are often used interchangeably in fMRI studies, and I use the term vmPFC here to 
include both regions when discussing human studies. 
Figure 2.8 (taken from (Bartra et al., 2013)) (p. 54) shows that overlapping regions of vmPFC 
and striatum reliably encode subjective value both at the time of making a decision and 
during receipt of the associated outcome. Importantly, valuations in vmPFC appear to be 
domain-general, with BOLD tracking subjective value for both primary (e.g. food) (Hare et 
al., 2009) and secondary (e.g. money) (Kable & Glimcher, 2007) rewards. This has led some 
to argue that vmPFC and striatum form part of a common currency valuation system (Hare 
et al., 2009; Kable & Glimcher, 2007), though others postulate that these regions operate on 
separate value systems that act in parallel (McClure et al., 2004). 
Further, while in some studies vmPFC appears to track the value of the chosen option (Kable 
& Glimcher, 2007; Plassmann et al., 2007) (implicating this region in value representation), 
others have reported a BOLD response in vmPFC that reflects the difference between chosen 
and unchosen options (Boorman et al., 2009; Hunt et al., 2012). The latter suggests that 
vmPFC may act as a final value comparator, thus entering the decision-making hierarchy 
further downstream. Further still, other evidence suggests that vmPFC encodes the 
difference in value between attended and unattended choice options, thereby reflecting an 
attention-modulated value signal (Lim et al., 2011). According to Lim and colleagues, since it 
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is a natural tendency to attend to options that we eventually choose for longer, it can appear 
as if vmPFC is encoding the difference in value between chosen and unchosen options in 
experiments that do not control for attention.        
 
Figure 2.8 Neural representations of subjective value; taken from (Bartra et al., 2013). (A)  
Here, Bartra and colleagues performed a whole-brain meta-analysis of BOLD activation that 
revealed neural representations of subjective value in vmPFC and striatum at the time of 
making a choice. (B) The same regions of vmPFC and striatum also response to the delivery 
of a reward at the outcome stage of a trial. (C) Conjunction effect of activation maps shown 
in panels (A) and (B).  
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While it is clear that vmPFC contributes to behaviour by signalling subjective or “economic” 
value, it is less clear how this value arises. For example, in sequential environments where 
decisions can confer both an immediate reward and a complex set of delayed consequences, 
it remains ambiguous whether vmPFC signals immediate rewards, delayed outcomes, or an 
integration of both components. Unfortunately, these components are typically correlated 
and thus indistinguishable in many value-guided decision-making paradigms. A recent study 
has attempted to address this by asking subjects to make real choices about differing food 
items (Hare et al., 2009). Here, the BOLD response in vmPFC reflected an integration of taste 
and health components, suggesting vmPFC accesses long-term, in addition to immediate, 
components of value; or in more general terms, supports goal-directed behaviour. Yet a 
value signal that reflects the calculation and integration of both immediate and future 
consequences has not been previously demonstrated in humans.  
Along similar lines, while some argue vmPFC signals value regardless of the associative basis 
of the information, others have postulated that vmPFC is crucial in contexts where value has 
to be estimated on the fly through knowledge of the causal structure of the world and the 
future consequences of actions (a model-based valuation). Recent work conducted in 
rodents has provided strong evidence for the latter (Jones et al., 2012), though evidence in 
humans is more sparse.  
Evidence from non-human primate electrophysiology studies, in which vmPFC (Brodmann 
area 14), medial orbitofrontal cortex (mPFC, Brodmann areas 11/13) and lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex (LOFC, Brodmann areas 47/12) are more easily delineated, suggest that these regions 
are anatomically and functionally distinct. For example, OFC, unlike vmPFC, receives inputs 
from sensory systems (Barbas, Ghashghaei, Dombrowski, & Rempel-Clower, 1999; Cavada et 
al., 2000), while vmPFC, unlike OFC, has dense projections to the nucleus accumbens (Haber 
et al., 1995) and hypothalamus (Ongur, An, & Price, 1998).  Although relatively few studies 
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have recorded from vmPFC, recent evidence suggests partially distinct computations in 
vmPFC and OFC during value-guided decision-making. For example, while both regions likely 
encode the subjective value of task events, neurons in OFC may be more sensitive to external 
factors that relate to value, such as visual cues, while vmPFC may be more sensitive to 
internal factors that relate to value, such as satiety (Bouret & Richmond, 2010). Further, 
others have argued for a functional subdivision between ventral vmPFC, in which neurons 
are more active during appetitive feedback, and dorsal vmPFC, in which neurons are more 
active during aversive feedback (Monosov & Hikosaka, 2012).  
A similar functional subdivision, inspired by human neuroimaging data (for a review see 
(Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004), has been proposed for mOFC and LOFC, with the former said to 
specialize in the evaluation of rewards and the latter the evaluation of punishments, but 
neurophysiology data has largely not supported this theory (Morrison & Salzman, 2009; Rich 
& Wallis, 2014). Instead, it has been proposed that LOFC neurons encode the value of 
external stimuli, while mOFC neurons use knowledge of the task structure and environment 
to make outcome predictions (Rich & Wallis, 2014). This is consistent with other evidence in 
animals and humans that vmPFC/mOFC is recruited when values are inferred on the fly using 
a model of action-outcome contingencies (Hampton, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2006a; Jones 
et al., 2012; Takahashi et al., 2013). Finally, lesion studies suggest that LOFC is required for 
reward-credit assignment and thus reward-value learning, whereas mOFC is required for 
value comparison amongst multiple competing alternatives (Noonan et al., 2010).  
2.3.5 Striatum  
Similar to vmPFC / OFC, the striatum is strongly implicated in value-guided decision-making 
(Balleine et al., 2007; Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Bartra et al., 2013; Brovelli, Nazarian, 
Meunier, & Boussaoud, 2011; Haber & Knutson, 2010; Kimchi & Laubach, 2009; Roesch, 
Singh, Brown, Mullins, & Schoenbaum, 2009; Stalnaker, Calhoon, Ogawa, Roesch, & 
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Schoenbaum, 2010; Yin, Ostlund, et al., 2005). As previously mentioned, the striatum 
interacts with the cortex via recurrent networks referred to as corticostriatal loops, 
classically divided into four loops: motivational, executive, visual and motor (Seger, 2008) 
(see also Figures 2.4 & 2.5). It is well-established that different striatal nuclei are associated 
with distinct loops and have distinguishable roles (Balleine et al., 2007; Basar et al., 2010; 
Daw et al., 2011; Yin & Knowlton, 2006).  
Here it is thought that the acquisition of reward-related (goal-directed) actions are mediated 
by converging projections from regions of medial prefrontal cortex (MPC) to the dorsomedial 
striatum (DM; caudate nucleus in humans), whereas the acquisition of S-O contingencies 
(habits) are mediated by projections from sensorimotor cortex (SM) to the dorsolateral 
striatum (DL; putamen in humans) (see Dorsal striatum, p. 59). These corticostriatal 
connections feed back to the cortex via the substantia nigra pars reticulata/internal segment 
of the globus pallidus (SNr/GPi) and the mediodorsal/posterior (MD/PO) nuclei of the 
thalamus. A parallel ventral circuit, mediated by the MPC and ventral striatum (VS) drives 
motivational and Pavlovian influences by feeding into the DM and DL loops (Balleine et al., 
2007).  
2.3.5.1 Ventral striatum 
Much like the vmPFC, the ventral striatum has previously been shown to track the subjective 
value of choice options (Kable & Glimcher, 2007) (see Figure 2.8, p. 54), and is an integral 
part of the reward circuit (Haber & Knutson, 2010) (see Figure 2.6, p. 42). However, the 
ventral striatum is more typically associated with temporal difference learning, and the 
encoding of reward prediction errors, as evidenced by single neuron recordings in the non-
human primate (Schultz et al., 1997) and fMRI paradigms in humans (J. P. O'Doherty, 
Buchanan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). In this framework, the ventral striatum is thought to 
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calculate the difference between expected and received levels of reward, a metric that is 
important for informing future choice (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Typically, trials that 
contain high value options are also likely to generate a positive prediction error, and thus 
these two quantities are often highly correlated. This has led to some controversy regarding 
the true quantity driving ventral striatum responses, though recent accounts claim that 
prediction errors prevail when they are decorrelated from subjective value (Hare et al., 
2008).  
While it is clear that the ventral striatum is intimately involved in reinforcement learning, it 
is less clear what learning system drives activity in this region. For example, prediction errors 
arising from a model-based system, that require evaluating actions through calling on an 
internal model of the world, can differ from those arising from a model-free system, where 
actions that are rewarded are reinforced in a retrospective fashion. While the signal in 
ventral striatum is classically thought to support model-free learning, a recent study has 
provided evidence for an integration of both model-based and model-free components of 
value in this region (Daw et al., 2011).  
The ventral striatum is also implicated in value-guided decision-making outside of learning 
paradigms, particularly in controlling ‘go’ or ‘nogo’ responses. While rewards are typically 
coupled with the requirement to ‘act’ in many value-guided paradigms, recent experiments 
in humans have shown that activity in ventral striatum more closely reflects the requirement 
for action as opposed to the anticipation of wins or losses (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). This 
association with action has led to a view that the ventral striatum may be closely involved 
with impulsivity. For example, it has been shown that the ventral striatum is more active 
when subjects choose smaller but immediate rewards over larger but delayed rewards in 
temporal discounting tasks (McClure et al., 2004), and a reduced response in ventral striatum 
to immediate rewards promotes goal-directed choice (Diekhof & Gruber, 2010). Further, in 
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rodents value representations in ventral striatum have been shown to be insensitive to 
changes in stimulus-reward contingencies, suggesting this region promotes automatic, 
stimulus-driven actions as opposed to those that serve goals (Kimchi & Laubach, 2009).  
Yet not all the evidence is in accord. For example, lesions of the nucleus accumbens core in 
rodents induces impulsive choice (Cardinal, Pennicott, Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 
2001), a phenomenon counter to that predicted by this region promoting impulsivity, and 
ventral striatum activity appears to reflect an integration of value and action requirements 
in animals (Roesch et al., 2009). Collectively, these data suggest that the ventral striatum 
may be differentially engaged depending on subtle task differences that probe varying facets 
of impulsivity.  
2.3.5.1 Dorsal striatum 
The dorsal striatum is a thought to mediate several important aspects of value-guided 
decision-making (Balleine et al., 2007). Much like the ventral striatum, the BOLD response in 
dorsal striatum has been shown to reflect the anticipation of both primary (J. P. O'Doherty, 
Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002) and secondary (Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 
2001) rewards in humans. In addition the dorsal striatum is thought to be particularly 
involved in action-contingent learning (Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 2004). However, evidence 
indicates that the two key sites within dorsal striatum, the caudate nucleus and putamen, 
play different roles. 
The putamen in humans is largely associated with the formation of habits (Yin & Knowlton, 
2006) and stimulus-driven responses, possibly through encoding stimulus-response 
associations (Featherstone & McDonald, 2005). This is consistent with previously discussed 
evidence from rodents, where lesioning dorsolateral striatum (corresponding to the 
putamen) disrupts habit formation such that animals remain sensitive to devaluation 
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protocols even after overtraining (Yin et al., 2004). Human studies also implicate the 
putamen in shifting choice towards acquisition of immediate rewards (Tanaka et al., 2004) 
and in the tracking of values associated with extensively trained choice (Wunderlich, Dayan, 
et al., 2012). Collectively, these studies align the putamen more closely with automatic, 
model-free processing. 
In contrast, while the caudate nucleus is associated with the learning of actions and their 
reward consequences, it is thought to support goal-directed over habitual choice. A number 
of human fMRI studies now point towards the caudate as a region coding reward prediction 
errors specifically during goal-directed behaviour (Delgado, Miller, Inati, & Phelps, 2005; J. 
O'Doherty et al., 2004). Perhaps the most direct example of model-based processing in the 
caudate comes from a recent experiment showing that the caudate tracks the value of 
individual branching steps in a decision tree (Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012). The caudate 
has also been implicated in future reward prediction (Tanaka et al., 2004) and the encoding 
of both positive and negative action consequences (Tricomi et al., 2004), all suggestive that 
this region is involved in promoting goal-directed decisions. Evidence from the rodent 
literature implicating the dorsomedial striatum in goal-directed control is also largely 
consistent with neuroimaging data from humans. For example, both pre and post-training 
lesions (Yin, Ostlund, et al., 2005), muscimol-induced inactivation (Yin, Ostlund, et al., 2005), 
and the infusion of an NMDA antagonist (Yin, Knowlton, et al., 2005) within dorsomedial 
striatum abolish goal-directed behaviour and render choice insensitive to outcome 
devaluation.  
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODS  
3.1 An introduction to neuroimaging  
There are many methods available for measuring brain activity in behaving humans (Bear, 
Connors, & Paradiso, 2007). The oldest method, electroencephalography (EEG), records 
electrical activity on the scalp by measuring voltage fluctuations that result from ionic 
current flows within the neurons of the brain. Data collected via EEG, and its relative 
magnetoencephalography (MEG), has excellent temporal resolution but poor spatial 
resolution given the complexities involved with identifying the anatomical source of activity 
recorded on the scalp. In addition, EEG/MEG is almost always contaminated with artefacts.  
An alternative method that has gained great popularity since its emergence over two 
decades ago is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). With fMRI, the activity of 
neurons is not measured directly but rather is inferred through measuring regional changes 
in the concentration of oxygen within blood vessels - the blood-oxygen-level dependent 
(BOLD) response - affording a vastly improved spatial resolution. This relies on the 
fundamental property that when a region of the brain is in use, blood flow to that same 
region increases to meet metabolic demands, which in turn increases the proportion of 
oxygenated Hemoglobin and changes the magnetic property of blood. fMRI measures this 
change in magnetic property. However, these changes in blood flow lag several seconds 
behind the underlying neuronal activity, resulting in a reduced temporal resolution. 
Multiple lines of evidence point towards the implementation of functional localisation and 
specialisation in the brain. That is, neurons that perform equivalent physiological functions 
group together into anatomically separable regions (Bear et al., 2007). This is particularly 
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evident in patients with focal brain damage, where lesions to a particular region can induce 
highly specific and reproducible deficits in cognition (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Badre, 2008; 
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Lavenex, Amaral, & Lavenex, 2006). Further, 
neurophysiological recordings undertaken in non-human primates have exposed a location-
specific mapping of function within domains such as vision (D. L. Adams & Horton, 2003; 
Takechi et al., 1997). It is this property which makes fMRI a useful tool for exploring brain 
function.  
fMRI allows inferences to be made about the simultaneous activity of the whole brain during 
a task or cognitive manipulation. One can therefore infer both the magnitude of activity in 
specific regions and how this activity changes over time. In practice, the analysis of fMRI data 
involves either comparing the BOLD response in one psychological context versus another, 
e.g. viewing faces versus scenes, or testing for correlations between BOLD and a given task 
attribute. The latter is of particular relevance to the study of decision-making, as one can 
determine which regions of the brain are sensitive to variables fundamental to the 
underlying neuronal process, such as reward, uncertainty, or subjective value. This provides 
a much more powerful tool than simply reporting a list of task-related brain activations, as it 
allows for the attribution of specific computational roles. In this thesis, I employed relatively 
standard acquisition protocols and analysis pipelines, which will be reviewed in the following 
sections. However, the reader is also encouraged to consult a number of excellent reviews 
(Jezzard, Smith, & Matthews, 2003; S. M. Smith, 2004).  
3.2 Physics of MRI  
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) measures an electromagnetic signal from the hydrogen 
nuclei within water molecules. The positively charged protons in water act as microscopic 
compass needles that emit a small electromagnetic field, but are randomly oriented in their 
natural state. The magnet of the MRI scanner generates a strong radiofrequency 
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electromagnetic field that acts to momentarily align the nuclei with the direction of the 
magnetic field. A second magnetic field, the gradient field, is then applied to induce a higher 
magnetization level. When the gradient field is removed, the nuclei return to their original 
orientation which results in the release of an electromagnetic signal detectable by the MRI 
scanner. In echo-planar imaging, each radiofrequency excitation is followed by a train of 
gradient fields with different spatial encoding that allows for the rapid acquisition of images. 
Functional MRI (fMRI) is used to estimate the brain activity evoked by a particular task 
through measuring regional changes in oxygen concentration within blood vessels. The 
process is similar to conventional MRI but uses the change in magnetization between 
oxygen-rich and oxygen-poor blood as its basic measure. Hemoglobin is an iron-containing 
molecule, found predominantly in red blood cells, that acts to transport oxygen from the 
respiratory organs to the rest of the body, to meet the needs of metabolically active tissue. 
Oxygen binds to the heme component of Hemoglobin in the pulmonary capillaries adjacent 
to the lungs resulting in Oxyhemoglobin. When oxygen is released into cells, Hemoglobin 
becomes relatively deoxygenated.  
Importantly, external magnetic fields have negligible influences on oxygenated Hemoglobin, 
but cause local magnetic field variations with deoxygenated Hemoglobin (Figure 3.1, p. 64) 
(Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990), as the four outer electrons of the iron electron are unpaired 
with oxygen. Blood-oxygen level dependent contrast (BOLD), first described by Seiji Ogawa 
in rat studies (Ogawa et al., 1990), is able to exploit this dissociation to estimate, albeit 
indirectly, underlying neuronal activity. The usual signal increases reported in BOLD fMRI 
experiments are due to the fact that neural activation induces a regional increase in cerebral 
blood flow and glucose utilization that is always larger than the oxygen consumption rate, 
since oxygen uptake is diffusion-limited. The net effect of neural excitation is thus a 
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seemingly paradoxical drop in the deoxyhemoglobin concentration, which in turn increases 
the signal strength (Logothetis, 2008).  
 
Figure 3.1 Schematic of a change in blood flow in response to a visual stimulus and the 
associated change in magnetization measured by fMRI; taken from (Saper et al., 2000). (A) 
When neurons in the visual cortex are not stimulated, a relatively large proportion of local 
Hemoglobin is in the deoxy form. Since deoxyhemoglobin promotes efficient dephasing of 
the rotating protons, the T2* curve is steep and the MRI signal is weak. (B) Conversely, when 
neurons in visual cortex are activated, blood flow increases resulting in a heightened 
proportion of oxygenated relative to deoxygenated Hemoglobin. This results in a slower 
dephasing of protons and a less steep T2* curve. (C) A heightened BOLD response in visual 
cortex results from an increase in the relative proportion of oxygenated Hemoglobin 
following presentation of the visual stimulus.  
Following action potentials in the brain, ions are actively pumped across the cell membrane 
to ensure the appropriate repolarization of the cell. This process requires glucose and 
oxygen, which is carried via blood, also acting to bring in oxygenated Hemoglobin via red 
blood cells. A higher rate of firing causes a greater rate of blood flow and a dilation of regional 
blood vessels. This results in a change in the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated 
Hemoglobin, and a subsequent alteration in the magnetic property of blood. It is this change 
in magnetic property that is detected during fMRI. A relative decrease in the proportion of 
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deoxyhemoglobin attenuates local susceptibility effects, and thus increased activity results 
in a higher signal intensity on T2-weighted images (Figure 3.1, p. 64).  
fMRI is susceptible to unwanted noise that originates from the scanner, from random brain 
activity, and from large blood vessels where blood flow is often highly variable due to factors 
that are not of interest (see also Chapter 7, p. 183). Consequently, fMRI studies require 
multiple repetitions of the same events to improve the signal-to-noise ratio.  
3.3 Analysis of fMRI data 
For the purposes of fMRI, the brain is divided into small cubes of volume, typically 2-3mm3, 
known as voxels. In order to make inferences about significant task-related effects, the time-
series of each individual voxel, that is, how BOLD activation throughout the scanned volume 
of the brain changes over time, needs to be assessed. In order to ensure these time-series 
are accurate and free from artefacts, a number of pre-processing steps are performed (for a 
review see (Strother, 2006)). These also serve to enable analysis across scans and subjects.  
3.3.1 Pre-processing 
Below I outline the standard pipeline for pre-processing of an fMRI dataset.  
3.3.1.1 Bias Correction (for structural scans only) 
The use of a 32-channel head coil may result in biases in signal intensity due to 
inhomogeneities in the magnetic fields of the MRI scanner. This can affect subsequent pre-
processing stages such as segmentation. Image intensities are therefore ‘flattened’ following 
acquisition by means of a multiplicative factor that changes the intensity values of image 
pixels. 
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3.3.1.2 Spatial Realignment & Unwarping 
The fMRI signal is expressed in 3-dimension space. Thus, any head movements during image 
acquisition will result in a mismatch of the location of subsequent images in the time-series. 
Even movements in the order of a few millimetres, such as those caused by swallowing or 
possibly associated task performance, can contribute significant variance to the fMRI signal, 
reducing the overall signal-to-noise ratio and decreasing the power of any subsequent 
analyses. To account for this, spatial realignment is performed by means of a 6-parameter 
rigid body transformation that minimizes the difference (typically the sum-of-squares) 
between subsequent images. Head motion estimates can subsequently be analysed as a 
quality check. EPI images also exhibit substantial signal dropout and spatial distortion in 
regions where the magnetic field is inhomogenous. By collecting field maps, which measure 
field inhomogeneity, EPIs can be unwarped by means of a field mapping distortion correction 
approach, resulting in improved coregistration between EPIs and anatomical images.  
3.3.1.3 Coregistration & Spatial Normalisation  
In order to ensure activations measured by fMRI are superimposed onto the correct 
anatomical location, functional images must be coregistered with an anatomical (T1-
weighted) scan. For images of different modality (i.e. anatomical versus functional) this is 
typically done by computing a transformational matrix that matches mutual information, or 
minimizes differences between images, and applying this to the data of interest. Next, in 
order to make comparisons between individuals with different brains, and to extrapolate 
findings to the population as a whole, scans must be normalised to a common template 
brain. This also allows the reporting of activations within an established standard space. The 
template adopted in this thesis is the standard template of the Montreal Institute of 
Neurology (MNI). During normalisation, images are warped so that functionally homologous 
regions across different subjects are as close together as possible. This involves using a 12-
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parameter affine transformation to minimize the sums of squared differences between the 
template brain and the subject-specific brain, and also the squared number of standard 
deviations away from the expected parameter values.  
3.3.1.4 Spatial Smoothing  
Smoothing involves spatially blurring functional images using a 3-dimensional Gaussian 
kernel. Smoothing can be applied at both the single-subject level and the group-level. In the 
case of the latter, smoothing the image increases the overlap of activation between subjects. 
Smoothing also helps to increase signal-to-noise ratio, because the signal from a single voxel 
in a smoothed image will also contain a signal from neighbouring voxels, reducing the 
contribution of random noise. Further, smoothing can be set to match the spatial scale of 
the data to the size of the expected effect. Researchers interested in both cortical and 
subcortical activations will typically employ an average smoothing kernel of 6-8mm.  
3.3.2 Statistical Modelling 
The pre-processing stages provide a set of voxel-based time-series of BOLD activation 
throughout the entire space of the scanned brain. The goal of any fMRI experiment is to 
relate these dynamic activations to the experimental manipulation in a statistically valid way.  
The general approach involves specifying a general linear model (GLM), in which we propose 
that our observed data (Y) is a function of our experimental manipulation (X), weighted by a 
parameter ‘beta’ that governs the size of the ‘effect’, and some residual error or noise 
(Friston et al., 1994).  
Y = βX + epsilon 
This is the basis of Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM, Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, London, UK) employed in this thesis. In fMRI, Y is the observed BOLD time-
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series and X is a matrix of explanatory variables, or regressors. The design matrix includes all 
relevant experimental manipulations that are proposed to modulate brain activity (effects of 
interest), plus any uninteresting variables that may also contribute to signal variance (effects 
of no-interest), such as session effects, movement parameters, and physiological regressors 
(e.g. pulse rate and breathing). Thus, in effect, SPM employs multiple linear regression, as 
more than one independent variable is considered in the same model: 
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2… + βpXp + epsilon 
where p is the number of regressors in the design matrix.  
SPM uses a mass univariate approach and standard parametric statistics to test the null 
hypothesis that the estimated effect size of any individual regressor in the design matrix is 
zero. Thus, rather than considering variance between groups of voxels, the time-series from 
each voxel is fit to the GLM in parallel. Effects of interest relate to the influence of a single 
regressor (after accounting for all other regressors in the design matrix), calculated as the 
effect size divided by its standard deviation (to give a T-statistic), or to some linear 
combination of more than one effect with respect to their relative variances (to give an F-
statistic). In order to extrapolate inferences to the population-level, one then performs a 
random-effects analysis to estimate the variance in betas for a given regressor in the design 
matrix (or contrast map from a within-subject analysis) between subjects.  
Note that our observed data, Y, represents BOLD response, which in turn is related to our 
key interest, neural activity, in some reliable way. Thus, in order to relate any observed 
effects to the underlying neuronal response, we must model the relationship between BOLD 
and neuronal activity in our GLM. This relationship is known as the haemodynamic response 
function (HRF), and is built into the SPM framework. It is known that the peak in BOLD from 
a burst of neural activity typically has a lag of 5-6 seconds (Logothetis, 2003). Thus, in event-
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related designs, where we are interested in the neuronal response to single independent 
events in time (such as the presentation of a stimulus), onset vectors are convolved with the 
HRF before being inserted into the design matrix. Thus, we can test whether our 
experimental manipulations are influencing BOLD in a manner predicted under the 
assumption that they are influencing neural activity.  
One potential drawback of using a voxel-based mass univariate approach is the problem of 
false positives that are likely to arise with multiple comparisons. In fMRI, statistical tests are 
repeated on over 100, 000 voxels in the brain, and it is likely that several voxels will show a 
significant effect by chance. A common approach for multiple comparisons is Bonferroni 
correction, in which the level of statistical significance is equivalent to 1/n times what it 
would be if only one test was performed, where n is the number of times the test is 
performed. However, this method is too conservative for fMRI, as it relies on the assumption 
that each test is independent. Since the signal in neighbouring voxels is often correlated, we 
use principles of random field theory to construct a more appropriate method for correction 
(Kilner, Kiebel, & Friston, 2005). Random field theory assumes that the error field conforms 
to a lattice approximation with a multivariate Gaussian structure, and that these fields have 
a differentiable and invertible autocorrelation function.  
In the absence of a prior hypothesis about which region(s) might respond to a particular 
experimental manipulation, i.e. if one is interested in exploring activations across the entire 
volume of brain scanned, then random field theory should be applied to correct for multiple 
comparisons across the whole brain, and any significant effects are thereafter reported 
whole-brain corrected. However, if there is a specific interest in how a manipulation may 
affect activity in a specific region (perhaps informed by previous experiments), then one can 
predefine functional or anatomical regions of interest (ROI), and correct for comparisons by 
only taking into account the number of voxels contained within those regions. Finally, an 
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alternative approach is to derive the average effect (beta) across voxels in an ROI, and 
perform a single statistical test, bypassing the requirement for multiple comparisons and the 
associated correction. 
In practise, fMRI experiments are constructed with a specific design type in mind. The 
simplest design involves subtraction between two experimental tasks or conditions. For 
example, if a task involves reacting to a stimulus with an action that is either congruent or 
incongruent with the displayed stimulus, then subtracting those conditions will identify 
regions of the brain whose activity is up-(or down)-regulated by congruency. Similarly, one 
can use multifactorial designs to embed subtractions and allow assessment of how one 
experimental factor influences another. The most common multifactorial design is a 2 x 2 
factorial where the experimenter manipulates two independent factors, each with two 
levels, e.g. congruent versus incongruent trials, and high reward versus low reward trials. 
This allows one to assess interactions in addition to main effects.  
Perhaps more powerful than subtraction designs are parametric designs. Here, the 
magnitude of a particular task-relevant quantity is varied over events (or trials), allowing one 
to test for regions of the brain that are sensitive to that change, or where activity shows a 
linear correlation with the magnitude of the manipulated quantity. For example, in the 
context of value-guided decision-making, one can look for brain regions that might track a 
participant’s subjective value for a particular choice option. In parametric designs, the onset 
regressors in the design matrix are ‘parametrically modulated’ by the variable of interest, 
and this variable then becomes an additional regressor in the multiple linear regression. The 
resulting beta describes the steepness of the slope or correlation between BOLD and the 
given variable. Thus, if the beta is not significantly different from zero, then there is no effect. 
Parametric designs are especially useful when trying to identify brain responses that 
correlate with potentially rich and complex variables derived from computational modelling. 
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In value-guided decision-making experiments, one might dynamically manipulate a feature 
of the environment relevant for making-decisions, such as the uncertainty surrounding a 
reward outcome, and use computational modelling to characterise how participants use this 
information to make choices. One might also want to test whether the brain tracks this 
quantity. By modelling a set of key parameters that change according to the complexities of 
the task environment, one can use parametric designs to assess whether these variables are 
tracked in the brain.  
3.3.3 Computational modelling  
In recent years, cognitive neuroscience has seen a rise in the use of quantitative 
mathematical models to describe, predict and explain peoples’ behaviour (Lewandowsky & 
Farrell, 2011). In general, computational modelling requires the experimenter to conceive a 
number of possible underlying mechanisms or processes for how a particular set of choices 
or behaviours emerge. For example, in the context of reinforcement learning, one might 
conjecture that the expected value of a chosen stimulus is updated according to the 
difference between the expected outcome (based on previous trials), and the actual 
outcome, governed by a learning rate. One can then test to see whether the trial-by-trial 
choices predicted by such a model are a good match to empirical data.  
3.3.3.1 Model fitting  
Often, computational models have a degree of algorithmic flexibility, in that the parameters 
governing each algorithm are free to vary across subjects in a manner that maximizes model 
evidence. A common method for evaluating model evidence (and indeed the method 
employed in this thesis) is maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). In brief, for a given data 
point y, maximum likelihood estimation determines the probability or probability density of 
observing y given a model, M, and a vector of parameter values θ. By varying the values in 
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θ, one can characterize how the observed likelihood changes in response to changes in 
parameter values, providing a measure of likelihood for each possible parameter value. 
Importantly, this allows one to determine the set of parameters with the highest likelihood.  
The most precise method underlying this, named grid search, is to plot the likelihood surface 
(for each combination of parameter values), and determine those values that correspond to 
the peak of the surface. However, in practise, grid search can be both inefficient and 
computationally expensive, particularly when the model in question contains a large number 
of free parameters. Thus, a number of techniques have been developed that approximate 
grid search in a far more efficient manner. In this thesis, I employ the simplex method, in 
which a simplex of parameter values, which starts at a location defined by the experimenter 
(typically random), attempts to locate the minimum on the error surface (the point of 
maximum likelihood) by variously reflecting, contracting, or expanding within the parameter 
space. During a reflection, the point with the greatest discrepancy (worst fit) is flipped to the 
opposite side, which may then cause the simplex to expand (if it is in a rewarding direction). 
Conversely, in a contraction, the point with the worst fit moves closer to the centre of the 
simplex. Parameter estimation is typically performed on each individual subject (under the 
assumption that each individual is independent and drawn randomly from the population), 
and can thus be a powerful tool for assessing between-subject, or between-group variability 
in the associated processes.  
In the instance where there is more than one conceivable model, the principles of Bayesian 
statistics and maximum likelihood (Bayesian information criterion, BIC) can be applied to 
determine the ‘best’ model. In BIC, a penalty term is introduced for the number of free 
parameters within a given model (which protects for overfitting) as follows: 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2 ln 𝐿 (𝜃|𝑦, 𝑀) + 𝑘 ln 𝑁 
73 
 
where L is the value that minimizes the negative log likelihood of the parameter set given 
the data (and the model), and N is the number of data points on which the likelihood 
calculation is based.  
In summary, computational models allow for detailed interpretations and insights that few 
other approaches can match, and are particularly relevant in the context of value-guided 
decision-making.  
3.3.3.2 Hierarchical Bayesian procedures  
Recently there has been a shift away from conventional (fixed-effects) approaches to model 
fitting in favour of hierarchical Bayesian (random-effects) methods. The key principle behind 
this approach is to use the population-level distribution of data to constrain unreliable 
parameter estimates at the individual level. Here I outline one approach named Expectation-
Maximization (E-M) (Huys et al., 2011). Typically, one estimates the maximum-likelihood 
hyperparameters given the data from a group of N subjects:  
?̂?𝑀𝐿 =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜗 𝑝(𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|𝜗) =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜗 ∏ 𝑝(
𝑖
𝐶𝑖|𝜗) 
where 
𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜗) =  ∫ 𝑑 𝜃𝑖 𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝜗) 
where 𝜗 is a parameter vector, and C is a vector of choices for each subject i 
Thus, on each iteration, the posterior distribution over the group for each parameter is used 
to specify the prior over the individual parameter fits on the next, kth, iteration:  
𝜃𝑖
(𝑘) =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃 𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝜗
(𝑘−1)) 
It is often assumed that the likelihood surface is normally distributed around the maximum 
a posteriori parameter estimate, in which case a Laplace approximation can be applied:  
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𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝐶𝑖) ≈ 𝑁 (𝜃𝑖
(𝑘), ∑𝑖
(𝑘)
) 
where ∑𝑖
(𝑘)
 is the second moment around 𝜃𝑖
(𝑘), which approximates the variance. In the M-
step, the estimated hyperparameters 𝜗(𝑘)  of the normal prior distribution, mean 𝜇, and 
factorized variance, 𝜎2, are updated as follows: 
𝜇(𝑘) =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑖
 
(𝜎(𝑘))
2
=
1
𝑁
∑ [(𝜃𝑖
(𝑘))
2
+ ∑𝑖
(𝑘)
]
𝑖
− (𝜇(𝑘))
2
  
With this method, models are typically compared using integrated BIC (BICint) which penalises 
for the number of estimated free parameters: 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2 ln 𝐼𝐿 (𝜃|𝐶, 𝑀) + 𝑘 ln 𝑁 
Note however, that in contrast to conventional BIC, ln 𝐼𝐿 (𝜃|𝐶, 𝑀) is a sum over the model 
evidence at the subject level by integrating over subject-level parameters.  
Random-effects model fitting has a distinct advantage over conventional fixed-effects in that 
the contribution of unreliable subjects to the group mean is effectively down-weighted, and 
is thus utilized in all experiments reported in this thesis. However, one potential pitfall of this 
method is that it relies on the assumption that parameter estimates are normally distributed 
at the group-level.  
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CHAPTER 4 
NEURAL MECHANISMS SUPPORTING ADAPTIVE DECISION-MAKING 
Actions can lead to an immediate reward or punishment and a complex set of delayed 
outcomes. Adaptive choice necessitates the brain track and integrate both of these potential 
consequences. Here, I designed a sequential task whereby the decision to exploit or forego 
an available offer was contingent on comparing immediate value and a state-dependent 
future cost of expending a limited resource. Crucially, the dynamics of the task demanded 
frequent switches in policy based on an online computation of changing delayed 
consequences. I found that human subjects choose on the basis of a near-optimal integration 
of immediate reward and delayed consequences, with the latter computed in a prefrontal 
network. Within this network, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was dynamically coupled to 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) when adaptive switches in choice were required. 
The results suggest a choice architecture whereby interactions between ACC and vmPFC 
underpin an integration of immediate and delayed components of value to support flexible 
policy switching that accommodates the potential delayed consequences of an action. 
4.1 Introduction 
As actions can lead to an immediate reward or punishment and a complex set of delayed 
consequences, it follows that to ensure the outcome of an action is optimal an agent needs 
to account for both immediate rewards and delayed consequences, which together 
constitute long-term expected value. A growing understanding of how hierarchical goals 
influence value comparison (Hare et al., 2009; Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011) contrasts 
with a dearth of knowledge regarding how the brain infers and integrates downstream 
consequence when evaluating options in a changing environment.  
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Paradigms requiring calculations of long-term value recruit the prefrontal cortex (Balleine & 
Dickinson, 1998; Basten et al., 2010; Glascher et al., 2010; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Wallis & 
Miller, 2003). In particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been linked to task 
planning (van den Heuvel et al., 2003; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012), the representation 
of abstract task rules (Buschman, Denovellis, Diogo, Bullock, & Miller, 2012; Stokes et al., 
2013), as well as discounted or goal values (McClure et al., 2004; Plassmann et al., 2010). 
However, these studies do not address how the brain infers long-term value when decisions 
are sequential and integrative. It is of interest that several tasks requiring cognitive control 
implicitly evoke representations of downstream consequence, and as such it seems plausible 
that these processes could be subserved by a common neural mechanism.  
In a typical example, an external cue signals a categorical contingency switch that instantiates 
a change in action or the inhibition of a prepotent response (Kerns et al., 2004). Although 
such tasks highlight a fronto-parietal network as being central to control (Badre, 2008; M. M. 
Botvinick et al., 2001), they are seldom deployed in the value domain, and a focus on isolated 
choice neglects downstream consequences of decisions. Recent studies have touched on 
these issues implicating parietal regions and PFC in representing the state-transitions 
necessary for building a model of the world (Glascher et al., 2010; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 
2012). It remains unclear what computational role these regions play when action control is 
reliant a subjective inference about a change in expected value.  
Here, I tested whether a context-specific evaluation of action could explain choice in a novel 
value-guided sequential go/nogo paradigm, whereby an agent tracks time-varying 
contingencies of a dynamic environment to adapt behaviour in anticipation of future value. 
Crucially, the dynamics of the task demanded frequent switches in policy based on an online 
computation of changing delayed consequences. Building on previous studies my paradigm 
allowed comparisons between policy switches arising either from inference, or by an 
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external cue, that the environment had changed. Thus, by using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), I could characterize the computations tracked by the brain in a 
dynamic world. I predicted PFC would compute the downstream consequence of acting by 
tracking changing aspects of the environment, and interact with regions such as vmPFC and 
striatum, both strongly implicated in reward (Kable & Glimcher, 2007), to compute an 
integrated signal of long-term value for guiding choice policy. 
4.2 Methods 
Subjects  
21 adults participated in the experiment (9 male and 12 female; age range 19-28; mean 23.2, 
SD = 2.3 years). All were healthy, reporting no history of neurological, psychiatric or other 
current medical problems. Subjects provided written informed consent to partake in the 
study, which was approved by the local ethics board (University College London, UK). 
Training paradigm  
In a conditioning phase, performed outside of the scanner, subjects learnt stimulus-reward 
associations between a set of four differently coloured rectangular cues and their respective 
monetary values. Each coloured rectangle corresponded to one of four possible value 
outcomes - 1, 2, 3 or 4 tokens - randomized across individuals. Subjects were instructed that 
each token would translate into a fixed sum of money at the end of the experiment.  
Each trial began with a central fixation cross presented for 1000 ms, followed by presentation 
of a random pair of coloured boxes, one appearing to the left of the screen and one to the 
right. Subjects had a 2000 ms time-window to choose between these two boxes via a left or 
right button press, followed by presentation of the outcome of their choice for 1000 ms. The 
outcome was revealed as a written message indicating the total number of tokens won. 
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Subjects were instructed to explore all options until they were confident they had learnt all 
four associations, after which they should choose the box from the pair with the higher value. 
Each trial was defined as either correct if the subject chose the more valuable of the two 
options, and incorrect if they failed to do so. To ensure adequate learning, performance was 
calculated over six bins of twenty trials, with all subjects reaching a performance criterion of 
>= 90% by trial 60 onwards. For absolute verification, subjects were asked to verbally 
communicate the nature of the learnt associations. 
Task paradigm 
On every trial subjects were presented with a random sequence of trained stimuli (see 
training paradigm, p. 77), appearing individually and sequentially, with a variable inter-
stimulus interval (750 - 1250 ms). The sequence order was pseudo-random and thus 
unpredictable, with each stimulus having an equal probability of being one of the four 
possible colours. In addition, the precise number of stimuli to be offered on any trial was 
uncertain, fluctuating under a uniform distribution between 3 and 7. 
Each stimulus constituted an offer with a worth equivalent to its respective token value, for 
which subjects had 1500 ms to accept or reject via a go or nogo response respectively. A 
restriction was placed on the number of offers that could be exploited. In high constraint 
trials (HC), the acceptance budget was between 1 and 3 offers, whilst in low constraint (LC) 
it ranged between 4 and 6 offers, both varying under a uniform distribution independent of 
the total number of offers made on the current trial. Subjects were not explicitly told the 
bounds of the distributions from which the number of offers and total budget were drawn, 
only that they were uniform. All subjects received 30 training trials (15 per condition) in order 
to infer these distributions and familiarize themselves with the task attributes.  
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Figure 4.1 Subjects learnt stimulus-value associations, ranging from 1 to 4 tokens, for four 
collared stimuli. On every trial participants saw a random sequence of these stimuli, varying 
unpredictably in length between 3 to 7, with each stimulus representing an offer requiring 
either a go response to win the associated tokens or a nogo response for no token gain (for 
simplicity, the illustrations span 3 offers). Subjects had a predetermined go budget that 
placed a restriction on the number of offers that could be accepted. In a low constraint 
context (LC) subjects could accept between 4-6 offers, but only between 1-3 in a high 
constraint context (HC), with the exact budget being uncertain. Upon exhausting a go budget, 
nogo responses were enforced for the remainder of the trial. The context or condition was 
cued via a large (LC) or small (HC) green circle, whilst a depleted budget was signalled via the 
green circle turning red.  
HC and LC trials were pseudo-randomly interleaved. The trial type was indicated via a small 
or large green circle, in the top central portion of the screen, for HC and LC respectively. This 
appeared at trial onset and turned red upon exhaustion of the budget indicating nogo 
responses were obligatory for the remainder of the trial. After the final offer, an outcome 
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incorporating the total number of tokens won, and corresponding cue-token credit 
breakdown was revealed for 2500 ms.  
120 trials (60 per condition) were completed in the scanner across four sessions. The number 
of tokens won across sessions was summed and converted to a cash prize.  
Behavioural data analysis 
Global behaviour 
My analysis focused exclusively on choices pertaining to within-budget offers. Accepts (go 
responses) were obtained as a percentage of the total offer number at each offer value, 
conditional on HC and LC trials. These measures were entered into a two-way repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors control (HC/LC) and offer value (1, 2, 3 
or 4). The data were analysed in the statistical software package SPSS, version 20.0.  
Within-trial modulation of choice 
Within a trial, a player transitioned through a number of discrete states dependent on two 
fluctuating variables, the number of offers already seen and the number of accepts already 
utilized. To assess whether the probability of accepting a given offer was flat across the entire 
length of a given trial or fluctuated as a function of these variables, I split trials by offer index 
(i.e. 1-7) and number of offers already rejected (i.e. 0-6), re-calculating the probability of 
accepting at every possible permutation (see Figure 4.3, p. 91). For each participant, I 
summed the number of offers with a given value presented at each possible state within a 
trial, and then summed the number of accepts at each of those states. Dividing these 
measures provided a probability of acceptance at every choice point. Thus, for both HC and 
LC trials and each offer value, I generated a separate probability accept matrix with offer 
number increasing along the x-dimension, and number of rejects increasing along the y-
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dimension. These matrices were averaged across all participants. For display purposes, I 
discarded cells with less than a total of 10 data points. 
Computational modelling 
As I was interested in assaying subjects’ strategy for maximizing reward, I evaluated evidence 
for four competing choice models. Broadly, I conjectured subjects might approach trials with 
a predetermined decision rule, in effect applying a heuristic uniformly throughout a trial. 
Alternatively, owing to uncertainty surrounding the number of expected offers and the go-
budget (the number of offers they can exploit for reward in a trial), subjects might continually 
adapt their threshold for accepting offers across a trial. I outline the distinct models below, 
ordered by increasing complexity, where each model calculated the value of accepting an 
offer which was then passed through a sigmoid function to determine action probabilities as 
follows: 
𝑃𝐴 =  
1
1 + exp (−𝜏 ∙  𝑉𝐴)
 
where VA is the expected value of accepting an offer, and τ is a temperature parameter that 
governs the stochasticity of choices.  
Baseline heuristic model 
I first specified a baseline heuristic model that calculates the value of accepting (VA) by 
comparing the (face) value of every offer to a stationary decision threshold: 
𝑉𝐴 = 𝑅 − 𝑐1 
where R is the (face) value of the current offer and c1 is a value threshold. 
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Thus, this model makes choices based solely on the immediate (face) value of an offer with 
the probability of acceptance fixed throughout a trial. 
The model has 3 free parameters: the associated decision threshold for both HC and LC 
separately, and the steepness of the sigmoid function. 
Sliding offer model 
I conjectured subjects might track the number of offers seen in a trial and adjust a decision 
threshold such that an offer is more likely to be accepted if forthcoming offers were scarce. 
I added a linear slope parameter to the baseline heuristic model that governed the steepness 
of this decay across a trial, such that: 
𝑉𝐴 = 𝑅 − (𝑐1 −  𝑜 · 𝑐2) 
where R is the (face) value of the current offer, c1 is a value threshold, o is the current offer 
index and c2 governed the steepness of the associated slope. 
The model has 5 free parameters: the associated decision threshold and a slope parameter 
for both HC and LC separately, and the steepness of the sigmoid function.  
Sliding budget model 
A second variable that subjects could track in order to dynamically adjust their decision 
threshold is the number of offers already accepted in a trial. Given a limited go budget, a 
player may be less likely to accept an offer as this resource is exhausted, assuming ample 
offers. This model linearly increased the decision threshold with every additional offer 
accepted, but did not take into account the abundance of remaining offers, such that: 
𝑉𝐴 = 𝑅 − (𝑐1 +  𝑎 · 𝑐2) 
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where R is the (face) value of the current offer, c1 is a value threshold, a is the number of 
offers previously accepted and c2 governed the steepness of the associated slope. 
The model has 5 free parameters: the associated decision threshold and a slope parameter 
for both HC and LC separately, and the steepness of the sigmoid function.  
Integrated sliding model  
Combining the sliding offer and sliding budget models, subjects could track both the number 
of offers seen and the number of offers already accepted in a trial, using each source of 
information to adjust the decision threshold. The threshold should drop linearly with every 
mounting offer and rise linearly with every mounting go response. I fit separate slope 
parameters that governed the linear gradient for the number of offers and number of 
accepts, such that: 
𝑉𝐴 = 𝑅 − (𝑐1 + 𝑎 · 𝑐2 − 𝑜 · 𝑐3) 
where R is the (face) value of the current offer, c1 is a value threshold, a is the number of 
offers previously accepted, o is the current offer index, and c2 and c3 govern the steepness of 
the associated slopes. 
Interestingly, this 2-factor model predicts the optimal action with a frequency of 87% (based 
on group mean parameter fits).  
The model has 7 free parameters: the associated decision threshold, a slope parameter for 
the number of offers, a slope parameter for the number of accepts for both HC and LC 
separately, and a parameter for the steepness of the sigmoid function.  
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Model comparison 
As described previously (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Huys et al., 2011) I used a hierarchical 
Type II Bayesian (or random-effects) procedure using maximum likelihood to fit simple 
parameterized distributions for higher level statistics of the parameters. Since the values of 
parameters for each subject are ‘hidden’, this employs the Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
procedure. Thus, on each iteration the posterior distribution over the group for each 
parameter is used to specify the prior over the individual parameter fits on the next iteration. 
For each parameter I used a single distribution for all participants. Before inference, all 
parameters were suitably transformed to enforce constraints (log and inverse sigmoid 
transforms).  
Models were compared using the integrated Bayesian Information Criterion (iBIC), where 
small iBIC values indicate a model that fits the data better after penalizing for the number of 
parameters. Comparing iBIC values is akin to a likelihood ratio test (Kass & Raftery, 1995).  
Reaction time analysis 
I conjectured that if subjects were evaluating choice options in light of an action threshold 
that fluctuated in accordance with the number of offers already seen and accepted/rejected, 
then reaction times should be faster when the associated threshold is low and a go response 
is relatively more valuable. To test this, I utilized multiple linear regression to model the 
dependence of reaction times for all go choices on the corresponding offer values 
(immediate values) and model thresholds, separately for HC and LC trials. The two regressors 
were forced to compete for variance so as to explore dissociable contributions to the 
observed reaction times.  
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fMRI data acquisition  
fMRI was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Quattro magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany) with echo planar imaging (EPI) and 32-channel head coil. Functional data 
was acquired over four sessions containing 166 volumes with 48 slices (664 volumes total). 
Acquisition parameters were as follows: matrix = 64 x 74; oblique axial slices angled at -30° 
in the antero-posterior axis; spatial resolution: 3 x 3 x 3 mm; TR = 3360 ms; TE = 30 ms. The 
first five volumes were subsequently discarded to allow for steady state magnetization. Field 
maps were acquired prior to the functional runs (matrix = 64 x 64; 64 slices; spatial resolution 
= 3 x 3 x 3 mm; gap = 1 mm; short TE = 10 ms; long TE = 12.46 ms; TR = 1020 ms). Anatomical 
images of each subject’s brain were collected using multi-echo 3D FLASH for mapping proton 
density (PD), T1 and magnetization transfer (MT) at 1mm3 resolution and by T1 weighted 
inversion recovery prepared EPI (IR-EPI) sequences (spatial resolution: 1 x 1 x 1 mm) with B1 
mapping data to correct for the effect of inhomogeneous transmit fields on the T1 maps (3D 
EPI Transverse partition direction; matrix = 64 x 48; phase direction right to left; 48 partitions; 
resolution = 4 x 4 x 4 mm).  
During scanning peripheral measurements of subject pulse and breathing were made 
together with scanner slice synchronization pulses using the Spike2 data acquisition system 
(Cambridge Electronic Design Limited, Cambridge UK). The cardiac pulse signal was 
measured using an MRI compatible pulse oximeter (Model 8600 F0, Nonin Medical, Inc. 
Plymouth, MN) attached to the subject’s finger. The respiratory signal (thoracic movement) 
was monitored using a pneumatic belt positioned around the abdomen close to the 
diaphragm.  
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fMRI data analysis  
Data were analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, London). 
Functional data were bias corrected for 32-channel head coil intensity inhomogeneities. Pre-
processing involved realignment and unwarpping using individual fieldmaps, co-registration 
of EPI to T1w images, and spatial normalization to the Montreal Neurology Institute (MNI) 
space using the segmentation algorithm on the T1w image with a final spatial resolution of 
1 x 1 x 1 mm. Finally, data were smoothed with an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The fMRI 
time series data were high-pass filtered (cutoff = 128 s) and whitened using an AR(1)-model.  
For each subject I used an in-house Matlab toolbox (Hutton et al., 2011) to construct a 
physiological noise model to account for artefacts that take account of cardiac and 
respiratory phase as well as changes in respiratory volume. This resulted in a total of 14 
regressors which were sampled at a reference slice in each image volume to give a set of 
values for each time point. The resulting regressors were included as confounds in all first 
level GLMs. 
In order to identify brain areas sensitive to within-trial variations in choice prescribed by my 
model, I derived an offer-wise go threshold to use as a parametric modulator of offer onsets 
in all first level GLMs. This model threshold (MT) represented an intercept value that 
increased linearly with every offer accepted and decreased linearly with every offer seen. 
The intercept and slopes were based on the mean posterior parameter fits across the group. 
If the offer value was higher than the MT the preferable decision is accepting, otherwise 
rejecting is preferred.  
Below I outline the GLM constructed for first level analyses. All imaging analyses address 
time-points when offers are within-budget and the subject has a free choice. Results are 
reported whole-brain corrected at the cluster level (FWE p =< 0.05) unless otherwise stated.  
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To explore a main effect of action constraint and value / MT (and their relevant interactions) 
I split offer onsets according to constraint (HC / LC) and offer (face) value (1, 2, 3 or 4), 
modelling each in a separate regressor parametrically modulated by MT. This resulted in 16 
regressors of interest. The four scanning sessions were concatenated into one, and a binary 
matrix was included to encode the identity of each session. Additional regressors of no 
interest included six movement-related covariates (the three rigid-body translations and 
three rotations resulting from realignment), 14-physiological regressors (6 respiratory, 6 
cardiac and 2 change in respiratory/heart rate), the onsets of the go responses (to explain 
away the effects of action), all offers outside of budget (for which ‘nogo’ responses were 
enforced) parametrically modulated by offer value, and outcome onsets parametrically 
modulated by the relevant number of tokens won. All regressors were modelled as stick 
functions with duration of zero and convolved with a canonical form of the hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) combined with time and dispersion derivatives.  
At the second level I conducted a random-effects 2 x 4 ANOVA with factors condition (HC / 
LC) and offer value (1, 2, 3 or 4), using first-level contrast images corresponding to the onset 
regressors of interest for each participant. This enabled me to explore main effects of 
condition and value, and their interaction. I generated a second 2 x 4 random-effects ANOVA 
drawing on first-level contrast images from the 8 MT parametric modulators, to explore an 
average effect of MT and a MT x value interaction. In order to obtain an average estimate of 
DLPFC activation in HC compared to LC, parameter estimates for offer values 1-4 were 
averaged in each condition, and LC was subtracted from HC.  
Functional regions of interest  
I used a functional regions of interest (f-ROI) approach to extract parameter estimates in a 
priori regions for a subset of analyses, including correlating neural and behavioural 
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measures, comparing value representations between conditions and exploring functional 
connectivity patterns. Functional ROIs were derived by identifying significant clusters of 
activation surrounding peak voxels from the relevant whole-brain mass univariate analysis. 
Given these clusters often spanned multiple regions, activations were constrained to 
corresponding anatomical ROIs from the MarsBar toolbox (V. 0.42) for SPM. For the VS, 
activations were constrained to an anatomical ROI derived from a diffusion tensor imaging 
connectivity-based parcellation of the right nucleus accumbens (NA) in humans, taken from 
(Baliki et al., 2013). The ROI consisted of both the core and shell subcomponents of NA and 
the right region was flipped along the x-dimension in the MarsBar toolbox to obtain a 
bilateral accumbens mask. 
Psycho-physiological interaction  
For each subject I defined a volume of interest (VOI) that included all active voxels (at p = 
0.2) from a first-level contrast that specified a linear effect of model thresholds across 
offered value { -2 -1 1 2 } within f-ROIs derived from the same second-level contrast (see 
Figure 4.6A, black arrows, p. 98). This allowed me to define voxels active on a subject-by-
subject basis, but confined to the cluster active at the group-level. I noted that 1 out of 21 
subjects had no active voxels when specifying both the ACC and left DLPFC (BA46) as seeds, 
while 3 out of 21 subjects had no active voxels when specifying dorsal vmPFC as a seed. These 
subjects were excluded from the corresponding PPI analysis. I used the generalized PPI 
toolbox for SPM (gPPI; http://www.nitrc.org/projects/gppi) to create a new GLM in which 
the individual seed time-course was deconvolved to construct a neuronal time-course for 
multiplication with regressors modelling all task effects, and then reconvolved with the HRF. 
Thus, the gPPI GLM includes a psychophysiological regressor for all conditions (McLaren, 
Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012). An indicator function for the relevant contrast, the original BOLD 
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eigenvariate, 6 motion and 12 physiological parameters were included as additional 
regressors.  
I first looked for regions in which connectivity with the seed region was modulated by MT, 
but where this modulation was greater for offers requiring adaptive control (values 1 and 2 
in HC, and value 1 in LC > values 3 and 4 in HR, and values 2, 3 and 4 in LC). I also performed 
a second PPI restricted to offers requiring adaptive choice (values 1 and 2 in HC, and value 1 
in LC), to ascertain whether connectivity increased (positive PPI) or decreased (negative PPI) 
with respect to increases in MT (compared to zero). One-sample t-tests were performed on 
the relevant contrasts at the second-level.  
4.3 Results  
Subjects reject lower value offers when a go budget is scarce  
Subjects were sensitive to both immediate (face) value and the delayed consequences arising 
from a budget constraint. Higher value offers were accepted more than lower value offers (a 
main effect of value: F(1,68, 33.63) = 277.87, MSE = 379.38, p < 0.001) and more offers were 
accepted overall in LC compared to HC (a main effect of constraint: F(1, 20) = 182.70, MSE = 
45.69, p < 0.001). Importantly, subjects were less willing to accept low value offers in HC 
compared to LC (a budget constraint x value interaction: F(1,73, 34.67) = 30.41, MSE = 
136.19, p < 0.001) (see Figure 4.2B, p.90).  
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Figure 4.2 (A) Plot shows the mean percentage of offers accepted split by token value and 
condition (HC in red, LC in blue). Subjects were less willing to accept low value offers when 
the budget was scarce. Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed significant decreases in percentage 
accept for offer values 1, 2 and 3 in HC compared to LC (all p < 0.001). Vertical lines represent 
SEM. (B) Integrated BIC scores (for the group as a whole) show that a model in which both 
the number of offers already seen and number of offers already accepted/rejected are used 
to adjust the threshold for action fits behaviour best. ISM = Integrated sliding model; SOM = 
Sliding offers model; SBM = Sliding budget model; BHM = Baseline heuristic model. The 
number of free parameters built into each model is indicated in parentheses.  
Dynamic versus fixed control 
Subjects dynamically adjusted their responses when delayed consequences fluctuated within 
a trial. These consequences depended on both the number of offers already seen and the 
number previously accepted/rejected in a trial. Figure 4.3 (p. 91) illustrates that subjects 
utilized both these components to adjust their responses.  
I next quantified this effect by comparing models accounting for the number of previous 
offers, number of previous accepts, or both (see Methods, p. 81 - 84). I found strong evidence 
that the integrated sliding model, wherein both components contribute to choice, fitted 
subject data best at the group level (lowest iBIC score). Although the sliding offer model 
performs well (in which only the number of offers seen is used to adjust choice), an addition 
of tracking the number of accepts/rejects improved the maximum likelihood across every 
subject (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 5.96 x 10-5). Consistent with the notion that subjects 
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used a dynamic control strategy, reaction times were faster when action (model) thresholds 
from the winning model were low (mean beta HC: 192.5, p < 0.0001; mean beta LC: 320.1, p 
< 0.0001), controlling for the immediate (face) value of the current offer (mean beta HC: -
107.3, p < 0.0001; mean beta LC: -92.0, p < 0.0001).  
 
Figure 4.3 Subjects adjust the probability of accepting less desirable offers as a function of 
the number of offers seen (x-axis) and number of offers already rejected (y-axis). The 
spectrum runs from blue (probability 0) to red (probability 1).  
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fMRI neuroimaging 
As in other control paradigms (Barber & Carter, 2005; Kerns et al., 2004), I first performed a 
categorical comparison to identify brain regions more active when the overall demand for 
control is increased (HC > LC), averaging across offer values (see Methods, fMRI data 
analysis, p. 86 ; see Table 4.1, p. 105). I found greater whole-brain corrected activity in right 
DLPFC and bilateral superior parietal lobule in HC overall compared to LC (Figure 4.4A, p. 93). 
These regions are associated with model-based planning (Owen, 1997; van den Heuvel et al., 
2003; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012), task switching and cognitive control (Badre, 2008; M. 
M. Botvinick et al., 2001; Liston et al., 2006), the resolution of uncertainty (Yoshida & Ishii, 
2006) and working memory (Barbey et al., 2012; Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003; Narayanan et al., 
2005).  
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Figure 4.4 Distinct but overlapping fronto-parietal networks are recruited when action 
constraints increase and when the expected long-term value of an option increases. (A) A 
fronto-parietal network spanning right DLPFC and bilateral parietal cortex was more active 
in HC compared to LC trials, during offers subject to go/nogo. The black arrows indicate two 
DLPFC clusters that were combined to form a DLPFC f-ROI responding to HC > LC. (B) Model 
thresholds, denoting the long-term component of expected value, correlated negatively with 
BOLD in an overlapping fronto-subcortical-parietal network, including ACC, bilateral DLPFC, 
parietal cortex and striatum. Activity in these regions was highest when the value of 
conserving a unit of budget (rejecting) was low. (C) Subjects with greater right DLPFC 
recruitment (see panel A, black arrows, for DLPFC f-ROI) in HC compared to LC showed a 
larger adjustment in willingness to accept value 2 offers between conditions (r2 = 0.33, p = 
0.007). Each point represents one participant.  
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I next hypothesized that greater right DLPFC recruitment in HC compared to LC would result 
in a larger behavioural adjustment between conditions. I focused on value 2 offers for which 
I observed the largest change in behaviour between HC and LC. I derived an average 
parameter estimate for a HC > LC contrast in a right DLPFC functional ROI, combining two 
activated right DLPFC clusters (1078 total voxels; see Figure 4.4A, middle panel, black arrows, 
p. 93), averaging the betas for the four value regressors, and then subtracting LC from HC. A 
between-subject correlation revealed a positive association between parameter estimates 
in right DLPFC for a HC > LC contrast and the change in propensity to accept value 2 offers 
between HC and LC (r2 = 0.33, p < 0.007) (Figure 4.4C, p. 93). Thus, right DLPFC is instrumental 
in the categorical adjustment of action control in my task.  
To identify correlates of value for guiding choice, I tested for a positive average linear effect 
of offer (face) value across both HC and LC conditions, revealing a value-dependent response 
in regions that included vmPFC and VS (including nucleus accumbens) (Figure 4.5A, p. 95; see 
Table 4.1 for all regions, p. 105). Importantly, this value signal was independent of any motor 
response as go responses were modelled as separate onsets in my GLM. Thus, offer values 
were tracked in regions involved in value representation (Jenison et al., 2011; Schultz, 2000). 
Further, as participants’ choices were sensitive to action constraint, I anticipated the 
representation of offer value in vmPFC and VS, two regions widely implicated in value-based 
choice (De Martino et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Hunt et al., 2012), would be 
modulated accordingly. I derived functional ROIs (see Methods, p. 88) by defining voxels 
(within whole-brain corrected clusters) in vmPFC (928 voxels; see Figure 4.5B, p. 95) and VS 
(56 voxels; see Figure 4.5C, p. 95) that showed a linear effect of offer value on average (as 
above), and then tested for an orthogonal value x condition (HC or LC) interaction. I found a 
significant interaction in vmPFC (F(2.38, 47.62) = 5.34, MSE = 1.67, p = 0.005) but not in VS 
(Figure 4.5B, p.95). In LC, vmPFC was more responsive to value 2 than value 1 (p = 0.02) and 
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value 3 than value 2 (p = 0.02), whereas in HC, neither value 2 (p = 0.35) nor value 3 (p = 0.38) 
induced greater BOLD than value 1.  
 
Figure 4.5 Value representations are modulated by context. (A) The BOLD signal in vmPFC, 
VS, right amygdala and precuneus/posterior cingulate covaries with offer value. (B) vmPFC 
tracks value linearly in LC but with a depressed slope for HC. The representation of value 2 
offers is particularly degraded, mirroring behavioural data. Vertical lines represent SEM. (C) 
A f-ROI confined to the ventral striatum was used in a constraint (HC/LC) x value (1, 2, 3 or 
4) interaction analysis.  
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Given behavioural and computational evidence that subjects used trial structure to evaluate 
options, I conjectured within-trial adaptive choice would manifest as a dynamic modulation 
of value representations in vmPFC, analogous to that observed between HC and LC trials. To 
test this I constructed a summary measure reflecting a time-varying decision threshold, as 
prescribed by the winning model, that then provided an offer-wise parametric regressor (see 
Methods, p. 86). In effect this model threshold (MT) represented the value of carrying one 
more unit of budget (the number of accepts endowed for a trial) into the next offer, 
independent of the immediate value of the current offer. The overall value of accepting was 
thus the difference between offer value and MT. Note however, in contrast to the down-
regulation of value 2 offers in HC, the time-variant adaptation in choice prescribed by the 
winning model require an up-regulation of low value offers when the future benefit of 
conserving a unit of budget is low.  
I first tested for regions where BOLD signal correlated with MTs across both conditions (see 
Methods, fMRI data analysis, p. 86) finding a fronto-subcortical-parietal network was 
modulated negatively, with no regions modulated positively. This is consistent with BOLD 
signal being highest when the expected utility of carrying a unit of budget forward was low, 
and thus a go response was more favourable. This network, that includes ACC, bilateral 
DLPFC, parietal cortex and striatum (Figure 4.4B, p. 93; see Table 4.1 for all regions, p. 105), 
is partially overlapping with that seen in the contrast of HC > LC (Figure 4.4A, p. 93), implying 
similar regions of PFC are recruited when action control is reliant on internal valuations 
versus external cues. Note that similar networks are engaged during working memory 
(Barbey et al., 2012; Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003) and in goal-directed and/or cognitive control 
paradigms (Badre, 2008; Hare et al., 2009; Rushworth et al., 2011; Yoshida & Ishii, 2006).  
In my task, the immediate reward gained from accepting value 3 or 4 offers is higher than 
the maximum MT value and thus these offers should always be accepted. In contrast, the 
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difference between the immediate reward obtainable from value 1 and 2 offers and their 
corresponding MTs fluctuates about zero, signifying choice policy, consistent with the 
observed behaviour, should shift in response to trial state. Consequently, I hypothesized that 
an independent network tracked MTs differentially dependent on offered value. To test this, 
I looked for brain regions showing a linearly increasing effect of MTs across both conditions. 
As MTs were tracked negatively this tested an hypothesis they would correlate more strongly 
with BOLD as offer value decreased. I found clusters in ACC, left DLPFC (BA46), and a dorsal 
region of vmPFC (BA10) (Figure 4.6A, p. 98; see Table 4.1 for details, p. 105) that were 
increasingly more responsive to changes in MTs as offered value decreased. The ACC cluster 
was particularly striking, with post-hoc exploratory one sample t-tests revealing MT 
representations solely for offers requiring adaptive choice, that is offer value 1 for both 
conditions (HC: p = 0.002, LC: p = 0.01) and a trend for offer value 2 for HC alone (p = 0.09) 
(Figure 4.6B, p. 98). Note that I found behavioural evidence of adaptive choice corresponding 
to these three offers (Figure 4.3, p. 91).  
Finally, I used a connectivity analysis to ask whether brain regions tracking MTs for offers 
requiring policy switches were modulating value representations in vmPFC to instigate 
adaptive switches in choice. I selected physiological responses from three f-ROI seed regions, 
showing a linear effect of MTs (reflecting the long-term component of value), that included 
ACC (739 voxels in group-level ROI), left DLPFC/BA46 (502 voxels in group-level ROI) and 
dorsal vmPFC/BA10 (179 voxels in group-level ROI) (see Figure 4.6A, black arrows, p. 98). 
Interestingly, the PFC has previously been implicated in flexible action control, and, in the 
case of DLPFC, top-down modulation of value signals (Hare et al., 2009; Walton et al., 2007). 
I performed a PPI to test a hypothesis that coupling would be modulated by fluctuations in 
MTs, and that this change would be greater for low value offers requiring adaptive choice 
(values 1 and 2 in HC, and value 1 in LC) than for high value offers (where choice is not 
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dependent on MT). The regions identified by the ensuing PPI correspond to regions whose 
connectivity with the relevant seed region depends on both the immediate value and MT of 
the current offer.  
 
Figure 4.6 Model thresholds are selectively tracked in a prefrontal network. (A) BOLD signal 
in ACC, left DLPFC (BA46) and dorsal VMPFC (BA10) increases as model thresholds decrease 
(and action is most favourable), only for offers mandating adaptive control. (B) Parameter 
estimates from the ACC cluster shown in panel A illustrate model thresholds are tracked for 
offers requiring adaptive control (value 1 in HC and LC, and a trend for value 2 in HC). Red 
corresponds to HC; blue to LC. Vertical lines represent SEM. (C) A whole-brain voxel-based 
gPPI analysis revealed ACC is more functionally connected with the vmPFC when actions cost 
are high and low offers should be rejected. This region of vmPFC overlaps with a cluster that 
tracks offer value (Figure 4.5A, p. 95) and is sensitive to categorical changes in context (Figure 
4.5B, p. 95). (D) Comparison of functional connectivity patterns between ACC (yellow; 
displayed at 0.001 uncorrected) or left DLPFC/BA46 (green; displayed at 0.005 uncorrected) 
and vmPFC. As with ACC, the left DLPFC demonstrates a functional coupling with vmPFC 
when accepting an option offering only a small immediate reward is unfavourable, but this 
effect only emerges at a more liberal threshold. 
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I found a functional coupling between ACC and vmPFC that was sensitive to fluctuations in 
MTs, that was larger on average for offers requiring adaptive choice. This effect was 
significant when using small volume correction for the vmPFC f-ROI that tracked offer value. 
Given directionality cannot be determined when comparing parametric effects across 
conditions, I performed a second PPI analysis, now confined to offers requiring adaptive 
choice, enabling me to assess whether connectivity was positively or negatively modulated 
by increasing MTs. A vmPFC f-ROI approach revealed that ACC and vmPFC were more 
functionally coupled when MTs were high (mean ppi = 3.04, p = 0.005), in other words when 
low value offers need to be rejected. Thus, connectivity between ACC and vmPFC was 
dependent on both immediate value and MT. Although the left DLPFC did not demonstrate 
functional coupling with vmPFC that depended on both MT and offer value, qualitatively I 
observed an effect in vmPFC at a more liberal threshold (p = 0.005 uncorrected). In fact, I did 
not detect any significant difference in the magnitude of the PPI effect (2-sample t-test, p = 
0.68) between ACC and DLPFC when using a vmPFC f-ROI, implying that despite a more 
prominent contribution of ACC, DLPFC also contributes to the observed connectivity. When 
dorsal vmPFC was used as a seed, no significant results were observed.  
4.4 Discussion 
This study addressed the computational implementation of context-specific action control in 
value-guided choice. I show that subjects incorporate both extrinsic constraints on action 
and intrinsic fluctuations in opportunity to adaptively switch between a go/nogo response. 
Mechanistically, a fronto-subcortical-parietal network tracks the downstream consequence 
of spending a limited action budget, whilst ACC couples to vmPFC to shift the representation 
of value in favour of long-term profit.  
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In this task, subjects track the number of offers already seen and number already 
accepted/rejected in a trial to compute the future value of expending a unit of budget. This 
model fits behaviour better than simpler candidates in which action is driven solely by 
immediate reward or where only a restricted set of environmental features is consequential. 
Of interest, the winning model produces behaviour that closely approximates optimal 
choice, which relies on back-propagating through a decision tree of all future moves in a trial. 
Although this strategy is computationally taxing (given the depth of the search tree in this 
game), subjects could be computing long-term value by recruiting a model-based system that 
searches through future states ‘on the fly’ (Dayan, 2008). Alternatively, a player could track 
aspects of the environment to index stored values, or to update values under a model-free 
regime. Although my task cannot arbitrate between these possibilities, I note the circuitry 
that tracks the MTs from the winning model overlaps with that implicated in model-based 
reinforcement learning (Daw et al., 2011; Glascher et al., 2010; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 
2012).  
Influential accounts of ACC propose a myriad of roles including conflict monitoring (M. M. 
Botvinick, 2007), error monitoring (Rushworth et al., 2004), overriding pre-potent responses 
(Kerns et al., 2004), evaluating outcomes (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002) and action-outcome 
learning for negative feedback (Rushworth et al., 2004). While the task lacked explicit 
negative feedback, the finding that ACC tracks the MTs necessary for implementing adaptive 
choice is consistent with the conflict monitoring account, but not with a role in error 
monitoring, given choices were closely aligned with optimality. Unlike previous paradigms 
where switches in contingency are explicitly cued (Kerns et al., 2004), I show conflict in ACC 
can arise endogenously via tracking fluctuations in downstream consequence.  
ACC is also implicated in foraging (Kolling et al., 2012) where it is proposed to track the value 
of alternative choice options during a trade-off between exploration and exploitation. I 
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found ACC activity was highest when exploiting a low value offer was more optimal. 
However, in my task ACC only tracks MTs corresponding to offers that are routinely rejected. 
In this light, my findings can be construed as in keeping with the former role. These findings 
also hint that a conflict monitoring account of ACC can be reinterpreted as reflecting a need 
to switch behaviour from the current default response, as opposed to encoding a non-
specific conflict signal (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013). Indeed, recent work further 
supports the notion that ACC assumes a default frame of reference, by adapting choice from 
the best long-running option (Boorman, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013). 
A number of studies propose ACC expresses a prediction error (Ide et al., 2013),which can be 
used to update internally-generated models (O'Reilly et al., 2013). This may explain why high-
conflict or high-volatility trials, often confounded with surprise, also induce responses in ACC. 
However, my data indicate that surprise cannot fully account for the ACC activation 
observed, as stimuli are presented with equal frequency such that surprise does not vary 
within a trial. Instead, a response to low value offers switches in line with changes in delayed 
consequence. Thus, in the context of the current study, it is likely that ACC plays a more 
general role in a strategic adjustment of behaviour that is rooted in processing or initiating 
atypical stimulus or action requirements, which also includes surprising events.  
A dynamic coupling between ACC and vmPFC was seen when MTs dictate action costs are 
high, with the greatest change in coupling evident in offers where action requirement is most 
dependent on MT. One interpretation is that ACC suppresses the representation of low value 
offers in vmPFC when the future value of conserving a unit of budget is high and the optimal 
decision is to reject. Conversely, when MTs are low, decoupling between ACC and vmPFC 
may reflect a disinhibition of value signals relating to previously unfavourable offers. This 
contrasts with other suggestions that ACC signals a need for control but plays no causal role 
in conflict resolution (Kerns et al., 2004), or that dissociable decision variables are computed 
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in vmPFC and ACC that compete for behavioural output (Boorman et al., 2013). Since ACC 
activity in the current task is not sensitive to changes in MTs corresponding to high value 
offers, it is unlikely to represent an unrelated correlate of trial time or WM content.  
In contrast to the selectivity implemented by ACC, I found that MTs were tracked 
indiscriminately within an extensive fronto-subcortical-parietal network. Though planned 
choice has only recently been studied in a value domain, a finding that this network tracks 
computations related to future value is consistent with previous work from the model-based 
reinforcement learning literature (Daw et al., 2005; Glascher et al., 2010; Wunderlich, Dayan, 
et al., 2012). Interestingly, recent evidence suggests PFC neurons can adapt their tuning 
profiles to accommodate changes in behavioural context (Stokes et al., 2013), a mechanism 
that could underlie a network-level implementation of the adaptive responses observed in 
my task. I note this fronto-parietal network also encompasses regions implicated in executive 
control (Barber & Carter, 2005; Hare et al., 2009; Wallis & Miller, 2003), exploratory 
behaviour (Daw et al., 2006; Yoshida & Ishii, 2006), intertemporal choice (McClure et al., 
2004) and WM (Barbey et al., 2012; Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003).  
One limitation of the current task is that it cannot characterize a neural correlate of the fully 
integrated value derived from my computational model (the difference between the current 
offer and the associated MT) because this is correlated with the immediate value of the offer. 
However, the observed fronto-subcortical-parietal activity may reflect a value comparison 
between offer value and MT. As MTs decrease the difference in value between go and nogo 
shifts in favour of a go response, whilst when MTs increase they approach the average worth 
of the offer value range (2.5), making the decision to accept or reject harder. Alternatively, 
given that MTs trended downwards as trials progressed (although not exclusively, as they 
are also a function of the current budget), they are anti-correlated with WM demand, 
following the contents of trial history become harder to maintain (and update) through time. 
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Since I found activity in this fronto-subcortical-parietal network tracked MTs across all offers, 
this profile may reflect a WM signature. Interestingly, it has been shown that goal-directed 
choice is dependent on WM (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013). In this regard, there is 
considerable debate as to whether delay-period DLPFC activity, classically interpreted as a 
correlate of WM, reflects the pure maintenance of information, or instead if WM is merely 
an emergent properly of executive and attentional functions implemented in DLPFC (Postle, 
2006).  
My paradigm also incorporated high (HC) and low action constraint (LC) environments, and 
in the former subjects reject lower value options to increase the probability of capitalizing 
from larger later rewards. I found categorically switching from LC to HC correlated with the 
fMRI signal in a similar fronto-parietal network. Within this network, the more DLPFC was 
recruited in HC compared to LC, the more a subject would modulate their behavioural 
response to value 2 offers between conditions. In addition, I found widespread correlates of 
offer value in regions previously linked to value computations, including vmPFC (Hare et al., 
2009), VS (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012), posterior cingulate/precuneus (Litt et al., 2011) and 
amygdala (Jenison et al., 2011). Importantly, value representations were altered in HC in 
vmPFC, a key value-coding region.  
Interestingly, a comparable fronto-parietal network is reliably up-regulated in conditions 
requiring cognitive control or overcoming response conflict in task switching paradigms 
(Badre, 2008; Kerns et al., 2004; Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 2009; Pochon, Riis, Sanfey, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). This likeness suggests participants may be engaging cognitive 
control mechanisms to appropriately reject appetitive, though relatively less valuable, offers 
in light of increasing environmental demands in HC trials. In this framework, my data 
corroborate previous ideas of interplay between PFC and value regions, suggestive of a 
scheme whereby value signals are modulated directly to achieve adaptive choice (Diekhof & 
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Gruber, 2010; Hare et al., 2009). However, as with previous control paradigms, I note that a 
categorical difference in activity profiles between conditions does not pose any properties 
that allow attribution of specific computational roles. 
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Table 4.1 Results for all second-level contrasts (whole-brain corrected at the cluster-level, 
FWE p =< 0.05). 
 
 
Contrast Name of Region 
Cluster FWE 
p value 
MNI Coordinates Statistics 
x y z t value Z score 
HC > LC 
Right Parietal < 0.001 28 -64 48 5.70 5.39 
Right DLPFC < 0.001 40 12 30 4.75 4.56 
Left Parietal 0.002 -28 -56 46 4.53 4.37 
LC > HC 
Right V1 
< 0.001 
8 -76 6 7.38 6.77 
Left V1 -8 -84 -8 6.08 5.72 
Left 
Parahippocampal 
< 0.001 -28 -28 -12 5.80 5.48 
Left Parietal 
< 0.001 
-50 -24 24 5.77 4.46 
Left Insula -40 -6 -2 4.59 4.42 
vmPFC < 0.001 -6 44 -10 5.06 4.84 
Left Precuneus < 0.001 -10 -54 -12 4.56 4.39 
Right Parietal < 0.001 44 -34 24 4.49 4.33 
Mid Cingulate 0.001 14 -20 46 4.08 3.96 
Linear effect offer 
value 
vmPFC 
< 0.001 
4 52 14 6.31 5.91 
Bilateral 
accumbens 
-4 14 -8 5.70 5.39 
Left Mid Temporal 
< 0.001 
-52 -58 20 5.83 5.50 
Left Parietal -54 -26 22 5.62 5.33 
Left Sup Temporal -58 -18 10 4.46 4.30 
Left Mid Occipital -42 -74 32 4.15 4.02 
Left 
Parahippocampal 
< 0.001 
-28 -32 -14 5.67 5.37 
Right Lingual 14 -44 2 5.45 5.18 
Right Cuneus < 0.001 16 -82 32 5.65 5.35 
Right M1 0.004 56 -8 44 5.38 5.12 
Left M1 0.001 -44 -16 58 4.91 4.71 
Right Hippocampus 0.008 24 -18 -16 4.89 4.69 
Negative offer value 
Right Insula < 0.001 30 22 -10 5.44 5.17 
ACC < 0.001 6 24 48 5.26 5.02 
Left Insula 0.009 -34 18 -4 5.04 4.82 
Right Parietal 0.001 36 -50 50 4.47 4.31 
Negative model 
thresholds 
Left Caudate 
< 0.001 
-12 -6 18 8.23 7.42 
Right Sup Parietal 24 -56 52 7.95 7.21 
Right IFGpt 32 18 28 7.92 7.19 
Right Thalamus 12 -10 18 7.77 7.08 
Left Mid Occipital -38 -72 10 7.49 6.86 
Right Lingual 20 -74 4 7.16 6.60 
Right DLPFC 32 8 26 6.99 6.46 
Right Frontal Mid 
Orb 
34 52 -6 4.87 4.67 
Left Putamen < 0.001 -18 17 -6 4.25 4.11 
Left M1 
< 0.001 
-42 -2 52 6.40 5.99 
Left DLPFC -26 6 64 4.94 4.73 
Right IDGpo 
< 0.001 
34 26 -10 6.06 5.70 
Right Caudate 10 20 -8 4.27 4.13 
Linear effect model 
thresholds 
ACC < 0.001 -6 28 22 5.29 5.04 
Left DLPFC (BA46) < 0.001 -32 46 18 4.69 4.51 
Dorsal vmPFC 
(BA10) 
0.037 -8 56 2 4.50 4.34 
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CHAPTER 5 
 ARBITRATION BETWEEN CONTROLLED AND IMPULSIVE CHOICE 
The impulse to act for immediate reward often conflicts with more deliberate evaluations 
that support long-term benefit. The neural architecture that negotiates this conflict remains 
unclear. One account proposes a single neural circuit that evaluates both immediate and 
delayed outcomes, while another outlines separate impulsive and patient systems that 
compete for behavioural control. Here I designed a task in which a complex pay-out structure 
divorces the immediate value of acting from the overall long-term value, within the same 
outcome modality. Using model-based fMRI in humans, I demonstrate separate neural 
representations of immediate and long-term value, with the former tracked in anterior 
caudate (AC) and the latter in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Crucially, when 
subjects’ choices were compatible with long-run consequences, value signals in AC were 
down-weighted and those in vmPFC were enhanced, while the opposite occurred when 
choice was impulsive. Thus, my data implicate a trade-off in value representation between 
AC and vmPFC as underlying controlled versus impulsive choice.  
5.1 Introduction 
Everyday occurrences often involve negotiating immediate temptations whose consumption 
might jeopardize long-term goals. A common instance is where the prospect of a large 
immediate reward is coupled with a harmful yet delayed consequence, such as enjoying a 
cigarette that can imperil long-term health. Behavioural findings suggest that in this context 
the desire for an hedonic payoff competes with the intent to act with foresight (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Hare et al., 2009; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009), 
demanding self-control.  
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A longstanding notion in psychology is that resisting temptation involves a competition 
between two competing systems (Hofmann et al., 2009; Hofmann & Van Dillen, 2012). In 
support of this idea, several experiments have found evidence for a trade-off between 
separate neural systems that preferentially activate when choice is driven by immediate and 
delayed rewards respectively (McClure et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004). These systems are 
thought to guide choice by encoding value on opposing time-scales, though it is unclear 
whether their selective involvement reflects the tracking of other decision components.  
An alternative perspective, particularly within neuroeconomics, suggests choice is driven by 
a single system that represents both immediate and delayed decision outcomes. In dietary 
choice paradigms, where individuals choose between foods that vary along a scale of 
healthiness and tastiness (Hare et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011), neuroimaging supports a role 
for the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in integrating both components of value 
(Hare et al., 2009; Rangel, 2013). This is reinforced by other evidence that a common vmPFC-
striatal circuit tracks the subjective value of choice options (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). The 
divergence between these two perspectives remains largely unresolved. 
Here, I designed a novel paradigm that required subjects to accept or reject offers with 
known immediate value, presented sequentially within a trial. The probability of receiving 
large or small offers depended on past actions, such that an early acceptance of a large 
immediately available offer harmed long-term earnings by diminishing the opportunity for 
future rewards. Thus, maximizing long-run earnings sometimes required rejecting seemingly 
attractive offers associated with a high immediate payoff. In contrast to previous paradigms, 
long-run consequences were fully defined within a single outcome modality based on 
knowledge of the formal structure of the task. In this way I was able to decorrelate 
immediate from long-term value across offers, where the latter includes the delayed 
consequences of acting. I used model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
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to investigate the neural representation of each value component and linked this to a 
disposition for controlled versus impulsive action.  
5.2 Methods 
Subjects  
23 adults participated in the experiment (9 male and 14 female; age range 18-26; mean 21.2, 
SD = 2.33 years). All were healthy, reporting no history of neurological, psychiatric or other 
current medical problems. Subjects provided written informed consent to partake in the 
study, which was approved by the local ethics board (University College London, UK). 
Training paradigm  
In a conditioning phase, performed outside of the scanner, subjects learnt stimulus-reward 
associations between a set of three differently coloured rectangular cues and their 
respective reward values. Each coloured rectangle corresponded to one of three possible 
outcomes involving receipt of 3, 5, or 7 tokens, randomized across individuals. Subjects were 
instructed that each token would translate into a fixed sum of money at the end of the 
experiment. Each trial began with a central fixation cross presented for 1000 ms, followed 
by presentation of a random pair of coloured cues, one appearing to the left one to the right 
of the screen. Subjects had a 2000 ms time-window to choose between these two boxes via 
a left or right button press, followed by presentation of the outcome of their choice for 1000 
ms. The outcome was a written message indicating the total number of tokens won. Subjects 
were instructed to explore all options until they were confident they had learnt all three 
associations, after which they should choose the box from the pair with the higher value. 
Each trial was defined as either correct if the subject chose the more valuable of the two 
options, and incorrect if the less valuable option was chosen. To ensure adequate learning, 
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performance was calculated over six bins of twenty trials, with all subjects reaching a 
performance criterion of >= 90% by trial 60 onwards. Subjects were asked to verbally 
communicate the nature of the learnt associations. 
Task paradigm 
On every trial subjects were presented with a random sequence of trained stimuli (see 
training paradigm), appearing individually and sequentially, with a variable inter-stimulus 
interval (750 - 1250 ms). Each stimulus, presented for 1500 ms, constituted an offer requiring 
either a go response to win the relevant number of tokens or a nogo response which lead 
the player to forego monetary gain. However, a restriction was placed on the number of 
offers that could be exploited for reward on any given trial. Specifically, subjects were 
instructed that they could receive between 7-9 offers out of which between 4-6 could be 
accepted. The precise offer number and acceptance budget were drawn randomly and 
independently on every trial under a uniform distribution, and thus every combination was 
equally likely. A green circle on the top central portion of the screen turned red to indicate 
that a player had exhausted their go budget, after which nogo responses were enforced for 
any remaining offers.  
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Figure 5.1 In pre-scanning training (not shown), subjects learnt to associate three distinct 
colour stimuli with a token value of 3, 5 or 7, with each token won translated into a cash 
prize at the end of the experiment. In the actual experiment proper (shown above), a player 
was presented with a sequence of stimuli, each constituting an individual offer. These offers 
required a go response to win or a nogo response to forego a gain. Crucially, a restriction 
was placed on the number of offers that could be exploited per trial sequence, such that on 
every trial a player could receive an overall amount of 7-9 offers but where only 4-6 (go 
budget) could be accepted, with every combination being equally likely. A green circle at the 
top central portion of the screen turned red to indicate a player had exhausted their go 
budget, after which they passively observed the remaining sequence of outstanding offers. 
At trial onset, each offer had an equal probability of being the colour associated with 3, 5 or 
7 tokens {0.33 0.33 0.33, respectively}. With the exception of the first offer, if a player 
accepted a value 7 offer before rejecting at least three previous offers, the distribution would 
shift in favour of value 3 offers for the remainder of the sequence {0.9 0.05 0.05}. Likewise, 
if a player accepted a value 5 offer before rejecting at least three previous offers, the 
distribution would modestly shift in favour of value 3 offers {0.5 0.25 0.25}. The current 
distribution was updated based on the most recent action. Thus, an optimal player had to 
track the immediate reward environment as well as calculate overall (long-term) value by 
taking account of how an immediate go response might impact on future reward abundance, 
entailing often rejecting an offer associated with a large immediate reward. 
Importantly, the value of each offer was probabilistic and governed by a set of explicitly 
instructed contingencies. At trial onset, each offer had an independent and equal probability 
of being worth 3, 5 or 7 tokens {0.33 0.33 0.33 (for 3, 5 and 7 respectively)}. Excluding the 
first offer, if a player accepted a value 7 offer before rejecting three or more previous offers 
the distribution would shift such that every future offer would have a probability distribution 
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greatly in favour of value 3 {0.9 0.05 0.05}. Similarly, excluding the first offer, if a player 
accepted a value 5 offer before rejecting three or more previous offers the distribution would 
shift such that every future offer would have a probability distribution moderately in favour 
of value 3 {0.5 0.25 0.25}. The probability distribution was updated according to the choice 
made on the most recent offer. Thus a player had to consider both the immediate and long-
term consequences of a go response in order to maximize payoff across a trial. Following the 
last offer, an outcome displaying the total number of offers won was presented on the screen 
for 2500 ms.  
All subjects received 1 block (36 trials) of training outside the scanner in order to familiarize 
themselves with the task attributes and to diminish learning in the scanner. Subsequently, 
108 trials were completed in the scanner across three sessions of 36 trials. The number of 
tokens won across sessions was summed and converted to a cash prize.  
Due to the complex nature of the task, subjects were probed to ensure they had currently 
understood the nature of the contingencies that linked actions to switches in the distribution 
of offers, prior to scanning. Specifically I constructed a written set of hypothetical trials, 
where for each trial subjects were ask to indicate their belief in the current offer distribution 
given a history of specific offers and actions. For example, “What is the probability of the 
next offer being worth 5 tokens given that a value 7 offer was accepted at the third index 
and no offers had previously been rejected?”. One subject failed to demonstrate correct 
knowledge of the task and was excluded from participating in the scanning portion of the 
experiment. This participant thus is not reflected in the remaining 23 participating subjects.  
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Behavioural data analysis 
Within-trial modulation of choice 
Within a trial, a player transitions through a number of discrete states dependent on three 
fluctuating variables, the number of offers already seen, the number of accepts already 
expended and the current offer distribution. To assess how the probability of accepting a 
given offer fluctuated as a function of these variables, I split trials by offer index (i.e. 1-9), the 
number of offers already rejected (i.e. 0-8), and the current offer distribution, calculating the 
probability of accepting at every possible permutation (Figure 5.3A, p. 124). Note that here I 
only display behaviour corresponding to offers where the probability distribution is equal 
given that choice under this contingency is most relevant to the questions of interest. The 
probability of accepting at every state was averaged across all participants. For display 
purposes, I discarded cells with less than a total of 15 data points. 
Robust logistic regression 
In order to confirm my hypothesis that both immediate and long-term value show 
independent effects on choice, I used a robust logistic regression to model the dependence 
of a go/nogo response (across all choice data) on immediate and long-term value in a model 
in which both regressors competed for variance. The algorithm implemented used iteratively 
reweighted least squares with a logistic weighting function. I performed one-sample t-tests 
on the resulting beta coefficients across subjects. A positive beta implies subjects are more 
likely to go when value is high.  
Computational modelling 
A major interest here is the extent to which subjects’ utilize estimates of immediate and 
long-term value to guide choice. I used computational modelling to evaluate evidence that 
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choice was guided purely by immediate value, purely by (the optimal) long-term value, or by 
a corresponding trade-off. Each model calculated the value of accepting an offer which was 
passed through a sigmoid function (σ) to determine action probabilities as follows: 
𝑃𝐴 =  
1
1 + exp (−𝜏 ∙  𝑉𝐴)
 
where VA is the expected value of accepting an offer, and τ is a temperature parameter that 
governs the stochasticity of choices.  
Immediate reward model  
I conjectured subjects might choose on the basis of immediate value, disregarding the 
downstream consequences associated with prematurely accepting high (face) value offers, 
whereby 
𝑉𝐴 = 𝐼𝑅 −  𝑐1  
where IR is the face value of the current offer and c1 represents a value intercept. 
IR, c1 and τ (the temperature parameter of the associated sigmoid function) were fit by 
maximum likelihood estimation (see Model fitting & comparison, p. 116).  
Optimal model  
I built a model that calculated the optimal decision at each offer, where optimal is defined 
as maximizing expectation of total reward delivery in the trial. The model assumes correct 
knowledge of the structure of the task. The current state of the task was defined by three 
belief distributions: O, over o, the number of offers remaining, A, over a, the number of 
accepts remaining, and M, the probability distribution governing the value of the 
forthcoming offer. The expected value of being in a state was: 
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𝑆𝑉(𝑶, 𝑨) = ∑ 𝐌𝑚(𝑟) ∙ max {𝑃(𝑜 > 1) ∙ 𝑆𝑉(𝑶
′, 𝑨), 𝑟 + 𝑃(𝑜 > 1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑎
𝑟={3,5,7}
> 1) ∙ 𝑆𝑉(𝑶′, 𝑨′)} 
where O' is defined by 
𝑃(𝑶′ = 𝑜) =
𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑜 + 1)
∑ 𝑃(𝑂 = 𝑜 + 1)𝑜
 
and A' is defined analogously. Thus going from O to O' or A to A' updates the probability 
distribution such that it remains uniform but shifts to the left. Note that calculating the 
recursive SV function was effectively a search through a tree of all possible moves. The 
recursion ends when P(o > 1) or P(a > 1) are 0, and SV is not evaluated. 
M is defined by three discrete probability distributions as follows: 
𝑀0  =  {0.33 0.33 0.33} 
𝑀1  =  {0.50 0.25 0.25} 
𝑀2  = {0.90 0.05 0.05} 
At trial onsets, m = 0, and is updated according to the following rules: 
If we are on the first offer, or 3 offers have previously been rejected, m doesn’t change.  
Otherwise, if a value 5 offer is accepted, m = 1, and if a value 7 offer is accepted, m = 2 
At each offer the model calculated the value of rejecting, 
𝑉𝑅 = 𝑃(𝑜 > 1) ∙ 𝑆𝑉(𝑶′, 𝑨) 
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and the future value of accepting, 
𝑉𝐴𝐹 = 𝑃(𝑜 > 1) ∙ 𝑃(𝑎 > 1) ∙ 𝑆𝑉(𝑶′, 𝑨′) 
The expected value difference between accepting and rejecting, EV, was calculated as, 
𝐸𝑉 =  𝑉𝐴𝐹 +  𝐼𝑅 −  𝑉𝑅 
where IR represents the (face) value of the current offer. 
EV was passed through a sigmoid function to determine PA, the probability of a go response 
(see above).  
Tradeoff model 
Given evidence that both immediate and long-term value had dissociable influences on 
choice, I hypothesized choice might involve a trade-off between two value systems. 
Accordingly, I specified a model whereby immediate and long-term value both contributed 
independently to the calculation of expected value (TV, tradeoff value), whereby the 
associated trade-off was captured by a single parameter that governed the weight placed on 
either value as follows: 
𝑇𝑉 = (𝐸𝑉 ∙  𝑐1) +  (𝐼𝑅 − 𝑐2 )  ∙ (1 −  𝑐1) 
where EV is the expected, or long-term value, derived from the optimal model (see above), 
IR is the (face) value of the current offer, c1 governs the nature of the trade-off, and c2 
represents a value intercept.  
In addition, it seemed reasonable to assume that subjects might trade-off immediate and 
long-term value differently depending on the face value of the current offer. I therefore 
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specified a second trade-off model in which a separate trade-off parameter governed the 
weight placed on immediate and long-term value for each face value (3, 5 and 7).  
Model fitting & comparison 
As described in previous reports (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Huys et al., 2011) I used a 
hierarchical Type II Bayesian (or random-effects) procedure using maximum likelihood to fit 
simple parameterized distributions for higher level statistics of the parameters (see also 
Hierarchical Bayesian procedures, Chapter 3, p. 73). Since the values of parameters for each 
subject are ‘hidden’, this employs the Expectation-Maximization (EM) procedure. Thus on 
each iteration the posterior distribution over the group for each parameter is used to specify 
the prior over the individual parameter fits on the next iteration. For each parameter I used 
a single distribution for all participants. Before inference, all parameters were suitably 
transformed to enforce constraints (log and inverse sigmoid transforms).  
Models were then compared using the integrated Bayesian Information Criterion (iBIC), 
where small iBIC values indicate a model that fits the data better after penalizing for the 
number of parameters. Comparing iBIC values is akin to a likelihood ratio test (Kass & Raftery, 
1995).  
fMRI data acquisition  
fMRI was performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Quattro magnetic resonance scanner (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany) with echo planar imaging (EPI) and 32-channel head coil. Functional data 
was acquired over three sessions containing 280 volumes with 48 slices (664 volumes total). 
Acquisition parameters were as follows: matrix = 64 x 74; oblique axial slices angled at -30° 
in the antero-posterior axis; spatial resolution: 3 x 3 x 3 mm; TR = 3360 ms; TE = 30 ms. The 
first five volumes were subsequently discarded to allow for steady state magnetization. Field 
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maps were acquired prior to the functional runs (matrix = 64 x 64; 64 slices; spatial resolution 
= 3 x 3 x 3 mm; gap = 1 mm; short TE = 10 ms; long TE = 12.46 ms; TR = 1020 ms) to correct 
for geometric distortions. In addition, for each participant an anatomical T1-weighted image 
(spatial resolution: 1 x 1 x 1 mm) was acquired for co-registration of the EPIs.  
During scanning peripheral measurements of subject pulse and breathing were made 
together with scanner slice synchronization pulses using the Spike2 data acquisition system 
(Cambridge Electronic Design Limited, Cambridge UK). The cardiac pulse signal was 
measured using an MRI compatible pulse oximeter (Model 8600 F0, Nonin Medical, Inc. 
Plymouth, MN) attached to the subject’s finger. The respiratory signal (thoracic movement) 
was monitored using a pneumatic belt positioned around the abdomen close to the 
diaphragm.  
fMRI data analysis  
Data were pre-processed and analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, UCL, London). Functional data were bias corrected for 32-channel head coil 
intensity inhomogeneities, realigned to the first volume, unwarpped using individual 
fieldmaps, co-registered to T1w images, spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurology 
Institute (MNI) space (using the segmentation algorithm on the T1w image with a final spatial 
resolution of 1 x 1 x 1 mm) and smoothed with an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The fMRI 
time series data were high-pass filtered (cutoff = 128 s) and whitened using an AR(1)-model. 
For each subject I computed a statistical model by applying a canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF) combined with time and dispersion derivatives. Using an in-house 
Matlab toolbox (Hutton et al., 2011) I constructed a physiological noise model to account for 
artefacts that take account of cardiac and respiratory phase as well as changes in respiratory 
volume. This resulted in a total of 14 regressors which were sampled at a reference slice in 
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each image volume to give a set of values for each time point. The resulting regressors were 
included as confounds in my GLM at the first level (see below).  
GLM 1 
In order to investigate regions tracking immediate or long-term value, I designed a GLM that 
allowed me to explore the BOLD response to a subset of offers for which immediate and 
long-term value were most decorrelated, corresponding to offers between index 2 and 3 
within a trial (see Figure 5.3A, middle panel, yellow boxes, p. 124). I split these offers 
contingent on their face value, such that each value (3, 5 and 7) was modelled as a separate 
regressor. Although these offers were selected from neighbouring states (meaning that for 
any given (face) value, the long-term value of a go response was similar), each onset 
regressor was parametrically modulated by long-term value (from the optimal model) so as 
to account for variance associated with a difference in current state. Additional regressors 
included the onsets of all within-budget offers outside of the yellow box in Figure 5.3A (p. 
124), parametrically modulated by both immediate and long-term value, all out-of-budget 
offers (for which nogo responses were enforced), parametrically modulated by immediate 
value, the onset of go responses (button presses) across the entire experiment, so as to 
explain away motor-related activity, and the onset of trial outcomes (parametrically 
modulated by tokens won). Regressors of no interest included 6 movement-related 
covariates (the 3 rigid-body translations and 3 rotations resulting from realignment) and 14 
physiological regressors (6 respiratory, 6 cardiac and 2 change in respiratory/heart rate). All 
regressors were modelled as stick functions with duration of zero and convolved with a 
canonical form of the hemodynamic response function (HRF) combined with time and 
dispersion derivatives.  
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To explore the BOLD response to the onset of value 3, 5 and 7 offers when immediate and 
long-term value were decorrelated, I conducted a random-effects one-way ANOVA at the 
second level, with a single factor (face value) and 3 levels (3, 5, 7), containing individual 
subject first-level contrast images corresponding to the first three onset regressors from my 
GLM. I constructed functional ROIs (fROIs) from clusters that survived small volume 
correction for a prior volume of interest (see Anatomical volume of interest, p. 120) using the 
MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) for SPM. I extracted mean parameter estimates from each fROI for 
the three onset regressors of interest and performed post-hoc paired t-tests to explore 
differences in BOLD response between offer values. For display purposes, onset parameter 
estimates were normalized (mean centred). In addition, I specified the contrast {0 -1 1} 
corresponding to the onset of value 3, 5 and 7 offers to explore regions that covaried with 
the demand for control. The latter was performed as a whole-brain analysis.  
In order to test whether the BOLD response to value 7 offers in my four ROIs was related to 
choice, I correlated mean parameter estimates (corresponding to the value 7 onset 
regressor) extracted from each ROI, with the trade-off parameter captured by our model 
fitting procedure. This resulted in four independent correlations.  
GLM 2 
In order to quantify the extent to which the BOLD response was modulated by immediate 
and long-term value, I built a second GLM where I concatenated the first three regressors 
from GLM 1 (onsets of 3, 5 and 7-token offers) into a single regressor, and added a parametric 
modulator for immediate value, which was forced to compete for variance (and was thus not 
orthogonalized) with an overall (long-term) value modulator. All other regressors remained 
identical to those specified in GLM 1. 
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I extracted mean parameter estimates from each ROI for the immediate and long-term value 
parametric modulators. I conducted Grubb’s test to probe for extreme values so as to 
remove subjects who were significant outliers at a threshold of p < 0.05, and performed one 
sample t-tests at the second level on the resultant betas across subjects.  
GLM 3  
In order to look for difference in value coding during correct and incorrect responses, I split 
the regressor corresponding to the onset of value 7 offers from GLM 1 into correct (nogo) 
responses and incorrect (go) responses. All other regressors remained equivalent. 
I conducted a random-effects one-way ANOVA at the second level, with a single factor 
(accuracy) and 2 levels (correct, incorrect), containing individual subject first-level contrast 
images corresponding to the go 7 and nogo 7 onset regressors. I extracted parameter 
estimates from each ROI and performed post-hoc paired t-tests to explore a main effect of 
response accuracy. I noted that only 15 out of 23 subjects had enough variance in their ability 
to respond accurately across trials, and thus the above analysis was restricted to these 
individuals.  
Anatomical volume of interest 
I also constructed an anatomical volume of interest (VOI) that included individual valuation 
regions of a prior interest for the purposes of small volume correction, effectively reducing 
the number of voxel-wise comparisons. This consisted of the entire vmPFC, caudate nucleus, 
putamen and ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) (see Figure 5.4, p. 127). The vmPFC and 
dorsal striatum were defined as anatomical ROIs from the MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) for SPM. 
For the ventral striatum I used a group-average ROI derived from a diffusion tensor imaging 
connectivity-based parcellation of the right nucleus accumbens in humans, taken from (Baliki 
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et al., 2013). This ROI consisted of both the core and shell subcomponents of nucleus 
accumbens. The right region was flipped along the x-dimension in the MarsBar toolbox to 
obtain bilateral accumbens. 
Functional regions of interest 
I defined functional regions of interest (fROIs) from clusters that survived small volume 
correction for a pre-defined VOI (see above) when testing for regions tracking IR or EV using 
GLM 1 (see GLM 1, p. 118). For the anterior caudate, I excluded voxels that fell outside of an 
anatomical ROI for bilateral caudate from the MarsBar toolbox. These fROIs were used for 
all remaining fMRI analyses. All ROI analyses were performed using the MarsBar toolbox (v. 
0.42) for SPM.  
5.3 Results 
On every trial, subjects received between 7-9 offers, but an imposition of a limited "budget" 
meant they could only accept between 4-6 offers. Importantly, I penalized acceptance of the 
largest (7-token) and second largest (5-token) offers early in a trial by impoverishing 
remaining offers in that trial, where the penalty scaled with the face value of the current 
offer (see Figure 5.1 p. 110; see Task paradigm p. 109). Here, immediate value equates to 
the face value of each offer (3, 5 or 7 tokens), whereas long-term value represents the total 
expected utility from accepting. Thus, long-term value includes the face value, the cost of 
expending a unit of budget, and the cost of changing the future probability of reward. In 
some cases, total earnings could be maximized by rejecting 7-token but not 5-token offers. 
This is because the penalty associated with an accept response can be greater than the 
immediate payoff for 7-token, but not 5-token offers. In other words, the long-term value of 
a 7-token offer can sometimes be negative while nonetheless yielding the highest immediate 
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payoff. Hence, immediate value was decorrelated from long-term value across offers, 
despite the former being a component of the latter.  
Given the complexity behind the rules governing how actions shaped future offers, subjects 
were probed prior to scanning to ensure they correctly understood the contingencies of the 
task (see Methods, p. 111). In brief, each subject was shown a series of hypothetical trials 
where they had to predict the probability of a forthcoming offer being a specific value, given 
a preceding sequence of offers and actions. All subjects demonstrated correct understanding 
of the task and were fully aware of the contingencies linking actions to states following 
careful instruction. In addition, in order to minimize effects of learning and uncertainty 
during scanning, subjects played one block (36 trials) of the task prior to performing the 
experiment in the scanner.  
Although self-control is multi-faceted, one important aspect is the ability to override one’s 
impulses or prepotent responses (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). In my task, the requirement 
for this form of self-control is greatest near the start of a trial, where accepting a large 
immediate offer has detrimental future consequences (see Figure 5.3A, middle panel, yellow 
boxes, p. 124). Interestingly, subjects were faster to accept 7-token offers compared to 5-
token (p < 0.001) or 3-token (p < 0.001) offers across a trial, suggesting of a prepotent 
tendency to reap large immediate rewards (see Figure 5.2, p. 123). In this part of a trial, I 
found that subjects under-chose 3-token offers and over-chose 5 and 7-token offers, as 
compared to an optimal model (Figure 5.3A, p. 124). 
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Figure 5.2 Considering all ‘go’ responses in a trial, subjects were faster to accept token-value 
7 offers compared to value 3 or 5 offers, suggestive of a prepotent attraction to 7-token cues. 
Vertical lines represent SEM. * indicates p < 0.05 (paired t-tests). 
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Figure 5.3 (A) Plotted above are subjects’ mean probability of offer acceptance as a function 
of the number of offers already seen (ranging from 1-9) and number of offers already 
rejected (ranging from 0-8) in a trial, split by offer value (3, 5, 7) (top panel). The spectrum 
runs from blue (p=0) to red (p=1). Compared to an optimal model in which choice is dictated 
by correctly inferring long-term value (middle panel), subjects under-accept value 3 offers 
and over-accept value 7 offers at the start of trials (top panel; based on group mean data, 
n=23). This discrepancy is rectified by a model in which immediate and long-term value 
trade-off for behavioural control (lower panel). Note that the lower panel illustrates choice 
predicted by the trade-off model based on mean group parameter fits (n=23). Yellow boxes 
in the middle panel demonstrate offers for which immediate and long-term value are 
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maximally decoupled, and those for which all fMRI analyses are centred on. (B) Model 
comparison showed that a model in which each offer value (3, 5, 7) is assigned a separate 
parameter that governs how much weight is placed on immediate versus long-term value in 
the associated trade-off fits behaviour better than alternatives, indicated by its lowest iBIC 
score (3 trade). These alternatives included a model in which a single parameter governs the 
trade-off (1 trade), a model dependent on optimally inferring long-term value (optimal), and 
a model driven purely by immediate value (immediate). The number of free parameters is 
indicated in brackets for each model. (C) Pair-wise scatter plots show individually fit trade-
off parameters (c1, see Methods, p. 115) from the winning model for 3 versus 5-token offers, 
3 versus 7-token offers, and 5 versus 7-token offers. A trade-off value closer to 0 indicates 
behaviour is predominantly driven by immediate value, while a value closer to 1 indicates 
behaviour is predominantly driven by long-term value. Each circle represents one 
participant.  
This pattern of choice is consistent with subjects being mindful of the future consequences 
of their actions, but nevertheless being over-susceptible to an influence of a current offer’s 
face value. I therefore predicted that both immediate and long-term value (see Methods, p. 
113, for an explanation of how these are calculated) would independently influence 
behaviour. Using a logistic regression I indeed found that immediate (mean b = 0.047; p = 
0.001) and long-term value (mean b = 0.113; P < 0.0001) were significant predictors of choice, 
implying behaviour was neither exclusively optimal nor impulsive, but incorporated features 
of both traits.  
Given evidence that immediate and long-term value exert a differential impact on action 
selection, I conjectured that a model encompassing a trade-off between each valuation 
would capture choice behaviour. I used Bayesian model comparison to evaluate whether 
group behaviour was driven exclusively by immediate value, by long-term value, or by a 
trade-off between the two (see Methods, p. 113 - 116). While subjects varied in their ability 
to prioritize long-term value in the face of high-token offers, a model in which each offer 
value (3, 5, 7) was assigned an independent trade-off parameter captured group-level choice 
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best (Figure 5.3B, p. 124). Hence, while subjects were considerate of future consequence, 
immediate rewards were (on average) overweighted across the experiment. The finding that 
subjects weight immediate and long-term value differently depending on face value is 
intuitive, as long-term value deviates from immediate value to a greater degree for some 
offers compared to others, and is thus sometimes harder to track. Indeed, the best-fitting 
trade-off parameters, which provide a measure of how strongly each player weighted 
immediate relative to long-term value for the three offers, strongly endorse this account 
(Figure 5.3C, p. 124).  
Since immediate and long-term value exert distinct influences on choice I conjectured these 
quantities would have dissociable representations in value sensitive brain regions. To test 
this, I used fMRI and implemented a GLM (see Methods, GLM 1, p. 118) in which each offer 
value (3, 5, 7) was modelled separately, but focusing on a subset of offers where immediate 
and long-term value were maximally dissociable within any given trial (see Figure 5.3A, 
middle panel, yellow boxes, p. 124). In this set of offers, optimal behaviour mandated 
strongly rejecting 7-token offers, strongly accepting 5-token offers, and weakly accepting 3-
token offers. Thus, regions representing long-term (overall) value should display a BOLD 
signal profile that is attenuated for 7-token offers, boosted for 5-token offers and modestly 
boosted for 3-token offers. In contrast, regions that track immediate rewards should show a 
BOLD signal profile that increases linearly as a function of face value. Importantly, I modelled 
go responses as an independent regressor in all GLMs, and this spanned button presses 
across the entire experiment, including those corresponding to offers outside of the yellow 
box in Figure 5.3A. Thus, any variance in activity attributed to cue onsets is independent from 
the generation of a motor response per se.  
Given an a priori interest in responses within valuation regions, I generated a volume of 
interest (VOI; see Figure 5.4, p. 127) that included the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
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(vmPFC) (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Hare et al., 2009; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012), 
ventral striatum (Baliki et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012), caudate nucleus (Tricomi et 
al., 2004) and putamen (Brovelli et al., 2011) to constrain the search space and reduce the 
number of statistical comparisons. I used anatomical ROIs from the MarsBar toolbox (v. 0.42) 
for SPM and from previous research (see Methods, Anatomical volume of interest, p. 120). 
 
Figure 5.4 Volume of interest consisting of valuation regions of a priori interest used for small 
volume correction. Regions include vmPFC, bilateral caudate, bilateral putamen and bilateral 
ventral striatum (accumbens).  
When testing for regions that track long-term value (a contrast of {0 1 -1} for 3, 5 and 7-token 
offers) I identified two clusters that survived small volume correction (SVC) for the VOI in 
vmPFC, including a ventral (Figure 5.5A, p. 128) and more lateral portion (Figure 5.5C, p. 128). 
Although it is difficult to distinguish between small cortical subdivisions along the medial 
prefrontal cortex in imaging studies (Haber & Knutson, 2010), it is possible that the more 
lateral portion of vmPFC is in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In fact, the peak voxel in both 
vmPFC clusters (Figure 5.5 A and C) falls within Brodmann area 11. Thus, I use the term 
vmPFC in a broad manner to include the medial OFC. I also note that the vmPFC itself does 
not have a universally agreed upon demarcation in humans.  
When testing for regions that track immediate value (a contrast of {-1 0 1} for 3, 5 and 7-
token offers) I identified activation in both left (Figure 5.5B, p. 128) and right (Figure 5.5D, p. 
128) anterior caudate nucleus that likewise survived SVC for the VOI. These clusters were 
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then used to define functional regions of interest (fROIs) in vmPFC and anterior caudate for 
further analysis, which correspond to the regions displayed in Figure 5.5 (below).  
 
Figure 5.5 (A) Ventral vmPFC showed greater activation in response to 5-token compared to 
3-token offers, but a deactivation in response to 7-token relative to 3 and 5-token offers, 
consistent with 7-token offers having a negative overall (long-term) value (see yellow boxes, 
Figure 5.3, panel A, p. 124). (B) BOLD in lateral vmPFC / OFC also reflected a representation 
of long-term (optimal) value. In trials where 7-token offers were impulsively accepted (7 go) 
compared to rejected (7 nogo), the representation of long-term value (for 7-token offers) 
was attenuated (less negative beta). (C) By contrast, anterior caudate exhibited a linearly 
increasing response profile to the presentation of 3, 5 and 7-token offers, consistent with 
this region showing preferential sensitivity to immediate value. Panel C shows the response 
in left anterior caudate. In trials where 7-token offers were impulsively accepted (7 go) 
compared to rejected (7 nogo), the representation of immediate value (for 7-token offers) 
was boosted in this region (more positive beta). (D) Right anterior caudate also tracks 
immediate value in this task, with BOLD response for 7-token offers being higher when these 
offers were impulsively accepted compared to when they were rejected. Vertical lines 
represent SEM. * indicates p =< 0.05; ‡  indicates p = 0.07; n.s. indicates not significant 
(paired t-tests). 
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To quantify the extent to which each fROI was preferentially driven by immediate versus 
long-term value, I constructed a second GLM that allowed me to regress both values against 
the BOLD signal within the same model, by collapsing offers into a single regressor and using 
immediate and long-term value as parametric modulators. Note these regressors, for which 
the average correlation was r2 = 0.24, were not orthogonalized in my GLM and were forced 
to compete for variance (see Methods, GLM 2, p. 119). This analysis again showed that BOLD 
response in both vmPFC fROIs was driven by long-term value (p = 0.004, p < 0.001) and was 
not explained by immediate value (p = 0.371, p = 0.795). By contrast, BOLD activity in anterior 
caudate was driven predominantly by immediate value (p < 0.001, p < 0.001), though long-
term value also contributed to signal variance (p = 0.038; p = 0.024) suggesting it represented 
mixed value components.  
It has been proposed that self-control involves a conflict between competing value systems 
(Hofmann et al., 2009; McClure et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004), and this idea gains support 
from evidence that the brain draws on multiple systems when making decisions (Balleine, 
2005; Daw et al., 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013). However, an alternative suggestion is that 
choice is governed by a common value system embedded in vmPFC (Hare et al., 2009) or a 
vmPFC-striatal network (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). A finding here that distinct 
representations of immediate and long-term value are tracked in the brain fits better with 
the idea of two competing value systems. However, I note that long-term value in my task 
includes both immediate and delayed components of value. Thus, my data is consistent with 
the notion that both value components are integrated within vmPFC (Economides, Guitart-
Masip, Kurth-Nelson, & Dolan, 2014; Hare et al., 2009). Importantly, if the separate encoding 
of immediate and long-term value is linked to the observed trade-off between these values 
during choice, I would expect between-subject variability in self-control to correlate with the 
strength with which long-term value was represented relative to immediate value. 
Specifically, a stronger representation of long-term relative to immediate value should track 
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greater self-control. Indeed one might also expect that representations of immediate and 
long-term value would be altered in trials where subjects (incorrectly) accepted a 7-token 
offer compared to when subjects (correctly) resisted the temptation.  
To test the first prediction, I correlated parameter estimates for the onset of 7-token offers 
with the trade-off parameter which captures the weighting placed on immediate versus long-
term value (for 7-token offers), for each of the four fROIs. The parameter estimates were 
derived from GLM 1 (see Figure 5.5, p. 128) and correspond to offers early in a trial where 
accepting a 7-token offer is detrimental overall despite yielding a large immediate reward. 
The weighting parameter effectively provides a measure of self-control for each individual 
player, although my task cannot distinguish whether subjects that over-accept 7-token offers 
do so because they overweight immediate value, or alternatively because they underweight 
the future consequences of accepting a high value offer (and thus miscalculate long-term 
value). In vmPFC, a higher BOLD activation in response to 7-token offers was linked to 
impulsively accepting (trade-off parameter fit closer to 0), while a lower BOLD activation was 
linked to foregoing the option (trade-off parameter fit closer to 1). This correlation was seen 
in ventral but not lateral vmPFC (Figure 5.6, p. 131).  
131 
 
 
Figure 5.6 When confronted with an offer associated with a high immediate value but low 
long-term value, between-subject variability in ventral vmPFC BOLD response to 7-token 
offers was tightly coupled with choice (r2 = 0.25, p = 0.015). The higher the signal in vmPFC, 
the more choice was driven by immediate value (more positive beta, trade-off parameter 
closer to 0). In contrast, the lower the signal in vmPFC, the more choice was driven by long-
term value (more negative beta, trade-off parameter closer to 1).  
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Here, a more negative beta implies a greater weighting on future consequence and a value 
representation that resembles long-term value, while a more positive beta implies a greater 
weighting on face value and a value representation that favours immediate rewards. To my 
surprise, there was no significant correlation in either the left or right caudate fROIs. Thus, 
while the BOLD response in anterior caudate was similar in both self-controlled and 
impulsive players (on average), value representations in the most ventral and medial region 
of vmPFC were tied to each individual’s capacity for self-control.  
In addition to observing variability in self-control between subjects, players were also highly 
variable in their ability to exercise control across trials. To test the prediction that trial-by-
trial switches between controlled and impulsive choice is linked to a change in the 
representation of immediate or long-term value, I constructed a new GLM (see Methods, 
GLM 3, p. 120) where I split 7-token offers contingent upon whether they were (incorrectly) 
accepted or (correctly) resisted. This analysis once again focused on the subset of offers that 
fall inside the yellow box in Figure 5.3A (p. 124). Note that although a difference in BOLD 
between go and nogo at the time of cue onset could reflect a modulation of value 
representation, it could also be driven by the execution of a motor response in one condition 
and not the other. To control for this motor confound, I regressed out button presses using 
a motor regressor that included a large proportion of button presses from outside of the 
yellow box in Figure 5.3A. However, I cannot fully exclude the possibility that any difference 
observed might be driven by the anticipation of an upcoming action.  
Bearing in mind this caveat, I found that a BOLD response to a 7-token offer was on average 
less negative in lateral but not ventral vmPFC, and more positive in bilateral anterior caudate 
when subjects chose to incorrectly accept compared to correctly reject (Figure 5.5, p. 128). 
Thus, impulsive responses were accompanied by a weaker representation of long-term value 
within lateral vmPFC and an enhanced representation of immediate value in bilateral 
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caudate, while optimal choices followed the reverse pattern. This profile implies that the 
representational fidelity of one aspect of a value computation may be promoted at the 
expense of the other.  
Previous studies show that self-control recruits the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) with 
evidence suggesting the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) acts to initiate inhibitory 
control (Aron et al., 2004) or in other cases that the ateroventral prefrontal cortex (Diekhof 
& Gruber, 2010) or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Hare et al., 2009) modulates the 
representation of value within valuation regions. While my primary interest with imaging 
was to identify the neural representations of immediate and long-term value, I conjectured 
that activity in LPFC might scale with the demand for control, and that this in turn may 
contribute towards the observed representations of value. Within a subset of offers at the 
start of each trial (yellow box in Figure 5.3A, p. 124), 7-token offers require amplified self-
control relative to 3 and 5-token offers, as the immediate value of accepting a 7-token offer 
here is most decorrelated from the overall long-term value. Thus, the BOLD response in 
regions enacting ‘control’ should be enhanced in response to 7-token offers, diminished in 
response to 5-token offers, and modestly enhanced in response to 3-token offers. Note this 
is the opposite profile to that observed in vmPFC that encodes long-term (overall) value (see 
Figure 5.5A/C, p. 124).  
I tested for this in a contrast ({0 -1 1} for 3, 5 and 7-token offers) using GLM 1 where I 
identified activation in a frontal network including anterior cingulate cortex and right inferior 
frontal gyrus that survived whole-brain correction (see Table 5.1 for all areas, p. 134). Thus, 
activity in these regions did not scale with value but instead with the demand for control 
(Figure 5.6, p. 134). Here I also note these regions are strongly implicated in cognitive control 
(Kerns et al., 2004), response inhibition (Aron et al., 2004) and self-regulated choice (Hare et 
al., 2009). 
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Figure 5.6 (A) BOLD response within a frontal network including ACC, rIFG and bilateral insula 
cortex, was enhanced for 7-token offers compared to 3 and 5-token offers, and thus scaled 
with the demand for control. (B) The betas for clusters in the ACC and rIFG (circled in red) 
are plotted for illustration. Vertical lines represent SEM. * indicates p =< 0.05; n.s. indicates 
not significant (paired t-tests); see also Table 5.1 (below).  
 
Name of Region 
Cluster FWE  
p value 
MNI Coordinates Statistics 
x y z t value Z score 
Anterior Cingulate 
< 0.001 
10 34 30 5.33 4.77 
R Supplementary Motor Area 8 16 66 3.69 3.42 
L Insula 0.013 -33 15 0 5.09 4.49 
R Insula 
< 0.001 
32 20 2 4.91 4.36 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 54 12 19 3.78 3.50 
R Parietal < 0.001 58 -43 34 4.23 3.85 
Table 5.1 Regions where BOLD covaried with the demand for action control ({ 0 -1 1 } for 
offers of token-value 3, 5 and 7 respectively) from GLM 1.  
 
 
 
 
135 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Both vmPFC and striatum are implicated in computing value for action selection (Brovelli et 
al., 2011; FitzGerald, Friston, & Dolan, 2012; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Tricomi et al., 2004; 
Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012), and these regions are differentially activated when 
individuals choose immediate versus delayed rewards (McClure et al., 2004). Whether this 
distinction arises from divergent computational roles has remained unclear. Here, I used a 
computational formalization to address how vmPFC and striatum arbitrate between 
immediate and long-term value where these are dissociable and can motivate differing 
actions. Further, by contrasting incorrect and correct decisions I could map the 
computational mechanisms that contribute towards impulsive or controlled choice 
respectively.  
Previous studies have proposed that choice utilizes a common value system based in vmPFC 
(Hare et al., 2009), or in a vmPFC-striatal loop (Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Consistent with this, 
I identified a value representation in vmPFC that takes into account the immediate and 
delayed consequences of actions. However, in contrast to the common value framework, I 
identified a separate representation of immediate value in anterior caudate that likely 
impacts action selection in parallel, and in a fashion that often opposes a course of action 
endorsed by vmPFC. In this scheme, failures of self-control stem from a degraded 
representation of long-term value in lateral vmPFC and a concurrent enhancement of 
immediate value within anterior caudate. Analogously, successful control is not only 
dependent on an accurate representation of long-term value in lateral vmPFC, but also an 
attenuation of immediate value in anterior caudate.  
There are several possible explanations for the discrepancy between my finding that the 
brain represents dual values and previous accounts that it uses a single value system. In the 
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Hare choice paradigm (Hare et al., 2009), subjects chose between a reference food item and 
alternatives that varied in healthiness and tastiness. The authors then asked whether the 
BOLD response significantly correlated with taste or health ratings in subjects who 
demonstrated either high or low capacity for self-control. However, this analysis was 
confined to the vmPFC, and it is possible that activity in anterior caudate may have tracked 
taste ratings in a manner similar to the immediate value representations that I observed in 
my data. Further, while tastiness and healthiness map onto different outcome modalities, 
my task considers immediate and long-term value attributes within a single modality. A 
second prominent study closely aligned with the single value account utilized an 
intertemporal choice paradigm to probe preference for rewards at differing time-scales 
(Kable & Glimcher, 2007). Here, subjects had to choose between an immediately available 
sum of money and a larger but delayed alternative. Similar to results reported here, Kable 
and Glimcher found that vmPFC (amongst other regions) computes the subjective value of 
the chosen option. However, since the immediate reward was kept constant in their design, 
it remains unknown whether this value is tracked separately in the brain.  
Another important consideration is that unlike the previous studies, my task did not require 
a choice between two options presented simultaneously. Rather, subjects were required to 
flexibly approach or avoid an option with both immediate and delayed consequences, 
spanning both action and valence (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). This action dependency was 
adopted so as to more closely resemble natural settings, where self-control often involves 
arbitration between approach and avoidance, and where the value of choice options often 
change dynamically. Given that the striatum is heavily implicated in both action and value 
processing (Guitart-Masip et al., 2014; Rothwell, 2011; Samejima, Ueda, Doya, & Kimura, 
2005), and that the distinction between these roles is not clearly defined, anterior caudate 
may in fact integrate value with a propensity to act during go/nogo judgments (Guitart-Masip 
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et al., 2011; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Roesch et al., 2009). In turn, this contribution may be 
absent in self-control tasks that do not pair the prepotent choice (accepting a large 
immediate reward) with a prepotent action (the execution of a ‘go’ response). Other 
evidence that task modality can impact value coding comes from a recent finding that 
switching the frame of reference used for decision-making alters patterns of value coding in 
the brain (Hunt, Woolrich, Rushworth, & Behrens, 2013).  
In humans, activity in vmPFC has been shown to include a representation of healthiness in 
individuals who resist temptation for unhealthy foods (Hare et al., 2009), a finding 
complimented by evidence that vmPFC acts to integrate multiple components of value 
(Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012). Further, in rodents, the orbitofrontal cortex has been 
shown to compute values based on anticipation of latent outcomes (Jones et al., 2012), while 
patients with bilateral vmPFC lesions demonstrate reduced sensitivity to future consequence 
and increased reliance on immediate rewards (Bechara et al., 2000). However, to the best of 
my knowledge, no previous study has demonstrated a value signal in human vmPFC that 
reflects an overall (long-term) value that is decoupled from immediate rewards. This points 
to the likelihood that vmPFC draws on contextual information to calculate an overall 
expectation of value (Hampton et al., 2006b; Jones et al., 2012; McDannald, Lucantonio, 
Burke, Niv, & Schoenbaum, 2011; Takahashi et al., 2013), while other valuation regions may 
only be privy to immediate outcomes.  
I found value coding in a more ventral region of vmPFC is dependent on subjects’ baseline 
ability to appropriately adjust a prepotent response, raising an important question regarding 
the underlying mechanism. One conjecture is that this region lacks access to representations 
required for inferring long-term value in impulsive players. This may be related to a weaker 
functional connectivity between this region of vmPFC and more dorsal prefrontal cortex 
regions associated with goal-directed control (Hare et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2014). By 
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contrast, value coding in a more lateral region of vmPFC was predictive of upcoming choice 
in a context requiring self-control. While I can only speculate as to the functional differences 
between these regions, one possibility is that the ventral portion encodes long-term value 
regardless of context, whereas the more lateral portion integrates long-term value with 
additional components that contribute to the action selection process, and is thus more 
representative of upcoming choice. Interestingly, a recent study has identified a similar 
pattern of differential reward processing within subregions of vmPFC in non-human primates 
(Monosov & Hikosaka, 2012).  
My finding that anterior caudate predominantly tracks immediate value is surprising given 
previous accounts that this region represents the utility of actions by differentiating between 
positive and negative consequences (Tricomi et al., 2004), or computing values for planned 
choice (Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012) and future reward prediction (Tanaka et al., 2004). 
A long-line of animal research has implicated the dorsomedial striatum (the caudate 
homologue in rodents) in representing the consequences of an animal’s actions, with lesions 
to this region impairing the acquisition of R-O contingencies (Yin, Ostlund, et al., 2005). Yet, 
much of the animal literature relies on devaluation paradigms that utilize immediate 
outcomes (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010). Similarly, experiments in humans have implicated 
anterior caudate in outcome devaluation (Valentin et al., 2007) and in tracking contingencies 
between actions and outcomes (Tanaka, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2008), yet often do not 
require valuations that integrate immediate and long-term consequences. Thus, one 
possibility is that both vmPFC and anterior caudate support goals by representing outcomes 
(Valentin et al., 2007), while vmPFC predominantly receives the input required to calculate 
long-term value. An alternative interpretation, given a finding that at least some component 
of the anterior caudate response is explained by long-term value, is that this region contains 
populations of neurons tuned to either immediate or long-term value respectively.  
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Although I used a model-based tree search to define overall value for the purposes of my 
analysis, my task cannot differentiate between model-based versus alternate choice 
strategies. For example, the use of heuristics may be more probable given the complexity of 
the tree search. Further, subjects’ probability of accepting an offer between offer index 2 
and 3 in a trial (see Figure 5.3A, yellow boxes, p. 124) is somewhat uniform, and this choice 
pattern is not well-captured by the winning model. Yet my key interest lay in exploring the 
behavioural and neural consequences of dissociating immediate from overall (long-term) 
value, and the trade-off model provides corroborative evidence that subjects take both 
quantities into account. An important follow-up question is whether long-term value is 
calculated online by projecting into the future, or whether it is cached and retrieved in a 
model-free framework following a sufficient number of trials.  
The data from this study have a number of implications. A comorbidity between impulsivity 
and selected psychiatric disorders is well-documented (Moeller, Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, 
& Swann, 2001), raising an interesting question as to the relationship between the biological 
substrates of these disorders and the dissociable value representations I identify. The current 
task might provide a novel avenue for probing this, including assessing the impact of both 
behavioural and pharmacological interventions. Finally, given a strong association between 
affective state and the capacity for self-control, the dual-value framework outlined could be 
useful for evaluating the impact of emotion, mood, stress, and other state-dependent factors 
on the representation of immediate and long-term value, and the resulting impact on 
decision-making in these contexts.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EFFECTS OF TASK TRAINING ON MODEL-BASED REASONING  
The brain has been suggested to employ multiple distinct strategies for solving problems 
using habitual (model-free) or goal-directed (model-based) algorithms. Hitherto, model-
based reasoning has been identified with slow, serial, executive processes, and model-free 
with fast, parallel, automatic processes. In a task that engages both model-based and model-
free systems, increasing cognitive load with a challenging concurrent task reduces the 
expression of model-based behaviour, consistent with the idea that a shared, limited pool of 
cognitive resources is used for model-based calculations and the concurrent task. Here, 
however, I show that this impairment in model-based reasoning under load is eliminated 
when subjects receive prior primary task training, whether or not the training is under load. 
Thus, task familiarity permits model-based reasoning even under substantial cognitive load. 
These data suggest a shift in the mechanism by which model-based calculations are 
implemented with increasing task exposure and also imply that model-based reasoning can 
be dissociated from serial executive functions.  
6.1 Introduction 
A wealth of experimental data shows that the brain makes use of at least two distinct 
decision strategies. One system prospectively reasons about action-outcome contingencies, 
while the other retrospectively links rewards to actions (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Daw et 
al., 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Loewenstein, 1996). The interplay between these two choice 
strategies has substantial practical implications. For example, over-reliance on habits could 
lead to inflexible decision-making in addiction (Everitt & Robbins, 2005) and compulsion 
(Voon et al., 2014).  
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A compelling computational account of these two mechanisms draws on reinforcement 
learning (RL) theory (Daw et al., 2005). In Daw and colleagues' framework, model-free RL 
exploits temporal difference mechanisms (R. S. B. Sutton, A. G., 1998) closely associated with 
striatal dopamine signals (Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996) to learn a preference for 
actions through direct reinforcement (Dayan & Niv, 2008). Model-based RL, on the other 
hand, prospectively evaluates actions by mapping the contingencies between actions and 
future states (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, 2008; Dayan & Niv, 2008). This renders the model-
based system more flexible, but at a heightened computational cost.  
Contemporary theories posit that model-based reasoning engages limited-resource 
executive functions (Donald & Tim, 1986) associated with regions of prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
in particular the dorsolateral prefrontal, ventromedial prefrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortices (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Barbey et al., 2012; M. M. Botvinick et al., 2001; Glascher 
et al., 2010; Jones et al., 2012; Kennerley et al., 2006; S. W. Lee et al., 2014; Owen, 1997; 
Valentin et al., 2007; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 2012). Further evidence for this view comes 
from the observations that model-based reasoning is impaired by increasing cognitive load 
(Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013), by disrupting dorsolateral prefrontal cortex function 
(Smittenaar et al., 2013) and by acute stress (Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013), with 
the degree of impairment often interacting with baseline working memory capacity.  
However, studies of model-based decision-making often utilize tasks in which the stimuli, 
contingencies and other task parameters are novel to the subject. Thus, one possibility is 
that reliance on limited-resource executive functions is not an intrinsic property of model-
based reasoning, but rather a characteristic of reasoning with an unfamiliar model. This is 
consistent with the everyday experience that practice lets us perform increasingly complex 
tasks with less demand for exclusive attention, and may be important for the human ability 
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to progressively acquire more complex behaviour. Nevertheless, the effect of training on 
model-based and model-free decision making remains unexplored.  
Here, I used a two-step decision-task that engages and measures both model-free and 
model-based reasoning (Daw et al., 2011; Otto et al., 2013). Using simple behavioural 
analyses as well as more sophisticated computational modelling, I quantified the degree to 
which model-free and model-based reasoning were manifest in choice, both before and after 
task training, and with or without cognitive load. I hypothesized that a shift in the neural 
mechanism for model-based calculations, as a result of task training, could lead to a 
reduction in the detrimental effect of cognitive load on model-based reasoning. 
6.2 Methods  
Subjects 
35 adult participants formed a group (referred to as the ‘high load group’) which received 
training both with and without cognitive load, of which 22 were included in the final analysis 
(7 male and 15 female; age range 18-34; mean 21.5, SD = 3.71 years).  
30 adult participants formed a second independent group (referred to as the ‘low load 
group’) for which cognitive load was omitted from training on days 1 and 2, of which 23 were 
included in the final analysis (9 male and 14 female; age range 18-26; mean 21.2, SD = 3.61 
years). 
Inclusion criteria: In line with (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013) I excluded 11 subjects from the 
‘high load group’ and 5 subjects from the ‘low load group’ whose accuracy on the Stroop task 
during dual-task trials was < 70% on any given day so as to ensure participants were in fact 
attempting to perform both tasks simultaneously. In addition I excluded 2 participants from 
the ‘high load group’ and 1 participant from the ‘low load group’ who chose the same first-
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stage fractal on > 90% of trials (on any given day), irrespective of events on the previous trial. 
Finally I excluded 1 participant from group two whose probability of repeating a first-stage 
action following a common-rewarded transition on the previous trial was < 0.25 on day 1 of 
training.  
General design  
Subjects in the ‘high load group’ performed alternating blocks of two-step (128 trials) and 
dual-task (64 trials) trials until two blocks of each trial type were completed (256 two-step 
trials, 128 dual-task trials in total). This protocol was repeated across three consecutive days. 
Subjects received 20 practice trials of each trial type at the start of day 1. Subjects in the ‘low 
load group’ performed 256 trials of the two-step task on each of two consecutive days. On 
day 3, they performed alternating blocks of two-step (128 trials) and dual-task (64 trials) 
trials until two blocks of each trial type were completed (256 two-step trials, 128 dual-task 
trials in total). Thus, day 3 was identical in both group protocols. Subjects received 20 
practice trials of two-step task at the start of day 1, and 20 practice trials of dual-task at the 
start of day 3.  
Task  
Subjects performed a two-step decision task based on (Daw et al., 2011) and equivalent to 
that used in (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013). At the first stage, a player was presented with 
two fractal images presented side-by-side on a grey background and had 2000 ms to select 
one via a left or right button press. After a response was made the selected fractal was 
highlighted for the remainder of the choice period with a yellow boarder. Each first stage 
fractal lead to one of two second stage fractal pairs with a probability of 70% (common 
transition) and to the other with a probability of 30% (uncommon transition). Following the 
transition, one of two second stage pairs of fractals was displayed on a green or blue 
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background in accordance with whether a common or uncommon transition had occurred. 
In addition, the chosen first-stage fractal was minimized and moved to the top central 
portion of the screen. The player again had 2000 ms to select a fractal via a left or right button 
press, and the selected action was highlighted for the remainder of the response period. 
Finally, an outcome was presented in the form of a golden coin (to indicate a monetary gain) 
or a ‘0’ (to indicate no monetary gain), followed by an inter-trial interval (fixation cross). The 
position of each fractal (left versus right) was counter-balanced across trials for first and 
second-stage pairs. 
Dual-task trials followed the same procedure, except that subjects had to additionally 
perform a numerical Stroop task (Waldron & Ashby, 2001). At the beginning of the first-
stage, two digits were presented, one above each choice fractal, for 200 ms, and then 
covered by a white mask for a further 200 ms. After second-stage choice feedback, either 
the word ‘SIZE’ or ‘VALUE’ appeared alone in the centre of the screen on a grey background. 
The player had 1000 ms to indicate with a left or right button press which digit of the two 
that appeared at the first-stage choice was larger in size or value, respectively. In accordance 
with (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013) and (Waldron & Ashby, 2001), the numerically larger 
number was physically smaller on 85% of trials. Thus, subjects had to hold incidental 
information in working memory whilst performing the two-step task. Following their 
response, feedback in the form of the word ‘CORRECT’ or ‘INCORRECT’ was presented a 
further 1000 ms. If participants failed to respond during the Stroop task probe, a red “X” 
appeared for 1000 ms. Trial lengths were equated across two-step and dual task trials (7200 
ms per trial).  
The reward probabilities associated with second-stage fractals were governed by 
independently drifting Gaussian random walks (SD = 0.025). I generated a pool of fifteen 
random walks for which reward probabilities did not exceed ~0.75 or fall below ~0.25. For 
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each subject, three walks were selected at random from the pool for use on each successive 
day of training. Thus, walks were continuous between blocks of two-step and dual task trials.  
Logistic regression  
In keeping with previous studies (Daw et al., 2011; Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; Smittenaar 
et al., 2013; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012), I first probed model-based versus 
model-free reasoning by analysing stay-switch behaviour at the first-stage of each trial. 
Model-free reinforcement learning predicts that first stage choices should be repeated if 
they lead to a reward (a main effect of reward), regardless of whether a common or 
uncommon transition is experienced on the previous trial. By contrast, a model-based 
learner is more likely to switch their choice at the first stage if a reward follows from an 
uncommon transition on the previous trials (a reward x transition interaction). This is 
because the model-based system can infer that the rewarding second-stage fractal can be 
accessed with a higher probability by choosing the alternate first-stage fractal. In short, by 
evaluating the dependence of switch-stay choice on the reward and transition status from 
the preceding trial (and their interaction), one can approximate the strength with which 
model-free and model-based reasoning are manifest in choice.  
I performed a random-effects logistic regression, implemented in the Matlab software 
package (MathWorks), in which the dependent variable was the first-stage choices in the 
current trial (coded as 0 for stay, 1 for switch), and the explanatory variables included the 
reward and transition type on the previous trial (coded as 1 or -1), and their interaction. 
Blocks of trials from the same day of training were concatenated, and trials where subjects 
failed to respond at either the first or second-stage were excluded from the analysis. When 
analysing data across all days, I included a variable for the day of training, in addition to all 
possible interactions (see Table 6.1 for all variables, p. 160). Here, my key interest lay in the 
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2-way interaction between reward and transition, and whether this interaction changes with 
training in the dual-task condition (a 3-way reward x transition x day interaction). Since these 
two regressors were highly correlated, I orthogonalized the latter with respect to the former, 
using a Gram-Schmidt process (Bjorck, 1994). Thus, any significant 3-way interaction 
represents a proportion of variance unaccounted for by a simple 2-way effect. One-sample 
t-tests were performed on all coefficients across subjects. When analysing dual-task trials 
from the ‘high load group’, I performed an additional logistic regression where I included 
Stroop task performance on the previous trial (coded as 1 for correct, -1 for incorrect), and 
all possible interactions (see Table 6.2 for all variables, p. 161), as additional predictors. Here 
my main interest was whether errors on the Stroop task would interfere with subjects’ ability 
to use reward and transition events on the previous trial to make a model-based choice on 
the following trial (a Stroop performance x reward x transition interaction). As before, 3 and 
4-way interactions were orthogonalized with respect to the simpler 2 or 3-way effect.  
In line with other recent studies that have used the two-step task, I also considered model-
free and model-based influences on choice in the current trial, with respect to events that 
occurred up to 3 trials in the past (Smittenaar, Prichard, FitzGerald, Diedrichsen, & Dolan, 
2014). Here, the dependent variable on trial t was 1 when stimulus A was chosen and 0 when 
stimulus B was chosen at the first-stage. Each regressor then described whether events on 
trial t-1, t-2 and t-3 would increase (coded as +1) or decrease (coded as -1) the probability of 
choosing A according to a model-free or a model-based system (6 regressors in total). 
Importantly, if a trial involved a common transition, both systems make identical predictions. 
However, opposing predictions emerge following uncommon transitions. I implemented a 
random-effects logistic regression in Matlab (MathWorks) and performed one-sample t-tests 
on the resulting coefficient estimates for the 6 regressors, separately for trained (day 3) 
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versus un-trained (day 1), and high load (dual-task) versus low load (two-step) (see Figure 
6.5, p. 170).  
Computational modelling  
Based on (Daw et al., 2011), the task was modelled as consisting of three states (𝑠𝐴 for the 
first-stage fractal pair; 𝑠𝐵 and 𝑠𝐶  for the second-stage fractal pairs) where two possible 
actions (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝐵) can be taken from each state. The goal of each RL algorithm is to learn a 
state-action value function 𝑄(𝑠,𝑎) that maps each state-action pair to its expected future 
value. In each trial t, the first and second-stage states are indicated as 𝑠1,𝑡  and 𝑠2,𝑡 
respectively, while first and second-stage choices (actions) are indicated as 𝑎1,𝑡  and 𝑎2,𝑡  . 
Since there is no reward at the first stage , 𝑟1,𝑡 is always zero, while 𝑟2,𝑡 can be zero or one. 
Model-free 
The model-free algorithm was temporal difference Q-learning (R. S. B. Sutton, A. G., 1998) in 
which the value of a given state is assumed to be equivalent to the expected reward from 
taking the best available action from that state. At each stage i of each trial t, the value of 
the chosen state-action pair was updated according to: 
𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡) +  𝛼𝛿𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝛿, the reward prediction error (RPE), is defined as 
𝛿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 max
𝑎
[𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑖+1,𝑡, 𝑎)] − 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡)  
where 𝛼 is a learning rate fit for each subject and 𝛾 is a discount factor that trades off the 
importance of sooner versus later rewards (fixed at 1).  
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Note that for the first stage choice, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  is always zero and 𝛿 is instead driven by the second-
stage value.  
After outcome delivery, the second stage RPE is used to update the first-stage action 
𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) according to the eligibility trace λ, which assigns credit to the first-stage action 
without the need for an additional step.  
𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) = 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) +  𝛼𝜆𝛿2,𝑡 
Thus, in the event that λ=0, choice is driven by the estimated value of the second-stage state 
on the previous trial. Consistent with previous studies (Daw et al., 2011; Otto, Gershman, et 
al., 2013), this model assumes that eligibility traces are cleared between trials.  
Model-based 
A model-based RL algorithm involves learning a set of contingencies between actions and 
states (a state-transition function), estimating a reward value for each state, and then 
combining the two by iterative expectation. Here, since first-stage transitions are 
probabilistic, a player must map action-state pairs to a probability distribution over 
subsequent states.  
One can approximate subjects’ estimate of the transition probabilities by assuming they 
believe one of two alternatives: 
𝑃(𝑠𝐵| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐴) = 0.7, 𝑃(𝑠𝐶| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐴) = 0.3, 𝑃(𝑠𝐶| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐵) = 0.7, 𝑃(𝑠𝐵| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐵) = 0.3  
or 
𝑃(𝑠𝐵| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐴) = 0.3, 𝑃(𝑠𝐶| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐴) = 0.7, 𝑃(𝑠𝐶| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐵) = 0.3, 𝑃(𝑠𝐵| 𝑠𝐴 , 𝑎𝐵) = 0.7 
based on the number of previous transitions from 𝑠𝐴 to 𝑠𝐵 given 𝑎𝐴 and from 𝑠𝐴 to 𝑠𝐶 given 
𝑎𝐵 (or vice versa). A previous study has shown this scheme settles on the true transition 
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matrix after the first few trials and fits subjects’ choices better than implementing a 
traditional trial-by-trial learning algorithm (Daw et al., 2011). Therefore I assume the true 
transition probabilities are learnt during practice trials and are known by the start of the first 
experimental block.  
Since the second-stage action is the only choice associated with immediate reward, and is 
the final step in a trial, an agent can learn the value of the second-stage state in a manner 
equivalent to temporal difference Q-learning (as above). Thus, 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠2,𝑡, 𝑎2,𝑡) is simply an 
estimate of the immediate reward 𝑟2,𝑡 , and the model-based algorithm converges with 
model-free learning at this stage.  
By combining the transition function with the second-stage values I can define the values of 
the two first-level actions (using Bellman’s equation) as follows: 
𝑄𝑀𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑎𝑗) =  𝑃(𝑠𝐵|𝑠𝐴, 𝑎𝑗) max
𝑎
[𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝐵, 𝑎)] + 𝑃(𝑠𝐶|𝑠𝐴, 𝑎𝑗) max
𝑎
[𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝐶 , 𝑎)]  
where these are computed on every trial based on the updated second-stage Q-values.  
Hybrid model  
For the hybrid model I consider contributions from both model-free and model-based RL. 
First-stage action values were defined as the weighted sum of values from the algorithms 
described above as follows: 
𝑄𝐻𝑀(𝑠𝐴, 𝑎𝑗) = 𝑤𝑄𝑀𝐵(𝑠𝐴, 𝑎𝑗) + (1 − 𝑤)𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝐴, 𝑎𝑗)  
where w is a weighting parameter.  
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When fitting data across all sessions, I included a slope parameter s that allowed w to shift 
across days: 
𝑤𝐷 = 𝑤[exp(𝑠(𝐷𝑎𝑦 − 2))] 
and used 𝒘𝑫 as the new weighting parameter.  
At the second-stage, all three models (model-free, model-based, hybrid) converge.  
Action selection 
For each model, values were converted to action probabilities using a sigmoid (softmax) 
function: 
𝑃(𝑎𝐴,𝑡) = 𝜀 +  
1 − 2𝜀
1 + exp (−𝛽[𝑄(𝑠𝑖,𝑡, 𝑎𝐴,𝑡) −  𝑄(𝑠𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝐵,𝑡)])
 
where 𝜺 is a lapse rate, such that when 𝜺 > 0 the boundaries of the sigmoid function are 
compressed and deviations from the model are less harshly punished, and 𝜷 is an inverse 
temperature parameter that governs the stochasticity of choice options.  
Model sets 
When fitting data from individual days, I considered a hybrid RL model that included a single 
learning rate (α) and softmax temperature (β), a weighting parameter that governs the 
balance between model-free/model-based control (w), and a lapse rate (ε). The eligibility 
trace (λ) was fixed at 1. Model-free and model-based algorithms were nested versions of the 
hybrid model where w was set to 0 and 1 respectively.  
When fitting data across all days, I considered a family of (nested) hybrid RL models in which 
specific parameters were omitted or included as fixed versus free parameters. More complex 
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models included separate RL parameters for first and second stage choices, an eligibility 
trace, and a slope parameter that permitted the weighting between model-free and model-
based control to shift across days. See Table 6.4, p. 167, for the full model set.  
Model comparison  
As described previously in this thesis I used a hierarchical Type II Bayesian (or random effects) 
procedure using maximum likelihood to fit simple parameterized distributions for higher 
level statistics of the parameters. Since the values of parameters for each subject are 
‘hidden’, this employs the Expectation-Maximization (EM) procedure. Thus on each iteration 
the posterior distribution over the group for each parameter is used to specify the prior over 
the individual parameter fits on the next iteration. For each parameter I used a single 
distribution for all participants. Before inference, all parameters were suitably transformed 
to enforce constraints (log and inverse sigmoid transforms).  
The model fitting routine follows that previously described by Huys and colleagues (Huys et 
al., 2011). Each model yielded a parameter vector, 𝜃𝑖, for each subject, 𝑖. Before inference, 
all parameters were suitably transformed to enforce constraints (log and inverse sigmoid 
transforms). Model fitting at the individual level aimed to find the maximum a posteriori 
estimate of 𝜃𝑖, given a vector of each subject’s choices, 𝐶𝑖: 
𝜃𝑖 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃 𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝜗) 
I used a hierarchical (random effects) model-fitting approach, with the assumption that 
parameter estimates were normally distributed at the group level, where 𝜗  are the 
parameters of the empirical normal prior distribution (hyperparameters) on 𝜃 . The 
hierarchical approach allows the population-level distribution of data to constrain unreliable 
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parameter estimates at the individual level. I estimated the maximum-likelihood 
hyperparameters, given the data from all 𝑁 subjects: 
?̂?𝑀𝐿 =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜗 𝑝(𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|𝜗) =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜗 ∏ 𝑝(
𝑖
𝐶𝑖|𝜗) 
where: 
𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜗) =  ∫ 𝑑 𝜃𝑖 𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝜗) 
The intractable integral above was estimated by Expectation-Maximization (EM). The E-step 
at the 𝑘th iteration sought the maximum a posteriori parameter estimates for each subject 
(given an estimate of the empirical prior  from the preceding iteration, achieved by 
unconstrained nonlinear optimization in Matlab, Mathworks, MA, USA): 
 
𝜃𝑖
(𝑘) =  𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜃 𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜃𝑖)𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝜗
(𝑘−1)) 
I used a Laplace approximation, which assumes that the likelihood surface is normally 
distributed around the maximum a posteriori parameter estimate: 
𝑝(𝜃𝑖|𝐶𝑖) ≈ 𝑁 (𝜃𝑖
(𝑘), ∑𝑖
(𝑘)
) 
where ∑𝑖
(𝑘)
 is the second moment around 𝜃𝑖
(𝑘), which approximates the variance. In the M-
step, the estimated hyperparameters 𝜗(𝑘)  of the normal prior distribution, mean 𝜇, and 
factorized variance, 𝜎2, were updated as follows: 
𝜇(𝑘) =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖
(𝑘)
𝑖
 
(𝜎(𝑘))
2
=
1
𝑁
∑ [(𝜃𝑖
(𝑘))
2
+ ∑𝑖
(𝑘)
]
𝑖
− (𝜇(𝑘))
2
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I compared models by Bayesian model evidence, 𝑝(𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|𝑀), approximated as 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡 : 
−
1
2
𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡 = log 𝑝( 𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|?̂?
𝑀𝐿) −  
1
2
|𝑀|log (|𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|) 
where |𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁| is the total number of choices made by all subjects, and |𝑀| is number of 
hyperparameters fitted. Notably here, by distinction from conventional BIC, 
log 𝑝( 𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|?̂?
𝑀𝐿) is a sum over the model evidence at the subject level by integrating 
over subject-level parameters: 
log 𝑝( 𝐶1 … 𝐶𝑁|?̂?
𝑀𝐿) =  ∑ log ∫ 𝑑𝜃 
𝑖
𝑝(𝐶𝑖|𝜃) 𝑝(𝜃|?̂?
𝑀𝐿)  ≈  ∑ log
1
𝐾
∑ 𝑝
𝐾
𝑘=1𝑖
(𝐶𝑖|𝜃
𝑘) 
The right hand expression approximates the integral by summing over 𝐾 samples, drawn 
from the empirical prior, 𝑝(𝜃|?̂?𝑀𝐿). Thus the individual-level parameters intervene between 
the data and the group-level inference, but are averaged out when comparing models.  
6.3 Results 
I employed the two-step task introduced by Daw and colleagues (Daw et al., 2011), and used 
in many recent studies (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; Otto, Raio, et al., 2013; Skatova, Chan, 
& Daw, 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2014; Voon et al., 2014; Wunderlich, 
Smittenaar, et al., 2012), which measures separate model-free and model-based influences 
on choice. Each trial of the task consists of two stages, where each stage involves a two-
alternative forced choice between a pair of adjacent fractal images (Figure 6.1, p. 155). 
Choice at the first-stage always involves the same two fractals, whereas choice at the second-
stage involves one of two distinct pairs of fractals. The first-stage choice is causally related 
to a transition to the second-stage, where each first-stage fractal is predominantly associated 
(with a 70% probability) with one of the second-stage pairs. The transitions with 70% 
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probability I call "common"; those with 30% "uncommon". In turn, each second-stage fractal 
is associated with a probabilistic reward. Importantly, these reward probabilities are 
different for each second-stage fractal, and fluctuate independently across a session. Thus, 
subjects have to make trial-by-trial adjustments in choice so as to maximize the current 
probability of reward.  
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Figure 6.1 On every trial of the two-step task, a choice between a pair of fractals (first-stage) 
led probabilistically to a second pair of fractals (second-stage), of which one fractal had to 
again be chosen. The second-stage choice followed either a reward (gold coin) or no reward 
(0), according to the reward probability associated with the chosen second-stage fractal, 
which fluctuated over time. Importantly, each first-stage choice led predominantly (on 70% 
of occasions) to one of the two second-stage pairs, and this transition structure could be 
exploited by the player. On dual-task trials only (displayed in this figure), two different 
numbers of physically different sizes were displayed briefly above each fractal at the start 
(first-stage) of the trial. After receiving second-stage reward feedback, either the word ‘SIZE’ 
or ‘VALUE’ was presented on the screen, and the player had to indicate whether the number 
that was larger in size, or value, respectively, had previously appeared on the left or right 
side of the screen. Correct responses were incentivized via a small monetary gain while 
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incorrect responses were unrewarded. The requirement to retain information pertaining to 
the numerical task whilst solving the two-step task bore a heightened cognitive load.  
Model-free and model-based decision strategies make different predictions about how 
choice depends on transitions and rewards from previous trials. I used a variety of analysis 
methods to estimate the relative contribution of model-free and model-based strategies 
when subjects performed the two-step task alone or in combination with a demanding 
concurrent task. I also tested whether the effect of the concurrent task changed with 
practice. I trained subjects on the two-step task for 3 consecutive days with short periods of 
concurrent task at various periods throughout the training. An initial group of 22 healthy 
subjects, referred to as the ‘high load group’, experienced the high load condition on each 
day of training. This allowed me to characterize choice under load across the entire training 
period. In contrast, a second group of 23 healthy subjects, referred to as the ‘low load group’, 
experienced the high load condition only on day 3. This allowed me to determine how 
training on the two-step task alone would impact choice under load, and thus provided a 
more conservative test of my hypothesis. 
Switch-stay choice strategy 
As with previous studies utilizing the two-step task (Daw et al., 2011; Otto, Gershman, et al., 
2013; Otto, Raio, et al., 2013; Skatova et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 
2014; Voon et al., 2014; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, et al., 2012), I first examined pairs of 
successive choices in isolation. Specifically, one can estimate the contribution of model-
based versus model-free reasoning by means of a two-factor analysis of the effect of the 
previous trial’s reward and transition type on the first-stage choice (switch versus stay) in 
the current trial (Daw et al., 2011). Here, a model-free strategy predicts that a player should 
repeat first-stage choices that lead to rewards at the second-stage, regardless of the 
transition between states (a main effect of reward on the probability of repeating the 
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previous action). By contrast, a model-based strategy predicts that a player should switch 
their first-stage choice if a reward is delivered after an uncommon transition, generating a 
higher probability of reaching a rewarding second-stage state (a cross-over reward x 
transition interaction in the probability of repeating the previous action). Note these 
predictions stem from the assumption that subjects make choices based only on events 
occurring on the immediately preceding trial, and thus provide only an approximate measure 
of the balance between model-free and model-based reasoning.  
I first analysed data from the ‘high load group’. Consistent with previous research (Daw et 
al., 2011; Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, et 
al., 2012), I found that subjects’ first-stage choices on the two-step task were indicative of a 
mixture of both model-based and model-free reasoning on day 1 of training (Figure 6.2A, p. 
158). This choice strategy remained stable across days, with a logistic regression revealing 
both a main of effect of reward (all p < 0.01) and a reward x transition interaction (all p < 
0.005) on all 3 days. By contrast, both model-based and model-free reasoning were disrupted 
on day 1 of dual-task training (Figure 6.2A, p. 158). Here, first-stage choices did not reveal a 
main effect of reward, and although I identified a reward x transition interaction (p < 0.05), 
it was not characterized by a full cross-over as predicted by a model-based strategy. 
Importantly however, subjects’ behaviour in the dual-task condition shifted across days. I 
identified a reward x transition interaction (p < 0.003), but no main effect of reward, on days 
2 and 3 of dual-task performance. Thus, on these days, subjects’ choices were consistent 
with model-based control despite being under heavy cognitive load.  
When considering data from the ‘low load group’ I again observed a choice pattern indicative 
of both model-free and model-based reasoning across all 3 days of two-step training (main 
effect of reward, all p < 0.05; reward x transition interaction, all p < 0.05), but no change in 
behaviour across days (reward x transition x day, p = 0.40) (Figure 6.2B, p. 158). By contrast, 
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dual-task performance on day 3 exhibited a reward x transition interaction (p < 0.001) but 
no main effect of reward (p = 0.59). These analyses suggest that task training renders model-
based reasoning resistant to load, whether training occurs in the presence or absence of 
load. 
 
Figure 6.2 Bars plots show the average probability with which subjects chose to repeat their 
first-stage action on the subsequent trial as a function of the transition (common vs. 
uncommon) and outcome (rewarded vs. unrewarded) on the previous trial (switch-stay 
choice pairs). Data are divided according to trial type (two-step vs. dual-task), training period 
(days 1-3) and subject group (panel A, ‘high load group’; panel B, ‘low load group’). (A) A 
heightened cognitive load during dual-task trials disrupts stay-switch behaviour associated 
with a model-free or model-based choice strategy given no prior training on the two-step 
task (day 1). This deficit is largely recovered following training (day 3). (B) Training on the 
two-step task alone (i.e. without dual-task trials) permits a degree of model-based reasoning 
under load (dual-task condition). Errors bars represent SEM.  
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For completeness, I repeated the logistic regression concatenating data across all 3 days and 
including a regressor for the day of training (and all possible interactions; see Table 6.1, p. 
160). I identified a significant 3-way reward x transition x day interaction for dual-task trials 
(p < 0.05), but not two-step trials (p = 0.41), consistent with the notion that training altered 
subjects’ performance under high but not low cognitive load (see Table 6.1, p. 160).  
Finally, I performed a separate logistic regression for dual-task trials where I included 
regressors relating to Stroop task performance on the previous trial (see Table 6.2, p. 161, 
for a full list of regressors). Here, I again found a 3-way reward x transition x day interaction, 
reflective of an increase in the influence of a model-based strategy across days, but this 
effect only trended towards significance (p = 0.07), likely owing to an increase in correlation 
between regressors. Interestingly, I found a main effect of Stroop performance (p < 0.05), 
indicating that subjects were more likely to repeat their first-stage choice on the next trial if 
they performed the Stroop task correctly on the current trial. In addition, I found a Stroop 
performance x reward x transition interaction (p < 0.01), indicating that subjects were less 
likely to switch their first-stage choice on the next trial following a rewarded uncommon 
transition on the current trial if they also made a Stroop error on the current trial. Thus, 
negative feedback on the Stroop task interfered with subjects’ ability to utilize a model-based 
strategy on the next trial. One possible explanation is that when subjects make a Stroop 
error, they allocate more attentional resources to the Stroop task cues at the start of the 
following trial, hindering choice on the two-step task. Another possibility is that errors on 
the Stroop task disrupt credit assignment (the appropriate updating of action values) on the 
current trial such that subjects make a less optimal choice on the following trial.         
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Regressor 
Two-step 
Dual 
High load group Low load group 
Coef SE p Coef SE p Coef SE p 
intercept -1.123 0.199 < 0.001 -0.828 0.167 < 0.001 -0.397 0.163 0.0235 
rew -0.179 0.033 < 0.001 -0.259 0.052 0.0001 -0.058 0.030 0.0691 
trans -0.139 0.084 0.1136 0.062 0.081 0.4510   -0.084 0.073 0.2622 
day 0.056 0.066 0.406 -0.055 0.054 0.3219 -0.057 0.055 0.3124 
rew x trans -0.540 0.100 < 0.001 -0.300 0.102 0.0081 -0.278 0.052 < 0.001 
rew x day 0.018 0.035 0.6105 -0.085 0.048 0.0911 -0.024 0.036 0.5164 
trans x day 0.006 0.035 0.876 -0.062 0.050 0.2234 -0.002 0.036 0.9676 
rew x trans 
x day 
-0.019 0.037 0.606 -0.023 0.051 0.6599 -0.110 0.052 0.0480 
Table 6.1 Table shows the group-level output of a logistic regression on first-stage switch-
stay behaviour, separately for two-step (‘high load group’ and ‘low load group’) and dual-
task trials, from data concatenated across all 3 training sessions. Note that ‘reward x day’ 
was orthogonalized with respect to reward, and in turn ‘reward x transition x day’ was 
orthogonalized with respect to ‘reward x transition’. These regressors thus account for 
variance unexplained by the 2-way effect (see Methods, p. 145 - 146). Bold-face denotes p < 
0.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. rew = reward; trans = transition; Coef = 
regression coefficient.  
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Regressor 
Dual 
Coef SE p 
intercept -0.263 0.352 0.135 
rew -0.084 0.126 0.020 
trans -0.109 0.126 0.012 
day -0.057 0.157 0.368 
stroop acc -0.091 0.179 0.026 
rew x trans -0.249 0.127 < 0.001 
rew x day -0.025 0.157 0.512 
trans x day 0.004 0.156 0.926 
rew x trans x day -0.105 0.157 0.075 
rew x stroop acc 0.039 0.193 0.364 
rew x trans  
x stroop acc 
-0.107 0.191 0.006 
rew x trans x  
stroop acc x day 
-0.047 0.231 0.420 
Table 6.2 Table shows the group-level output of a logistic regression on first-stage switch-
stay behaviour, for ‘high load group’ data and dual-task trials only, where data is 
concatenated across all 3 training sessions. Note that ‘reward x day’ was orthogonalized with 
respect to reward, and in turn ‘reward x transition x day’ was orthogonalized with respect to 
‘reward x transition’. Similarly, ‘reward x transition x stroop accuracy’ was orthogonalized 
with respect to ‘rew x stroop accuracy’ and so on. These regressors thus account for variance 
unexplained by the simpler 2, 3 or 4-way effect (see Methods, p. 145 - 146). Bold-face 
denotes p < 0.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. rew = reward; trans = transition; 
stroop acc = Stroop task accuracy; Coef = regression coefficient.  
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Computational modelling  
One limitation of a switch-stay regression analysis is that it attempts to explain choice on the 
current trial by events occurring on the immediately preceding trial. Thus, ‘switching’ after 
an uncommon rewarded trial is always deemed model-based, whilst ‘staying’ is deemed 
model-free. However, a model-based player might repeat a first-stage choice after an 
uncommon rewarded trial if the expected utility of the previous first-stage action is high. 
Reinforcement learning models typically account for this by assuming a decaying influence 
of all previous trials. I therefore used computational modelling to corroborate the switch-
stay regression analysis.  
First, I used Bayesian model comparison to validate that choice in the two-step task reflects 
a hybrid of both model-free and model-based valuations (Daw et al., 2011). The hybrid model 
makes choices according to a weighted combination of model-free and model-based action 
values (with the weight governed by the parameter w), where choice is purely model-free or 
model-based when w = 0 or 1 respectively. I then fit the hybrid model to the ‘high load group’ 
and the ‘low load group’, separately for two-step and dual-task trials, treating each day of 
training as a discrete set of data. This allowed me to assess the impact of training on the two-
step task, by comparing the value of w under load on day 1 in the ‘high load group’, and day 
3 in the ‘low load group’ (a between-group comparison). Specifically, this provided a 
conservative test of my hypothesis that training on the two-step task alone would permit 
increased model-based choice under load. I also evaluated the effects of training under load 
over time, by comparing the value of w during step-task and dual-task trials in the ‘high load 
group’ across each day of training (a within-group comparison). Finally, in order to validate 
my findings within a fully Bayesian framework, I performed a second model comparison 
where I concatenated data from the full training period and tested model variants in which 
the value of w could change across days.  
163 
 
Between-group comparison  
I fit a hybrid RL model, in addition to reduced (nested) versions that describe pure model-
free and model-based choice respectively, to ‘high load group’ data from day 1 of training, 
and to ‘low load group’ data from day 3 of training, separately for two-step (low load) and 
dual-task (high load) trials. Using Bayesian model comparison, I found that the hybrid model 
provided a better fit to subject data in both groups and both trial types, as indicated by a 
lower iBIC score (see Table 6.3, below). Importantly however, w was significantly higher in 
the two-step condition compared to the dual-task condition (p < 0.01) in the ‘high load group’ 
on day 1, consistent with previous evidence that model-based reasoning is impaired under 
high cognitive load in untrained subjects (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013) (Figure 6.3A, p. 164). 
Conversely, I found no difference in the value of w between two-step and dual-task trials 
when fitting ‘low load group’ data from day 3 of training (Figure 6.3B, p. 164). This suggests 
that prior training on the two-step task permitted a strong degree of model-based reasoning 
under load, despite subjects having no prior experience with performing a task under load.  
Models 
iBIC Two-step (x 104) iBIC dual (x 103) 
No. 
Parameters 
High load 
group 
(day 1) 
Low load 
group 
(day 3) 
High load 
group  
(day 1) 
Low load 
group  
(day 3) 
α β ε       (model-free) 1.3831 1.4605 7.2260 7.8552 3 
α β ε       (model-based) 1.3688 1.4589 7.3056 7.8471 3 
α β ε w   (hybrid) 1.3491 1.4195 7.1863 7.8143 4 
Table 6.3 Results of a Bayesian model comparison that accounts for differences in model 
complexity. The hybrid model, which incorporates influences from both model-free and 
model-based control, fit subject data better than pure model-free and model-based RL 
algorithms across both trial types (two-step versus dual-task) and both groups (‘high load 
group’ day1, ‘low load group’ day 3). Bold-face denotes the winning model (lowest iBIC score) 
for each condition.  
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Figure 6.3 (A) Mean best-fitting parameters from the hybrid model for ‘high load group’ data 
from day 1 (i.e. before task training). The weighting parameter w, which represents a 
measure of model-based (w = 1) relative to model-free (w = 0) control, was lower in the dual-
task (high load) condition compared to the two-step (low load) condition. (B) By contrast, w 
did not differ between dual-task and two-step trials in the ‘low load group’ on day 3, who 
had received prior training on the two-step task over two consecutive days. Vertical bars 
represent SEM. * denotes p < 0.05.  
Within-group comparison 
Next, I fit the hybrid model to data from days 2 and 3 of training in the ‘high load group’, 
separately for two-step and dual-task trials. This allowed me to characterize the temporal 
dynamics of a shift in the balance of model-free or model-based control with increasing task 
exposure (i.e. across all 3 days). Here, I was principally interested in whether I would observe 
an abrupt switch in subjects’ strategy at the start of a given training day, or alternatively, 
whether a gradual shift in behavioural control would emerge across days (as suggested by 
subjects’ switch-stay choices; see Figure 6.2, p. 158). To test these hypotheses, I performed 
paired t-tests on parameter estimates from Bayesian model inference. In the two-step task, 
I found evidence for a moderate shift towards more model-based choice, as indexed by 
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higher w values, on days 2 and 3 of training compared to day 1 (both p < 0.01) (Figure 6.4A, 
below). During dual-task trials, I found a more pronounced shift towards model-based 
choice, with an approximately linear increase in the value of w across days (all p < 0.001) 
(Figure 6.4B, below). Thus, consistent with the regression analysis, training increased the 
relative contribution of model-based reasoning to a greater degree during high load trials, 
suggesting that the addition of load is necessary to expose training-induced changes in 
behaviour in the two-step task.  
 
Figure 6.4 Mean best-fitting parameters from the hybrid model for ‘high load group’ data 
from days 1-3 of training. The weighting parameter w represents a measure of model-based 
(w = 1) relative to model-free (w = 0) control. (A) At the group level, model parameters 
remained relatively stable across two-step trials, indicating that performance in the absence 
of load was not largely affected by training. (B) By contrast, performance under load shifted 
across days, with higher learning rates and higher w values as task exposure increased. 
Vertical bars represent SEM.  
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Multi-day model comparison 
To corroborate the finding that w changes with training within a fully Bayesian framework, I 
fit a full hybrid RL model (in addition to various nested alternatives) to ‘high load group’ data 
across all 3 days (combined), separately for two-step and dual-task trials. Importantly, I 
tested model variants in which w could shift across days, governed by a slope parameter σ, 
allowing the balance between model-free and model-based control to vary with each 
consecutive day of training. Bayesian model comparison revealed that the slope parameter 
σ was supported for the dual-task condition but not for the two-step condition, with the 
latter result replicating in both the ‘high load group’ and the ‘low load group’ (see Tables 6.4 
& 6.5, p. 167). Thus, training influenced the balance between model-free and model-based 
control across each day of training in dual-task trials but not in two-step trials (however, w 
was higher on days 2 and 3 compared to day 1 of training during two-step blocks, a subtlety 
not captured by the slope model). Importantly, the value of σ was negative at the group-
level, indicating a higher degree of model-based control on day 3 compared to day 1 (see 
Table 6.5, p. 167). Thus, subjects’ ability to perform model-based reasoning gradually 
became immune to cognitive load when training included both the two-step and dual-task 
conditions, both within a fully Bayesian framework, and when fitting behaviour from each 
day individually.  
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Models 
iBIC Two-step (x 104) 
 
iBIC dual  
(x 104) 
No. Parameters High load 
group 
Low load  
group 
α β ε w 3.9598 4.2879 2.1602 4 
α β ε w λ 3.9544 4.2880 2.1598 5 
α β ε w σ 3.9703 4.2917 2.1598 5 
α β ε w λ σ 3.9563 4.2912 2.1608 6 
α1 α2 β ε w 3.9592 4.2877 2.1498 5 
α1 α2 β ε w λ 3.9494 4.2887 2.1507 6 
α1 α2 β ε w σ 3.9612 4.2907 2.1490 6 
α1 α2 β ε w λ σ 3.9459 4.2906 2.1494 7 
α β1 β2 ε w 3.9153 4.2556 2.1494 5 
α β1 β2 ε w λ 3.9072 4.2494 2.1472 6 
α β1 β2 ε w σ 3.9214 4.2612 2.1476 6 
α β1 β2 ε w λ σ 3.9120 4.2541 2.1476 7 
α1 α2 β1 β2 ε w 3.9134 4.2586 2.1449 6 
α1 α2 β1 β2 ε w σ 3.9196 4.2632 2.1433 7 
α1 α2 β1 β2 ε w λ 3.9055 4.2501 2.1442 7 
α1 α2 β1 β2 ε w λ σ 3.9111 4.2569 2.1462 8 
Table 6.4 Results of a Bayesian model comparison that accounts for differences in model 
complexity. More complex model variants include those that have separate RL parameters 
for first and second stage choices, eligibility traces, and a parameter for capturing shifts in 
model-free versus model-based control across days. Bold-face denotes the winning model 
(lowest iBIC score) for each condition.  
Condition 
 
α1 
 
α2 
 
β1 
 
β2 
 
ε 
 
 
w 
 
λ 
 
σ 
 High load group: 
two-step  
0.442 0.405 6.682 2.734 4.97 x10-5 0.723 0.546 0* 
High load group: 
dual-task 
0.097 0.355 3.981 2.250 0.021 0.899 1* -0.306 
Low load group: 
two-step 
0.510 4.752 2.560 6.66 x 10-5 0.566 0.628 0* 
Table 6.5 Best-fitting parameter estimates shown separately for each group and condition 
(two-step versus dual-task), using data concatenated across all 3 days of training. Values 
represent mean parameter fits across all subjects. * represents fixed parameter values.  
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Other learning parameters 
In addition to differences in the value of w between two-step and dual-task trials, I also found 
differences in a number of other learning parameters. When fitting data from the ‘high load 
group’ on day 1, and the ‘low load group’ on day 3, I found subjects were less considerate of 
the most recent reward information (as indexed by a lower learning rate) and chose more 
stochastically (as indicated by a lower inverse temperature) during dual-task trials compared 
to two-step trials (all p < 0.05) (Figure 6.3, p. 164). I identified similar differences when fitting 
data across all training days consecutively (Table 6.5, p. 167). However, when subjects were 
able to practice the dual-task condition on each day (‘high load group’), both the learning 
rate and inverse temperature under load increased across days (all p < 0.001 comparing day 
1 to day 3) (Figure 6.4B, p. 165).  
3-Back Logistic Regression  
Computational modelling characterizes subject behaviour in the two-step task by integrating 
over a history of choices. In this modelling, I quantified the relative degree of model-free and 
model-based control by fitting w to subjects’ choices. However, this approach also relies on 
fitting several other model parameters that may exhibit a degree of shared variance. This has 
the potential to complicate interpretation when the true value of more than one parameter 
differs between two conditions.  
I therefore employed a second logistic regression, to capture the main effects of the model, 
in a manner that more closely approximates a modelling approach. Here, rather than 
consider pairs of isolated choices, I quantified the degree to which choice on the current trial 
reflected a model-free and model-based influence relative to events occurring on the 
preceding 3 trials (see Methods, Logistic regression, p. 146) (Smittenaar et al., 2014). For 
example, if a player received a reward following an uncommon transition 3 trials in the past, 
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a model-free system would be more likely to choose the same first-stage fractal on the 
current trial, whereas a model-based system would be more likely to choose the opposite 
first-stage fractal on the current trial.  
During two-step trials, I identified a significant model-free and model-based influence on 
choice extending up to 3 trials in the past (all p < 0.05), consistent with a notion that subjects 
utilized a hybrid of both systems (Figure 6.5A, p. 170). However, I found a reduction in model-
based control in the dual-task condition compared to the two-step condition in the ‘high load 
group’ on day 1, an effect that spread up to 2 trials in the past (pared t-tests, all p < 0.05). 
Importantly, this difference was reduced following task training (on day 3), independent of 
whether training included (‘high load group’, Figure 6.5A, p. 170) or excluded (‘low load 
group’, Figure 6.6, p. 171) the high load condition. To help visualize these effects, I derived 
single indices of model-free and model-based learning by summing the coefficients that 
correspond to an influence of events on 1, 2 or 3 trials in the past respectively (see Figure 
6.5B, p. 170). Further, to my surprise, I was unable to identify a significant model-free 
influence in either group in the high load condition. However, model-free coefficients were 
not significantly different when comparing the two-step and dual-task conditions (with 
paired t-tests). Thus, I do not wish to draw strong inferences from this subtle dissimilarity. In 
summary, these results replicate my computational modelling in a format that is slightly less 
powerful but is also freer from parametric assumptions.  
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Figure 6.5 I performed a logistic regression to estimate the relationship between choice on 
trial t and events occurring on trial t-1 up to t-3. Here, regression coefficients can be 
interpreted as reflecting a model-free or model-based influence on choice, where larger 
coefficients indicate a stronger influence. (A) In the two-step condition, model-free and 
model-based coefficients were significantly different from 0 (up to 3 trials in the past), 
suggesting that subjects used a hybrid of both strategies (upper panel). In the dual-task 
condition, I observed no significant influence of a model-free system, and a diminished 
influence of a model-based system in untrained subjects. This impairment in model-based 
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reasoning was suppressed following task training (day 3), while the absence of a model-free 
influence remained insensitive to training (lower panel). (B) For each condition, and 
separately for days 1 and 3, I summed (individually) the coefficients corresponding to trial t-
1, t-2 and t-3, and derived single estimates of the degree to which model-free and model-based 
control were dominant in choice. I observed a larger relative shift towards model-based 
control with training in the dual-task condition compared to the two-step condition, 
consistent with the previously discussed analyses. Vertical lines represent SEM. * denotes p 
< 0.05, ‡ denotes p = 0.09.  
 
Figure 6.6 I performed a logistic regression on data from ‘low load group’ and day 3 of 
training to estimate the relationship between choice on trial t and events occurring on trial 
t-1 up to t-3. Here, regression coefficients can be interpreted as reflecting a model-free or 
model-based influence on choice, where larger coefficients indicate a stronger influence. In 
the two-step condition (blue bars), model-free and model-based coefficients were 
significantly different from 0 (up to 3 trials in the past), suggesting that subjects used a hybrid 
of both strategies. In the dual-task (high load) condition (orange bars), I observed a 
significant influence of a model-based system, that did not differ from the two-step 
condition, up to 3 trials in the past. In contrast, I found no significant influence of a model-
free system. These results are consistent with data from the ‘high load group’ (see Figure 
6.5, p. 170). Vertical lines represent SEM. * denotes p =< 0.05, ‡ denotes p = 0.08.  
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Numerical Stroop performance 
Mean numerical Stroop accuracy during dual-task trials was 81.9% on day 1, 85.5% on day 2, 
and 89.5% on day 3 for the ‘high load group’. Thus, performance on the secondary task 
demonstrated an approximately linear increase across training days (all p < 0.05). Mean 
numerical Stroop accuracy for the ‘low load group’, in which subjects only experienced the 
dual-task condition on day 3 of training, was 83.2%, and thus comparable to the ‘high load 
group’.  
Despite performance on the Stroop task being high overall (~80 - 90%), I hypothesized that 
the ability for subjects to respond accurately would depend on, or interact with, events 
occurring on the two-step task. To explore this I performed a logistic regression, using data 
from the ‘high load group’, to quantify whether Stroop task performance on the current trial 
(coded as ‘0’ for incorrect and ‘1’ for correct) could be explained by choice or events related 
to the concurrent two-step task. The explanatory factors in this model included whether the 
numbers presented on the current trial were congruent or incongruent with respect to ‘SIZE’ 
and ‘VALUE’, whether subjects choose to repeat or switch their first-stage choice with 
respect to the previous trial, the response time at the first-stage, whether the transition on 
the current trial was common or uncommon, whether the current trial was rewarded or not, 
and whether the data were from day 1, 2 or 3 of training. The resulting coefficients are 
presented in Table 6.6 (p. 173).  
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Regressors 
High load group 
Coef SE p 
intercept 1.5854 0.3084 < 0.001 
switch/stay -0.1122 0.0958   0.255 
rew -0.0094 0.1068 0.931 
trans 0.1592 0.0831 0.069 
congruency -0.0613 0.1991 0.761 
RT -0.0004 0.0002 0.020 
day 0.3377 0.0766 < 0.001 
Table 6.6 Group-level output of a logistic regression on the probability of performing the 
Stroop task correctly. Bold-face denotes p < 0.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons. rew 
= reward; trans = transition; RT = first-stage reaction time; Coef = regression coefficient.  
This regression analysis revealed that subjects were more likely to perform the Stroop task 
correctly with increasing task experience (a main effect of day). Performance was also more 
accurate when they were faster to make their first-stage choice on the two-step task. This 
could imply that deploying more cognitive resources to the two-step task (or for a longer 
period of time) - owing to reduced decision confidence - might negatively impact on the 
encoding or maintenance of distracting information. Alternatively, subjects may have 
generally been more aroused and attentive on trials where they were faster to respond on 
the two-step task. Further, I identified a main effect of transition that trended towards 
significance (p = 0.07). This suggests that subjects may have been less likely to perform the 
Stroop task correctly on trials where they experienced an uncommon transition on the two-
step task. The Stroop task requires maintaining spatial information about numerical cues in 
working memory. Thus, one possibility is that the experience of an uncommon transition 
interfered with subjects’ ability to correctly maintain location-specific (left versus right) 
information required for the Stroop task, perhaps because it increased the likelihood of 
mentally switching these locations. However, subjects had no explicit reason to map 
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common or uncommon transitions onto specific spatial locations since they did not transition 
through the Markov structure “spatially” when performing the task. A more likely 
explanation is that uncommon transitions utilize more cognitive resources than common 
transitions. For example, it is feasible that subjects prepare a second-stage response 
following their first-stage choice based on the fractal pair that would result from a common 
transition. In the event of an uncommon transition, subjects might have to deploy additional 
cognitive resources to retrieve and compare cached values at the second stage on the fly.   
6.4 Discussion  
A prominent account of decision-making posits that humans and other animals use (at least) 
two distinct strategies for making choices (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Daw et al., 2005; 
Dolan & Dayan, 2013; van der Meer, Kurth-Nelson, & Redish, 2012). In this view, a habitual 
or model-free decision system resides primarily in the basal ganglia and does not depend on 
limited executive resources (Stalnaker et al., 2010; Yin & Knowlton, 2006). Meanwhile, a 
goal-directed or model-based decision system engages prefrontal cortical areas with 
capacity limits that might arise from serial processing (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Glascher et 
al., 2010; Jones et al., 2012; Sigman & Dehaene, 2008; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Wunderlich, 
Dayan, et al., 2012).  
Here, I asked whether reliance on a limited pool of executive resources is a universal property 
of model-based choice, or whether, as task familiarity increases, the brain can execute 
model-reasoning in a way that depends less on these limited-resource functions. I found that 
model-based choice was preserved under load in subjects that had acquired familiarity, 
through prior training, with the structure of a two-stage Markov decision task (Daw et al., 
2011), suggesting a change in the implementation of model-based behaviour. This finding 
was independently replicated in two cohorts of subjects (who received training either with 
or without load) and using different methodological approaches.  
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There are several possible explanations for this result. First, following training, subjects may 
become more efficient at using the task structure to plan ahead. From a neural perspective, 
this might entail shifting model calculations away from executive brain areas that are limited 
by serial processing (Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006; Glascher et al., 2010; Sigman & 
Dehaene, 2008; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Valentin et al., 2007; Wunderlich, Dayan, et al., 
2012). Interestingly, task training has previously been shown to cause "off-loading" to other 
neural circuits in tasks requiring executive resources, including a shift from the prefrontal 
cortex to parietal and striatal regions (Kelly & Garavan, 2005; Yildiz & Beste, 2014). In 
particular, recent evidence suggests the striatum, in contrast to the prefrontal cortex, may 
be more optimized for parallel processing in dual-task conditions (Yildiz & Beste, 2014). If 
model calculations remain in the same brain areas, it is possible that the coding within these 
areas becomes more efficient with experience, for example, if only a fraction of neurons are 
required to fire in order to achieve the same representational fidelity (Beauchamp, Dagher, 
Aston, & Doyon, 2003; Bush et al., 1998; Poldrack, 2000). 
Second, resilience to load could emerge with training if other implicitly necessary processes 
(other than reasoning with the Markov transition matrix of the task itself) become more 
efficient. For example, some cognitive resources may be required for identifying the various 
fractals and remembering which is which, for maintaining events that occurred on the 
previous trial in working memory, and for retrieving cached values at the second-stage 
during planning. There may also be resources involved in maintaining belief distributions 
over meta-parameters, such as whether the task structure might change or new fractals 
might appear, what appropriate learning rates are, when model-based reasoning should be 
deployed (Daw et al., 2005; Keramati, Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011) and how attentional resources 
should be allocated within a trial. Since all these processes are likely dependent on executive 
brain regions to some degree (Badre, 2008; Behrens et al., 2007; Knight et al., 1995; E. E. 
Smith & Jonides, 1999; Waskom et al., 2014), gaining efficiency in any of these domains may 
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free resources for model-based computations, or for maintaining task-relevant content in 
working memory.  
Third, subjects could learn to perform model-based calculations at the end of each trial (i.e., 
"offline"), rather than the beginning of the next trial. The results of this calculation could 
update a cached or habitual value accessed for the next choice, relieving the need to store 
the current reward in memory until the beginning of the next trial. In turn this could allow 
increased allocation of executive resources to the concurrent task. Further, choice under 
load after training may not be truly model-based. Increasingly sophisticated choice heuristics 
(for example, applying Q-value updates to the opposite first-stage transition following an 
uncommon transition), permit behaviour that is increasingly difficult to distinguish from fully 
model-based in the simple two-step task (K. J. Miller, Erlich, Kopec, Botvinick, & Brody, 2013). 
Although not realizing the full Markov model of the task, these strategies implicitly embody 
partial models of the task structure.  
While my data cannot currently disambiguate between these divergent mechanisms (many 
of which are at least to some degree overlapping and by no means mutually exclusive), it 
seems likely that task training could instigate a combination of the above. Future 
experiments could aim to investigate their respective predictions, for example via the use of 
neuroimaging. In the remainder of the discussion I will elaborate on a number of more subtle 
features of the data that, while not affecting the main conclusions of the paper, are 
nevertheless of interest.  
Using computational modelling, I found that w (a parameter indexing the balance between 
model-based and model-free control) was reduced by load, and this deficit was eliminated 
by prior task training. However, a subsequent 3-back regression analysis suggests the 
possibility that the observed reduction in w under load could reflect a marginal weakening 
of model-free reasoning, in addition to a more pronounced disruption of model-based 
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reasoning. This contrasts with previous studies showing that model-based, but not model-
free learning, is prone to interference in a range of contexts (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; 
Otto, Raio, et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Voon et al., 2014; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, 
et al., 2012). One possibility is that this subtle difference may be a consequence of 
dissimilarities in task design. For example, while Otto and colleagues utilized interleaved 
trials of low and high load (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013), I employed alternating blocks of 
either condition. If subjects make choices by integrating over a history of trials, then 
enforcing a high load over a longer history of trials could have more diffuse consequences 
on choice. Similarly, I found that task training boosted model-based but not model-free 
reasoning under load. While I do not wish to draw strong conclusions, one possibility is that 
subjects were encouraged to overcompensate for load during dual-task trials, and that this 
suppressed the influence of a model-free system following training.  
Through computational modelling, I found that load affected not just w but also learning 
rates and choice noise parameters. These changes were not eliminated by prior task training. 
Slower learning rates and more stochastic choice appeared during high load trials, 
independent of training (in the ‘low load group’). Slower learning rates raise the possibility 
that subjects under load inferred lower environmental volatility (perhaps placing stronger 
weight on priors) (Behrens et al., 2007). Alternatively, it may reflect a tradeoff between 
executive processes, such as updating the contents of working memory, and more 
incremental learning processes that exhibit longer time-constants. Noisier choice might be 
associated with a reduction in decision-making confidence (De Martino et al., 2013; Kepecs, 
Uchida, Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008). It is also possible that the underlying choice strategy used 
by subjects was not fully captured by the winning model, leading some other form of 
variability to be absorbed by the model parameters. In addition, although prior task training 
had a large effect on behaviour under load, it had little effect on behaviour without load 
(comparing day 3 to day 1 in the 'low load group'). This suggests that training induced latent 
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changes that were made apparent by the addition of load, for example, due to an effective 
ceiling on model-based choice.  
I found slightly higher w values on day 3 of training in the ‘high load group’ (who received 
training both with and without load), than the ‘low load group’ (who only received training 
on the two-step task), in both trial types, indicating a higher degree of model-based relative 
to model-free control. This could in part be explained by the fact that subjects in the ‘high 
load group’ received more overall training (256 additional trials; 4 blocks of 64 dual-task 
trials) than the ‘low load group’. However, it is also possible that training under load induced 
neural adaptations that permitted improved dual-task performance independent from a 
change in the implementation of model-based choice (Hazeltine, Teague, & Ivry, 2002). 
Finally, I cannot exclude the possibility that a component of the behavioural change I 
observed across days in the ‘low load group’ was unrelated to familiarity with the primary 
decision-task. For example, subjects may have simply become more comfortable in the 
laboratory setting after consecutive visits. Further, by merely practicing a cognitively 
demanding task, subjects’ working memory capacity may have improved, reducing the 
burden associated with concurrent task performance. However, evidence that working 
memory training generalizes to novel tasks or contexts remains at best controversial (Melby-
Lervag & Hulme, 2013).  
In summary, I present data that challenge a prominent notion in decision-making that goal-
directed or model-based reasoning is necessarily reliant on a finite pool of executive 
resources. Instead, I show this reliance is linked to the degree of prior experience with the 
model of the world, where more experience may enable different (and potentially less costly) 
neural mechanisms for the implementation of model-based choice. These data may have 
implications for therapies to restore normal decision-making in psychiatric disorders, where 
deficits in model-based reasoning are thought to play a key role.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
A major focus of the work presented in this thesis has been the contribution of multiple 
neural systems to decision-making in an adaptive context. My first two experiments focused 
on the processes supporting value encoding and action selection, while the latter experiment 
investigated learning. In the following sections I will give an overview of the significance of 
my findings within the broader context of neuroeconomics and proceed to discuss the 
limitations of the work and relevant future directions.  
7.1 Overview, limitations, and further work 
Contemporary theories formalize decision-making in terms of an evaluation of the predicted 
rewards, punishments and costs associated with different choice options, which are then 
compared so that the best option can be chosen. Over the last decade, a number of 
influential experiments have sought to reveal the neural correlates of such valuations by 
combining behavioural paradigms, in which individuals choose between options that differ 
in value, with neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI, or single-unit recordings.  
Although a wide array of brain regions have been implicated, two ubiquitous regions include 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the striatum. For example, in a set of studies 
by Padoa-Schioppa and colleagues (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006, 2008), activity in the 
orbitofrontal cortex of non-human primates correlated with the subjective value of different 
rewards or “goods”. Here, monkeys were made to choose between a set of two or three 
juice options where the types and amounts of juices varied across trials and sessions. This 
allowed the experimenters to infer the subjective value of different options based upon each 
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monkey’s actual choices. Within the orbitofrontal cortex, neurons were identified that 
encoded the subjective value of one of the offered rewards, or alternatively the chosen 
reward, or the type of juice chosen. This led the authors to conclude that this region in the 
brain is a good candidate for the type of value assignment that is thought to underlie 
economic choice. Similarly, Kable and Glimcher (Kable & Glimcher, 2007) showed that 
comparable brain areas encode subjective value in humans. In their experiment, subjects 
were required to choose between an immediately available sum of money and a larger but 
delayed sum. Here, the subjective value of a delayed outcome typically declines as the 
imposed delay to its delivery increases, a phenomenon termed delay discounting. By 
estimating a discounting factor for each individual subject, Kable and Glimcher were able to 
show that the BOLD response in regions including the vmPFC and striatum correlated with 
the subjective value of the delayed choice option. Thus, the authors similarly concluded that 
these regions form a common valuation system that assigns values to choice options in the 
environment and ultimately guides action selection. 
Many value-guided decision-making paradigms involve discrete, binary decisions between 
two or more choice options, where the outcome of each decision (or trial) is independent. 
Thus, rewards and punishments accumulate discretely over time, or alternatively, a single 
random trial is realized at the end of the experiment. Although this approach is highly 
efficient, it fails to capture several components of real-life decision-making, where choice is 
often sequential and highly context-dependent. For example, drinking coffee may have a 
high utility in the morning (due to increased alertness), but a low utility in the evening (as 
one’s sleep is likely to be disrupted). Similarly, actions that lead to an immediate reward or 
punishment may also generate a complex set of delayed consequences. For instance, 
smoking a cigarette may bestow immediate rewards but may also imperil long-term health 
and confer negative social consequences. Bearing in mind these complexities, we know less 
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about how vmPFC and other valuations regions encode different components of value in 
different contexts, or how this contributes towards adaptive decision-making.  
In this thesis I took the relatively novel approach of designing sequential decision-making 
paradigms in which the value of a given choice option can fluctuate according to changes in 
context. The data I present in Chapters 4 and 5 support a notion that vmPFC (and other 
valuation regions) represent the immediate or stimulus-driven value of choice options in 
such contexts. These low-level representations are then moderated by higher-order 
prefrontal (and possibly parietal) networks that track specific contextual or task-related 
computations, in a manner that allows individuals to overcome prepotent responses, 
maintain hierarchical goals, and adaptively switch their choices. These results are consistent 
with previous computational theories that decision values reflect the accumulation and 
integration of multiple sources of information in the brain (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008), and 
with empirical evidence that dorsal prefrontal cortex incorporates more abstract decision 
components within vmPFC (Hare et al., 2009; McClure et al., 2004). However, it should not 
be overlooked that in some cases, there may be substantial inter-individual variability in the 
degree to which stimulus-driven valuations are modulated, and consequently, in the extent 
to which individuals are able to dynamically adjust their behaviour (as shown in Chapter 5). 
Future experiments could address whether this variability stems from an impaired 
representation of context, or from a deficit in in the functional integration of multiple 
decision components.  
Importantly, while several previous studies have shown that dorsal prefrontal cortex is 
involved in flexible decision-making when changes in context are externally cued (Aron et al., 
2004; Badre & Wagner, 2004; Kerns et al., 2004), few paradigms have explored the 
mechanisms underpinning switches in choice when the agent has to infer that the context 
has changed, a decision process important in real life. Here, I show that both instances recruit 
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similar regions of prefrontal cortex and likely utilize equivalent choice architectures. 
Although I used a computational approach, it remains unclear to what extent the functional 
contribution of dorsal prefrontal cortex generalizes to other tasks, or how it relates to other 
executive functions supported by the neocortex, such as working memory (Curtis & 
D'Esposito, 2003). These issues are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.  
Further, in Chapter 5, I showed that value representations within some brain regions (such 
as the striatum) remain insensitive to changes in context, and that this may lead to 
suboptimalities in decision-making. In this framework, choice might instigate a competition 
between value systems supporting short-term gains and long-term goals respectively. This 
dual-system framework is analogous, albeit computationally distinct, to other dual-system 
theories in the brain, such as the increasingly evident division between model-free and 
model-based reinforcement learning (Daw et al., 2011; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Doll et al., 
2012). Further work is needed to understand, i) how these “short-term” reward 
representations in striatum manifest in choice, ii) whether they are in fact ‘functional’ as 
opposed to merely ‘content’ representations (deCharms & Zador, 2000), iii) whether they 
are exaggerated in impulsive individuals, iv) whether they are enhanced by stress or fatigue, 
and v) whether they can be suppressed through training. Further, we currently know little 
about how the brain resolves competition between systems supporting short-term and long-
term goals respectively, or put differently, why one system prevails on some trials but not 
others.  
Finally, in Chapter 6 I asked whether the mechanism by which the brain uses feedback to 
learn how to make optimal decisions in a given environment changes with experience. 
Laboratory-based experiments that probe learning and planning often utilize tasks in which 
the underlying structure -that is, the relationship between actions and their future 
trajectories - are entirely novel to the subject. Thus, the neural implementation of learning 
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in this context may represent a special case that is less commonly encountered in everyday 
life. To address this, I trained subjects on a value-guided decision-making task for 3 
consecutive days. The data were suggestive of a shift in the implementation of value-guided 
planning with training, from a more cumbersome, resource-dependant mechanism, to a 
more efficient and robust process that remained resistant to attentional load.  
While very few previous studies have explored the effects of task-experience on value-
guided choice, I believe the data speak as an important reminder that the brain is a dynamic 
machine, and that by reporting averaged data we are merely taking a snapshot of the 
underlying cognitive processes and could thus be overlooking important subtleties. 
Naturally, a vital follow-up will be to use neuroimaging techniques to identify the underlying 
changes in neural representations that occur with training. In addition, given these data, it 
may be important to determine whether equivalent changes in the neural architecture 
supporting value-guided choice occur outside of learning tasks. Even in experiments not 
designed to probe the effects of training, one could contrast fMRI activation maps obtained 
from the first and last session of a task (albeit at more liberal thresholds), and test a null 
hypothesis that no differences would be observed in a more explorative manner. Finally, a 
highly pertinent follow-up would be to determine whether similar training effects would 
generalize to other planning (model-based) tasks, as this may have implications for 
enhancing model-based reasoning in psychiatric disorders.  
7.2 Challenges in fMRI 
Although fMRI has become a widely used tool for understanding the association between 
brain activity and cognition, it is not without limitations. Whilst providing a detailed account 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis (for an excellent review see (Constable, 2012)), I outline 
some of the major and more general challenges.  
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Firstly, fMRI measures changes in cerebral blood flow (the BOLD signal) and is thus merely a 
correlative measure of neuronal activity. Here, the change in the MR signal from neuronal 
activity is called the hemodynamic response (HR) and lags the neuronal event triggering it by 
1-2 seconds, typically rising to a peak 5-6 seconds after event onset, and dropping back to 
baseline some 16-20 seconds later. During fMRI analysis, task-relevant cues are convolved 
with an HR function so as to capture the time-course of the BOLD response in the brain. 
Action potentials on the other hand, fire over the course of milliseconds. Since the BOLD 
response cannot capture detailed aspects of evoked responses or specific spike timings, it 
has poor temporal resolution. The relationship between neural activity and BOLD response 
is also a complex one. It is typically assumed that an increase or decrease in BOLD signal 
stems from an equivalent increase or decrease in the spiking of many task or stimulus-
specific neurons. While this may be true in many cases, it is also important to consider that 
cortical microcircuits consist of multiple interacting neuronal populations, each with a 
specific set of excitatory and inhibitory connections (Douglas & Martin, 2004). Thus, 
activation of a microcircuit sets in motion a sequence of excitation and inhibition in every 
neuron of the module, and the proportional changes in this excitation-inhibition will likely 
impact the haemodynamic response. In some cases, this can lead to an increase in BOLD 
response without a net excitatory increase in task-related cortical output (Logothetis, 2008).  
Further, as previously mentioned, fMRI is susceptible to multiple sources of unwanted noise. 
Consequently, fMRI studies require multiple repetitions of the same events to improve the 
signal-to-noise ratio. Common sources of noise include the scanner, random brain activity, 
and large blood vessels where blood flow is often highly variable due to factors of no interest. 
Other physiological sources include signal changes as a function of both the cardiac cycle and 
respiration pattern. Lastly, head movement by the subject is an invariable problem in fMRI 
experiments. Although one can attempt to rectify this using spatial realignment algorithms 
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(see Chapter 3, Pre-processing, p. 65), improved motion-correction methods and motion-
limiting devices are needed as the field moves towards higher spatial resolution imaging.  
In addition to the practical limitations of fMRI, it is important to also consider 
interpretational difficulties. A common phenomenon from electrophysiological studies that 
measure the activity of single neurons in non-human primates is that of opponent encoding 
schemes. Thought to be a fundamental feature of decision-making networks, opponent 
encoding describes the phenomenon that individual neurons within a given population 
frequently encode the same neural computation with opposing signs. For example, in the 
context of value-guided decision-making, a neuron in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) may 
increase its firing rate as the probability of reward goes up, whilst a neighbouring neuron 
may decrease its firing rate under the same conditions (Kennerley et al., 2009). Thus, 
averaging across the activity of these neurons within a given brain region may average away 
meaningful signals. A related issue is that spatially adjacent neurons may track distinct 
computations. Returning to the example of value-guided decision-making, neighbouring 
neurons in OFC may track the probability or the magnitude of an expected reward 
respectively. fMRI relies on voxel-based analyses, and typically hundreds of thousands of 
neurons are included in a single voxel. Thus, different groups of neurons may be activated 
by different tasks within a single voxel, making it difficult to distinguish different functional 
roles.  
Related to several of these concepts, significant attention has recently been given towards 
the notion that many neuroimaging experiments may be under-powered. Low statistical 
power not only reduces the chances of detecting true effects but also increase the chances 
of finding statistically significant effects that are in fact false positives. Recently, Button and 
colleagues used meta-analytic studies to estimate the ‘true’ power of a given effect, and then 
prospectively calculated the power of each individual study in the meta-analysis based on 
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the associated sample size (Button et al., 2013). The authors reported that the mean 
statistical power across 461 neuroimaging studies (from 41 separate meta-analyses 
published from 2006-2009) was as low as 8%. While other researchers claim this statistic may 
be inflated, it nevertheless highlights the need for increasingly efficient designs, sufficient 
numbers of subjects, a shift from univariate to multivariate methods, and (where possible) 
paradigms that allow for replications.  
7.3 Challenges in computational modelling  
Classical behavioural analyses rely on averaging data over a number of trials to achieve a 
reasonable statistical power with which to quantify a given metric of human performance, 
such as a reaction time, a preference for action A over action B, or the number of correctly 
executed choices. However, it is evident that the complexities of the human mind cannot be 
understood strictly though observing human behaviour. Computational models on the other 
hand, seek to address how human performance comes about. That is, they represent a 
description of the underlying representations, mechanisms and processes that result in 
cognition. By considering how (latent) variables in the environment influence behavioural 
responding on a trial-by-trial basis, computational models offer a much more fine-grained 
explanation of the processes underlying flexible decision-making.  
The use of model-based analyses is becoming increasingly popular in fMRI studies of value-
based learning and decision-making. Here, the goal is to capture key aspects of behaviour 
with a computational model, and then to investigate whether different components of the 
model are realized in the brain. Unlike subtraction analyses which merely report increases 
or decreases in the BOLD signal in one condition with respect to another, model-based fMRI 
analyses allow attribution of specific computational processes to the underlying neural 
activations. For example, this approach has been used to show that the ventral striatum 
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tracks prediction errors associated with temporal difference reinforcement learning 
(Rutledge, Dean, Caplin, & Glimcher, 2010), that the anterior cingulate cortex tracks the 
volatility of the environment during foraging (Behrens et al., 2007), and that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex supports model-based reasoning by encoding the underlying task structure 
(Glascher et al., 2010). Further, rather than exclusively trying to reason backwards from 
behaviour to the underlying processes, modelling affords the opportunity to simulate large 
amounts of data, to adjust small components of the model, and to observe how these 
changes influence the output of the model. This process can be extremely useful for 
generating new hypotheses, and for providing novel insights into the interpretation of real 
experimental data (Sun, 2008).  
Computational modelling faces a number of important challenges and limitations. For 
example, models often encompass a number of free parameters - variables that have to be 
set a certain value in order for the model to make practical predictions. Since it is assumed 
that these values can differ between individuals, parameters are often fit to each individuals’ 
choices (e.g. via maximum likelihood estimation), with the resulting parameters then being 
used to predict the neural data. Of course, this relies on a critical assumption that the 
behavioural and neural data are fitted accurately by the same parameters, which may not 
necessarily hold true. Further, many of the optimization (parameter-estimation) procedures 
(such as the Simplex method) are susceptible to converging on local minima that do not 
represent the true global minimum. This typically occurs when the error surface is not 
smooth but rather contains dimples, valleys or plateaus, compromising any meaningful 
interpretation of parameter values and obscuring the true power of the model 
(Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011). This latter problem can be somewhat alleviated by repeating 
the fitting procedure using multiple random starting values, or using population-level data 
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to constrain unreliable parameter estimates at the individual level (both of which are 
employed in this thesis).  
It is customary when performing computational modelling to not just consider the fit of a 
single model, but rather to compare the performance of a number of competing models. This 
raises an obvious question of how to specify which models to include in the set? Given a free 
choice from a wide range of models that are a priori possible, selected models should be 
informed by factors such as how successful they are at predicting performance in related 
tasks, although such data is not always available. Further, model comparison is only 
meaningful in the extent to which the models tested are plausible, yet falsifiable; in other 
words, that there are hypothetical outcomes, that if observed, would falsify a candidate 
model (Lewandowsky & Farrell, 2011). A further complication arises in the instance when 
more than one model does an equality effective job at explaining the data. For example, the 
striatal prediction error discussed above is in some cases similar to Shannon surprise 
(Shannon, 1948). This presents the danger that the result of a model comparison could 
represent a bias in a particular data set, as opposed to a true preference for one or the other 
algorithm. Thus the output of the comparison process warrants, in this case, a more general, 
as opposed to specific, conclusion about the type of algorithm implemented in the brain.  
A related issue is that at the behavioural level, model-based analyses often remain neutral 
about how, or even whether, some components of the model are realized in neural 
algorithms, or whether the implementation of a given model is biophysically plausible (Mars, 
Shea, Kolling, & Rushworth, 2012). Further, in the event that a clear winning model emerges, 
there is no guarantee that there does not exist a better model that was simply not conceived 
of by the experimenter. In fact, it has been argued that the number of factors influencing any 
given cognitive process are far too great to ever allow for a full specification of the “true” 
underlying model (Burnham & Anderson, 1998). Perhaps most clearly stated by MacCallum, 
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“Regardless of their form or function, or the area in which they are used, it is safe to say that 
these models all have one thing in common: They are all wrong” (MacCallum, 2003). Thus it 
is important that researchers remain aware of these limitations when drawing conclusions 
from their data.  
A final problem worth discussion is the issue of overfitting. In general, overfitting occurs 
when a model is excessively complex (owing to too many free parameters), such that it 
captures elements of the data that are likely driven by random error as opposed to the cause 
that is of interest. The potential for overfitting is common in the field of decision-making 
where data are inherently noisy. In our experiments, subjects typically have to perform 
multiple repetitions of the same trial type in which their response latency, attention span, 
alertness, and action selection will vary. The problem is illustrated in Figure 7.1 (taken from 
(Pitt & Myung, 2002)) (p. 190). Plotted on the y-axis is a measure of goodness-of-fit (such as 
root mean squared error (RMSE), or percentage error accounted for). A common occurrence 
is that goodness-of-fit will increase in tandem with model complexity (x-axis), but at the risk 
of fitting noise. The three graphs along the x-axis represent data points (dots) and the 
corresponding fits (solid lines), as model complexity increases. In the leftmost graph, the 
model is not complex enough to capture the data. In the second graph, the model and data 
are well matched, with model generalizability peaking at this point. Here, generalizability 
refers to the ability of the model to fit all data samples (such as those obtained from a 
different experimental cohort) generated by the same cognitive process, as opposed to just 
the current sample. In contrast, the rightmost graph is more complex than the data, and 
despite providing the best objective fit, is capturing elements of random error.  
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Figure 7.1 Tradeoff between goodness-of-fit and generalizability in cognitive modelling; 
taken from (Pitt & Myung, 2002). Increasing model complexity improves the objective model 
fit (y-axis), as a higher percentage of variance is accounted for. By contrast, whilst model 
generalizability initially follows the same trajectory, peaking when the complexity of the 
model and the data are well matched (middle graph on the x-axis), it declines with increasing 
complexity due to fitting of variance (noise) unrelated to the underlying cognitive process.  
Pitt and Myung further demonstrated the importance of overfitting using the principles of 
model recovery (Pitt & Myung, 2002). Here, the authors used a one-parameter model, Mx, 
to generate a sample of data, and added some sampling noise. Next, they fit the original 
model, Mx, to the data, in addition to a more complex model, My, which contained three 
parameters. The authors then asked whether the simulated data was fit best by Mx, the true 
model, or the competing alternative, My. To their surprise, Pitt and Myung found the data 
were better accommodated by the more complex model, as measured by RMSE, compared 
to the true underlying model. In this scenario, Mx and My were equally probable a priori, and 
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the simulation thus serves to demonstrate the potential dangers of overfitting. One can at 
least partially safeguard from these dangers but deriving measures of model fit that account 
for complexity (the number of free parameters), such as the Bayesian Information Criterion. 
However, Pitt and Muyng argue that a model’s data-fitting abilities are also affected by other 
properties of the model, such as its functional form, which are often too easily overlooked 
(Pitt & Myung, 2002).  
7.4 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, I combined economic paradigms with computational modelling (and 
neuroimaging) to draw conclusions about the cognitive and neural mechanisms that support 
adaptive economic choice. Behavioural, neural and computational data contribute 
differentially towards our understanding of individual components of decision-making. Yet, 
when combined, these divergent methodologies form a largely unified framework which 
speaks to the usefulness of this approach. I have extensively reviewed previous evidence that 
humans and other animals make choices by assigning ‘values’ to potential choice options 
which then compete for action selection. I then presented data in support of a framework 
where multiple interacting neural systems contribute to this valuation. In chapter 6, I focus 
on how the behavioural manifestation of these systems evolves with task training.  
In chapters 4 and 5, I show that one system, involving the striatum (and possibly 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is short-sighted and responds to basic and immediate 
outcomes. This system appears insensitive to context-dependent information and may 
contribute towards choices that are inconsistent with higher-order goals. On the other hand, 
a second system, likely involving the ventromedial and dorsal prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC/dPFC), is far-sighted and is associated with abstract or delayed outcomes and goals. 
One possibility is that dPFC modulates value representations within vmPFC, enacting 
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controlled choice. In this framework, an enhancement of the representation of long-term (or 
context-specific) value in vmPFC, and a suppression of a representation of short-term (or 
prepotent) value in striatum, may contribute to more controlled choice, while impulsive 
choice may arise from the reverse. Further, a finding that anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
modulates value representations in vmPFC in response to a change in environmental context 
(see Chapter 4) contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the precise role of this region in 
decision-making. In particular, while previous work proposes ACC signals a non-specific 
conflict signal (or Bayesian surprise) (Ide et al., 2013; Shenhav et al., 2013), my data suggests 
this interpretation could instead be re-framed as signalling a need to switch behaviour away 
from a default or prepotent action. Future work might expand on this idea by re-examining 
previous data in light of such a framework.  
Further experiments are also needed to elucidate exactly how these dual systems interact 
during choice, and why the representation of long-term value is disrupted in impulsive 
individuals. For example, one could use magnetoencephalography (MEG) to better 
characterize the temporal dynamics of value representation in vmPFC and striatum during 
decisions that require self-control. Imaging of deep or superficial structures using MEG is 
becoming increasingly feasible with more advanced signal processing techniques (Kanal, Sun, 
Ozkurt, Jia, & Sclabassi, 2009). Further, it is unclear whether long-term value computations 
in vmPFC can arise without a modulatory influence from dPFC. One could test this by 
disrupting dPFC function with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and assessing 
whether choice becomes increasingly impulsive.  
In chapter 6, I draw on a parallel dual-systems account of value-based decision-making in the 
context of reinforcement learning. In this framework, one system is thought to be model-
free (favourable actions are memorized and not flexibly updated with new information) and 
resource-independent, while the other system is thought to be model-based (flexibly 
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transforming new information through a model of the world) and resource-dependent (Daw 
et al., 2005). Although these systems are computationally distinct from those discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, it is likely that their implementation involves overlapping neural substrates 
and mechanisms. Here, I provide at least provisional evidence that the implementation of 
model-based choice changes as task familiarity increases, raising the possibility that model-
based reasoning becomes less reliant on executive resources over time. An alternative 
interpretation is that the model-free system is able to instigate increasingly complex 
heuristics that progressively resemble a model-based computation, perhaps by 
incorporating increasingly sophisticated models of the world. Given a mounting interest in 
model-free versus model-based decision-making, including a growing number of 
experiments utilizing tasks that dissociate both systems (Daw et al., 2011; S. W. Lee et al., 
2014; K. J. Miller et al., 2013; Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; Otto, Raio, et al., 2013; Skatova 
et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2013; Smittenaar et al., 2014; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, et al., 
2012), and evidence that model-based reasoning is disrupted in psychiatric disorders (Voon 
et al., 2014), the data I present provides strong incentive for follow-up experiments (perhaps 
using neuroimaging) with the aim of teasing apart these divergent mechanisms.  
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